FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-048
Monday
11 March 1996

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-048 CONTENTS *11 March 1996*

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Videnov Accepts Criticism at BSP Plenum *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: Government's Record at BSP Plenum Assessed *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: Konakchiev: Plenum Supported Government *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Bulgaria: Kostov Claims MVR Man Spied for Orion *[KONTINENT 7 Mar]* 1

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Daily Advocates Tougher Approach to Moscow *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 7 Mar]* 3
Czech Republic: Moravian National Party Splits *[Prague Radio]* 3
Czech Republic: CNB To Weaken Position on Interbank Market *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 4 Mar]* 3
Czech Republic: Chemical Uranium Extraction To End *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 7 Mar]* 4

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Commentary on Lessons Learned From EU Meeting *[NARODNA OBRODA 29 Feb]* 5
Slovakia: Repatriation of Ex-SFRY Refugees Set for Jun *[NARODNA OBRODA 7 Mar]* 5
Slovakia: Cabinet Approves Bill on New Territorial Division *[PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 6
Slovakia: Political Purpose of Territorial Division Viewed *[NARODNA OBRODA 7 Mar]* 6
Slovakia: Cabinet Debates Mochovce Financing Model *[NARODNA OBRODA 7 Mar]* 7

HUNGARY

Hungary: President Goncz on Progress Toward Europe *[Budapest Radio]* 8
Hungary: Military Intelligence Chief Views Tasks *[REFORM 5 Mar]* 8
Hungary: Union Leader on Strategies, Alliances *[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 13 Jan]* 10
Hungary: Survey Assesses Prejudices in Society *[MAGYAR NEMZET 1 Mar]* 12

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Izetbegovic Warns Against Settling Serbs in Brcko *[Sarajevo Radio]* 15
B-H: Muratovic Says Serbs Destroying Sarajevo Economy *[Sarajevo Radio]* 15
B-H: PM, U.S. Ambassador Discuss Foreign Soldier Issue *[Sarajevo Radio]* 15
B-H: Ganic Comments on Meeting With NATO Delegation *[Sarajevo Radio]* 15
B-H: Gen Delic, OSCE Envoy Hold Talks in Sarajevo *[Sarajevo Radio]* 16
B-H: Deputy Interior Minister Views Hadzici Police Issue *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 8 Mar]* 16
B-H: Federation President Examines Croat-Muslim Relations *[Zagreb Radio]* 17
B-H: Muslim-Croat Federation Disintegration Considered *[TANJUG]* 17
B-H: TANJUG Reports on Mojahedin Presence in Country 18
B-H: Koschnick To Leave Mostar 2 Apr; No Successor Yet *[AFP]* 18
B-H: Koschnick Reportedly To Run Mostar's Central District *[TANJUG]* 19
B-H: EU Official Comments on Croatian Demands in Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
B-H: Bosnian Presidency Member Visits Mostar *[Sarajevo TV]* 20
B-H: Croats Said To Demand Division of Central Mostar *[TANJUG]* 20
B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Chamber of Deputies Ends Session *[Zagreb Radio]* 21
B-H: Croats Protest Muslim Implementation of Dayton Accord *[Mostar Radio]* 21
B-H: Bosnian Croats Refuse Muslims' Return of Kulen-Vakuf *[Sarajevo Radio]* 22

B-H: Croats Request Control of Sarajevo Suburb Ilidza *[TANJUG]* 22
B-H: Gen Walker To Visit Ilidza To Calm Situation *[AFP]* 22
B-H: Mayor Appeals for Transport for Serbs Leaving Ilidza *[SRNA]* 23
B-H: IFOR Provides Escorts To Tackle Sarajevo Arson *[AFP]* 23
B-H: IFOR Says Karadzic Rally Attendance 'Exaggerated' *[AFP]* 23
B-H: Karadzic Threatens 'Heavy Losses' in Arrest Attempt *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 11 Mar]* 24
B-H: Karadzic: Bosnian Serbs Want Independent State *[SRNA]* 24
B-H: Serbs Torch Houses, Apartments in Sarajevo Suburbs *[Sarajevo Radio]* 24
B-H: IFOR Assails Media Over Images of Sarajevo Suburbs *[AFP]* 25
B-H: IFOR Disarms Serb Police After Civilian Assaulted *[Mostar Radio]* 25
B-H: Krajisnik, Smith End Talks on Burning, Looting *[Pale TV]* 26
B-H: Pejanovic Seeks More IFOR, International Police *[Sarajevo TV]* 26
B-H: Territorial Demarcation Carried Out in Sarajevo *[Banja Luka Radio]* 27
B-H: Serb PM, Yugoslav Officials View Cooperation *[SRNA]* 27
B-H: UK Troops on Alert for Alleged War Criminal Martic *[PRESS ASSOCIATION]* 27
B-H: Martic Denies Being War Criminal *[TANJUG]* 28

CROATIA

Croatia: Granic, Milutinovic Call Talks 'Constructive' *[AFP]* 29
Croatia: B-H Parliamentary Delegates, Tudjman Discuss Ties *[Sarajevo Radio]* 29
Croatia: Iranian Ambassador Views Aims, Ties to B-H *[GLOBUS 8 Mar]* 30
Croatia: Martic 'Unmoved' by Hague Indictment *[AFP]* 32
Croatia: Martic Rejects Authority of Hague Tribunal *[SRNA]* 32
Croatia: Lawyer Says Blaskic To Appear at Tribunal *[AFP]* 32
Croatia: Unions Start Petition for General Strike *[AFP]* 33
Croatia: President Tudjman Appoints New Press Secretary *[Zagreb TV]* 33

POLAND

Poland: Commentary on Chinese Maneuvers in Taiwan Strait *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 8 Mar]* 34
Poland: Government Lacks Funds for Battalion in Bosnia *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 7 Mar]* 34
Poland: Daily Reports Pope Refused To Meet Kwasniewski *[PAP]* 35
Poland: Envoy Denies Pope Refused To Meet Kwasniewski *[Warsaw Radio]* 35
Poland: President Kwasniewski Interviewed *[Warsaw Radio]* 35
Poland: Prime Minister Visits Police Headquarters *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 8 Mar]* 42
Poland: Skepticism About Changes at Interior Ministry *[TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA 15 Feb]* 42
Poland: MON Department Chief Dismissed for Arms Sales *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 8 Mar]* 43
Poland: Jaskiernia Heads Sejm Legislative Commission Again *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 8 Mar]* 44
Poland: President Makes SdRP Successor of PZPR Property *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 8 Mar]* 44
Poland: STP Leader Wants Good Relations With Russia *[Warsaw Radio]* 45
Poland: Prospects of Olszewski's Party Analyzed *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 7 Mar]* 45

ROMANIA

Romania: Ethnic Hungarians To Set Up Cultural Institutions *[ZIUA 4 Mar]* 47
Romania: Police Catch Serbs Smuggling Radioactive Osmium *[ADEVARUL 4 Mar]* 47

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: PM Drnovsek Discusses Foreign Policy With Press *[Ljubljana Radio]* 48
Slovenia: Italy Expects Cooperation on Genocide Charges *[Ljubljana Radio]* 48
Slovenia: Poll Shows No Major Changes in Party Popularity *[DELO 4 Mar]* 48
Slovenia: United List Becomes Leading Opposition Party *[VECER 27 Jan]* 49

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Belgrade Weekly on New Constitution Rumors *[NIN 9 Feb]* 50

FRY: Kontic on Normalization With Ex-SFRY Republics *[Belgrade Radio]* 53
FRY: Official on Normalizing Relations With Zagreb *[TANJUG]* 53
FRY: Foreign Minister Milutinovic Leaves for Croatia *[TANJUG]* 53
FRY: Possibilities for Cooperation With Moldova Viewed *[TANJUG]* 53
FRY: Lilic, Belarus Prime Minister Discuss Cooperation *[Belgrade Radio]* 54
FRY: Lilic Demands Equal Treatment for B-H Parties *[Belgrade Radio]* 54
FRY: Serbian Bishop Urges Serbs To Return to W. Bosnia *[TANJUG]* 55
FRY: Economic Delegation To Visit Bosnian Serb Republic *[SRNA]* 55

Serbia

Serbia: DS Warns of Authorities' Plans To Disrupt Rally *[NASA BORBA 8 Mar]* 56
Serbia: Authorities' Bid To Disrupt 9 Mar Rally Reported *[NASA BORBA 8 Mar]* 56
Serbia: Further on Campaign To Minimize Belgrade Rally *[NASA BORBA 8 Mar]* 56
Serbia: TANJUG Reports 'Several Thousand' Attend Rally 57
Serbia: AFP: Belgrade Rally Draws 'Around 10,000' 57
Serbia: SRNA: 'Several Tens of Thousands' at Rally 58
Serbia: Rally Organizers Disappointed With Low Turnout *[Belgrade Radio]* 58
Serbia: Draskovic Blames Milosevic Regime for War *[FONET]* 58
Serbia: DS Leader Says 'No Future' With Milosevic *[FONET]* 59
Serbia: Communist Leader Calls For SPS-JUL Coalition *[NASA BORBA 6 Mar]* 59

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serb Violence in Kacanik, Urosevac Reported *[KOSOVO DAILY REPORT]* 59

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Efforts Toward Vojvodina Autonomy Reported *[Budapest Radio]* 60

Bulgaria: Videnov Accepts Criticism at BSP Plenum

AU1003165896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The main tasks facing the Left this year are to win the presidential elections, preserve financial stability in the country, and utilize Bulgaria's great geopolitical advantages to defend the country's statehood. This is what Zhan Videnov stressed in his report to today's plenum of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] in Sofia. He said that the Left had established that the main problems are the resistance offered on the part of the president and the judiciary and the difficult interrelations between the party and capital.

In his report, the BSP leader, Zhan Videnov, agreed with the criticisms that industry has not been restructured. He also agreed with his critics that priority must indisputably be given to the continuing crisis in agriculture and to financial stability, which is not yet fully guaranteed. However, the report noted that real social peace has been achieved, the chaos in state administration is lessening, and local government has been consolidated. In foreign policy, the Left has succeeded in defending Bulgaria's place as a crossroads meeting point for new partnerships, towards both the East and the West.

Bulgaria: Government's Record at BSP Plenum Assessed

AU1003185396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 10 Mar 96

[Report by Lili Yancheva on the expanded session of the Supreme Council of the BSP and the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The main report to the plenum was delivered by the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] leader, Zhan Videnov. The chief issues that Videnov covered were the results of the BSP's year in government, the difficulties and criticisms that the government faces, and the tasks lying ahead this year. Videnov acknowledged as correct the criticisms that industry has not been restructured, agriculture has not emerged from its state of crisis, and full financial stability has not been guaranteed. He also admitted that relations have not yet been settled with the international financial institutions and that no substantial foreign investments have been attracted. However, according to Videnov's report, real social peace has been achieved, successes can be claimed in foreign trade and foreign policy relations, and the local government has been consolidated.

The main tasks that the BSP and the government face this year, Videnov said, are to win the presidential elections, preserve financial stability, and defend the country's statehood.

Positive assessments of the Left's year in government predominated in the speeches made by leaders of parties in the Democratic Left coalition, namely Svetoslav Shivarov [Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] and Stefan Gaytandzhiev [Ecoglasnost Political Club]. Some speeches made at the plenum were purely (?political), while others were more specific in the subjects addressed. Aleksandur Lilov, for example, said in his statement that the BSP must make a sober assessment of last year and make changes where necessary in the government's team. Chavdar Kyuranov, leader of the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] in the BSP, said that in the view of the OSD, the plenum had completed its work. I have some doubts about the merging of the party with the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Andrey Lukanov told me, but I will announce my views in a few days. Mr. Lukanov told me this after making his speech inside the hall, although I cannot tell our listeners exactly what Mr. Lukanov said because the plenum is being held behind closed doors.

Bulgaria: Konakchiev: Plenum Supported Government

AU1103110396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 11 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In Sofia this morning, Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev said that the main result of yesterday's BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] plenum is that the government received the support it needed, which enables it to carry on with its present policies. Apart from this, Konakchiev pointed out the coincidence in the assessments and ideas put forward by the three political parties that form the Democratic Left coalition, as well as the fact that the plenum debates were constructive and conclusions were reached from them.

Bulgaria: Kostov Claims MVR Man Spied for Orion

AU1103125996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Malina Angareva: "Interior Ministry Secretary Reportedly Gathered Intelligence for Zhan Videnov for Orion's Benefit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Paraskev Paraskevov, a secretary in the Interior Ministry, is the head of Zhan Videnov's personal intelligence service, Ivan Kostov declared at a news conference held after the majority in the Bulgarian Parliament had rejected the proposal of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] to set

Czech Republic: Daily Advocates Tougher Approach to Moscow

AU1003181796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Mar 96 p 12

[Commentary by Lubos Palata: "Passivity Toward Moscow Will Not Help"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech diplomacy toward Russia is woefully passive and unimaginative. Josef Zieleniec came back from Moscow satisfied, despite the fact that he had merely reiterated to Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov that we want to join NATO and had received the anticipated negative response. Primakov's lip service to the possibility of Prague's joining the alliance's political structures does not alter this.

Then yesterday the head of Czech diplomacy announced with pomp the Prague meeting involving the foreign ministers of the 12 states that want to join NATO and U.S. Secretary of State Christopher. If, however, the meeting is not to be a 12-fold waste of time, it is necessary for it to be something more than a mere monologue by the U.S. representative accompanied by the applause of his listeners.

The Czech Republic, as the host country, should lead by example and put forward the idea of an accommodating step toward Russia's demands for the creation of a Pan-European security system. Namely, the West is listening to this idea, and, if we restrict ourselves to the stereotypical claim that this is nonfunctional and dangerous nonsense, the West will take this step without us. It is in our interest to act in this regard so that this "proffered finger" does not push back the alliance's enlargement and NATO's capability for action altogether. The model that offers itself is Russia's participation in the IFOR [Implementation Force] corps in Bosnia, which corresponds to Moscow's status and, at the same time, does not limit the operation of the international forces.

It would be expedient if, at the meeting with Christopher, at least some of the countries put forward their views jointly. We should harmonize our points of view with those of the Poles at least. This would at last be a kind of outcome to the hectic contacts we have been witnessing recently between Prague and Warsaw.

The situation in Russia today looks as dismal as the state of our diplomacy toward this power. An active approach to Moscow may seem like an unnecessary waste of effort. It is, however, a waste to go to Russia merely with the repeat proclamation that we will enter NATO no matter what they say in the Kremlin—even if Josef Zieleniec saves on government aircraft and, as on this occasion, flies on a normal flight.

Czech Republic: Moravian National Party Splits

LD0903173196 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Moravian National Party split today, and one of its factions merged with the Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia. The announcement was made during today's congress of this new faction, called [Faction] for Moravian National Unification [Za Moravske Narodne Sjednoceni, ZMNS], by its representatives Deputies Jiri Bily and Petr Kavan.

Czech Republic: CNB To Weaken Position on Interbank Market

AU0803135596 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by "jas, juf": "The CNB Will Not Prevent Greater Fluctuation of the Koruna on the Interbank Market"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Czech National Bank [CNB] expects to utilize the entire fluctuation band of the koruna exchange rate in the future, CNB Governor Josef Tossovsky said after a session of the Parliament Banking Commission. He said it in the context of the CNB's resorting to interventions at the end of last week, although the greatest deviation so far from the currency-basket parity has been only 2.6 percent. At the same time, the maximum deviation possible is plus/minus 7.5 percent.

At present, the CNB wants to play a stabilizing role. Therefore, it sets a narrower internal band for the fluctuation of the rate, and, if the koruna moves out of it, the bank will intervene, Tosovsky said. The government spent $0.5 billion from its foreign currency reserves on Wednesday and Thursday of last week on intervention measures in favor of the koruna exchange rate following the expansion of its fluctuation band. The central bank expects stabilization on the interbank market this week.

The governor said further that, for the future development of the Czech foreign-currency market, the central bank intends to open the bank foreign currency positions more (the difference between the volumes of assets and liabilities in foreign currency at any given moment). At present, it is given by individual convertible currencies as 15 percent of the bank capital. Opening the positions will result in more foreign currency remaining in the banking sector, so, if the banks sufficiently exploit this situation, the current dominant position of the CNB on the interbank market will weaken.

At the end of the week, the rate of the koruna stabilized, it weakened on the interbank market by only 0.3 percent against the currency-basket parity. As Petr Tomek, head of dealing at the Zivnostenska Banka, told HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, foreign investors, in general, and the large investment funds from the United States, in particular, are interested in long-term purchases of the koruna. This means that they believe in the long-term stability of the Czech currency. The crisis that occurred on the interbank market after the announcement of the new fluctuation band can be explained, according to him, by the general mistrust in the so-called developing markets (e.g., Poland, the Republic of South Africa), where many investors lost their funds in the past.

Czech Republic: Chemical Uranium Extraction To End

AU1003181296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by "(nak)": "The Government Has Declared an End to Uranium Extraction in Straz pod Ralskem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The government decided yesterday that, by 1 April, it will declare an end to the chemical extraction of uranium in Straz pod Ralskem.

"We have agreed that it is necessary to announce the windup of chemical extraction immediately and that it is essential to begin eradicating its consequences," said Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus yesterday.

According to him, bringing an end to uranium extraction is a difficult problem that has been bothering the government for some time. "The grave ecological problems are a consequence of the decisions that were made in the first half of the 1960's. The windup phase of extraction will indeed be very costly," said Klaus.

The prime minister pointed out that the termination of uranium extraction will be long-term and very expensive. The preparatory work will commence this year and will continue in 1997, when a definitive decision will be made on the option for and the means of finally resolving the entire issue.

Slovakia: Commentary on Lessons Learned From EU Meeting

AU1003203996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 29 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "Bitter Lessons From Brussels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks between the European Union Association Council and the Slovak Republic (AC EU-SR) vividly, and at the same time drastically, showed for the first time what awaits the membership-hopeful countries if they join this exclusive club. The Union representatives let the candidate know very clearly what is expected from him in the political and economical spheres. Although the talks were—at least according to the head of the Slovak diplomacy—matter of fact and relaxed, what the EU Commission tabled should not leave anyone in Slovakia relaxed and satisfied.

Regarding domestic political development in Slovakia, the Union declared what its two demarches already contained. This, despite concealing it in the final statement under the euphemistic formulation: to improve the work of the democratic institutions. Similarly euphemistically also expressed was the expectation that the National Council of the Slovak Republic will finally ratify the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty at its March session.

Nevertheless, the focal point of the AC EU-SR was economic and political issues, which clearly shows that the Union firmly insists on Bratislava's implementation of the conditions and obligations from the so-called Association Agreement. It was not exactly little what swamped the Slovak delegation.

The uncompromisingly stated demand to remove the import surcharge by the end of June, to liberalize electricity prices, and, least expected, the firmly stated demand to close the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant because it does not meet international safety standards revealed the main direction of the blow. Thus, the demands were a smash hit to the Slovak side of the negotiation table for the removal of all the protectionist measures adopted with the objective to, on the one hand, improve the (recent) catastrophic balance of payments and, on the other, support the competitiveness of the large manufacturers and exporters by maintaining the electricity price by means of state subsidies.

This form of protectionism is fashionable neither in the EU nor in the World Trade Organization because it contradicts the adopted principles of free trade.

The Slovak reaction was very weak, because with respect to the surplus in foreign trade and the amount of foreign currency reserves, the government should have if not completely canceled then at least reduced the import surcharge a long time ago. To refer here to similar measures by neighboring countries is not tactical, although it may result in certain pressure in the sense of a common interest to reach an acceptable compromise. In the interest of Slovakia—not only the protection of its exporters—the government should quickly meet the EU at least half way and publicly announce a schedule for the withdrawal of the antiliberal measures. The conceivable sanctions resulting from the adopted documents could have a much more serious effect on the domestic economy.

All this requires clear political decisions, giving up both the populist policy and burying one's head in the sand. True, under the condition that we will play according to the agreed upon rules of the game. Otherwise, it will be necessary to clearly state that we have decided to follow another path.

Slovakia: Repatriation of Ex-SFRY Refugees Set for Jun

AU0803163096 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by Alica Cincarova: "Refugees Will Be Repatriated From Slovakia by End of June"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The organized repatriation of people who had fled from the war conflict in the Balkans will start in two weeks. The Slovak Republic has provided them with temporary shelter and the status of so-called departed persons [odidenci] since 1993. As of the end of January 1996, 316 refugees were staying in humanitarian centers in Slovakia, 51 of whom refuse to return and 72 have not yet decided (They will be able to stay on the territory of the Slovak Republic only if they are granted the refugee status or as foreign nationals with temporary or long-term residence).

The organized repatriation of persons who had fled from former Yugoslavia will be carried out in several waves. The first group will return to Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid-March, the next groups in April and May. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Slovakia and the Slovak Red Cross (SCK) are organizing a humanitarian collection (account number 115-61638-11/0200 with VUB [General Credit Bank] Bratislava) to facilitate the start of the repatriates' new life at home.

Slovakia: Cabinet Approves Bill on New Territorial Division

AU0803162496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Mar 96 p 1

[Report by "ns": "Government Approved Eight Regions and 74 Districts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The government yesterday approved the bill on new territorial and administrative arrangement. Following its passage at the March meeting of Parliament, Slovakia will be divided into eight regions and 74 districts. Until now there have been four regions and 38 districts. According to Pavol Kacic, state secretary at the Ministry of Interior, the government approved only one major change to the submitted draft—Gelnica will become district capital instead of Krompachy. Despite a protest rally by representatives of Nova Bana yesterday, the government did not change its original decision to make Zarnovica capital of the district.

According to Pavol Kacic, the costs associated with the new territorial and administrative arrangement will amount to roughly 1 billion korunas [Sk] this year and to around Sk3 billion next year. As he said, the financial sum required will to a considerable degree depend on the approach by the new district capitals toward the placement of state administration offices, mainly on the new districts' readiness to make available buildings at the symbolic price of Sk1. Pavol Kacic expects that, eventually, the reform will bring about an overall reduction of state administration staff, compared with the status quo. The transfer of jurisdiction from central state administration bodies toward self-administration bodies will be addressed in a separate law, according to Kacic, which the government should discuss in May. Kacic conceded that the new territorial and administrative arrangement would require an amendment to the electoral law.

[On the same day, on pages 1 and 2, under the headline: "Nova Bana Residents: We Do Not Want Zarnovica," Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak carries a 300-word report by Jozefina Kassova on a rally staged by "almost 300" Nova Bana residents in front of the Government Office on 5 March "to express disagreement with the decision of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Presidium, which, at its meeting on 24 February, decided to change the originally proposed seat of the district." According to one of the protesters interviewed by the PRAVDA correspondent, "Zarnovica does not live up to Nova Bana" in infrastructure, economic potential, and size and the only reason it was chosen as district capital is that "Meciar went to high school there."]

Slovakia: Political Purpose of Territorial Division Viewed

AU0803162796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Jan Fule: "New Territorial and Administrative Arrangement as Key to Future Electoral Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to public opinion polls, the majority of citizens of Slovakia are satisfied with the present territorial and administrative arrangement. The government is trying to increase the number of those satisfied. It seems that it will be successful even in the case of Nova Bana [whose residents staged a demonstration in front of the Government Office on 5 March to protest the government bill]. Even if the city does not become the district capital, at least the district office chairman sitting in Zarnovica [chosen by the government as district capital in lieu of Nova Bana] will be from Nova Bana....

The loud jubilation of those euphoric over the creation of new district capitals and the weakening grumbling of failed candidates and of the Association of Towns and Villages have drowned out the purpose, as well as the cost, of this great migration. The cost is being shrouded in secrecy and we will probably never find out about it. The purpose is satisfaction. A satisfied voter knows how to show his gratitude—by means of his vote. Of course, it will be necessary to help him.

It will take years before all future 74 districts will have everything required of the seats of districts. Before this happens, we will surely experience an attempt to amend the electoral law. Even Pavol Kacic, state secretary at the Ministry of Interior, admitted this at the news conference after Tuesday's cabinet meeting.

Why will this amendment be necessary, and which direction could it take?

Our electoral system, given the present long-term correlation of forces, does not allow the election winner to govern with constitutional majority and without coalition support. There exist two possibilities. The first is to try to pursue the path of Slovakia as a single constituency. Each party would field a single slate of candidates, instead of four (for Bratislava, West Slovakia, Central Slovakia, and East Slovakia) as in previous parliamentary elections. In each corner of the country, the slate of candidates would be topped by the party's leader. In view of the declining popularity of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in large cities, however, the prospect of winning a constitutional majority is uncertain. The second possibility is therefore more likely. Slovakia will be divided not only into 74 districts, but also into 74 constituencies. The winner of the "district elections" will qualify for Parliament according to the majority system and the runner-up according to the proportional system. In this way it will be possible, thanks to the new territorial and administrative arrangement, to obtain constitutional majority even with the present correlation of forces. Only two vacant seats would remain. Most probably, these would have to be guaranteed by law for deputies of Hungarian political parties and movements (similarly as is the case in Hungary in relation to the Slovak minority), whose chances would otherwise be minimal.

Of course, a constitutional majority is required to approve an amendment to the electoral law. And such an amendment would be extremely unfavorable for the two small coalition partners as well. Yet they might support this amendment if the HZDS promises them an electoral coalition. The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], too, is very strong in some of the new districts. It may be worth the effort for the SDL to come to an agreement with the HZDS that, in these districts, it will not field any strong countercandidates. The possibility that the SDL will simply like the law amendment cannot be ruled out either.

For a while to come, citizens really may have the feeling that, thanks to the new territorial and administrative arrangement, they will be closer to "their" affairs. In reality, however, politicians only took a step to be closer to their goal.

Slovakia: Cabinet Debates Mochovce Financing Model

AU0803163596 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by CTK: "Contracts on Completing Two Mochovce Units To Be Ready by End of March"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The projected deadline for preparing the conclusion of contracts with participants in the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant is 30 March 1996. This transpires from a press release by Alena Melicharkova, spokeswoman for Slovenske Elektrarne [Slovak Power Plants, SE], drafted on the model for financing the completion of the first two units of the power plant, which the Slovak Government acknowledged at its meeting on Tuesday [5 March]. The document is confidential and will not be made available to the press. The contract with the French EdF [Electricite de France] company on technical assistance in the first stage of the completion of Mochovce has already been signed. The SE's contractual relations with Skoda Prague, Hydrostav Bratislava, Energoprojekt Prague, EUCOMP [expansion unknown], and Russian organizations are about to be finalized. The model for financing the project comprises [Czech] Komercni Banka [Commercial Bank], Ceska Sporitelna [Czech Savings Bank], and a government credit from the Russian Federation. EUCOMP's supplier export credits and the remainder are being dealt with in conjunction with measures related to the SE's income situation, the SE press release states.

[Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak on 7 March on page 2 carries a 200-word TASR report on a meeting of the parliamentary environmental committee in Bratislava on 6 March, which discussed a Slovak Ministry of Economy "conceptual document entitled Nuclear Power in Slovakia—Present State and Development Prospects." The TASR report states: "Regarding the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant, the document states that the most advantageous option is the completion of the first two units because it is 28 percent cheaper than the alternative of a steam-gas power plant. According to the approved project, there should be an interval of at least nine months between the completion of the two units. The completion will require [investment of] at least 26.741 billion Slovak korunas until the year 1999."]

Hungary: President Goncz on Progress Toward Europe

LD0903141196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In an interview with Kossuth Radio, the president has stressed the importance and increasing role of social organizations. Arpad Goncz said that the role of the president had changed, today it was of social rather than political character. He noted that the state's role was rapidly decreasing but the society was not yet strong enough to take over all the tasks from the state. On his trips to the provinces, he sees examples of ways to correct mistakes in the state's operation on local level. Hungary is in a transitional stage, but it is progressing towards the European organizations and this process can not be stopped or reversed, Arpad Goencz stressed. Andrea Keleti reports [Keleti] In contrast with the past, which we cannot understand, the future is shrouded in mist. The only certain thing is that Hungary is progressing towards European integration irreversibly, Arpad Goncz said.

[Begin Goencz recording] We will gain one thing, namely that, if all goes well, we will be able to unite our forces with those of Europe, from which both we and Europe will benefit economically and, I hope from the bottom of my heart, culturally, too, because we have some traditions from the old Europe.[end recording]

[Keleti] The pessimism dominating [the domestic] public mood is not present in foreign views on Hungary. Today investors are the most interested in Hungary among the countries of East-Central Europe, and the country's production indicators are by far the best in the region, Arpad Goncz said.

[Begin Goncz recording] Never before has it been so pleasant to be Hungarian. Hungary is judged on the basis of its achievements. Obviously, Hungary's domestic pessimism has no effect abroad. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Hungary: Military Intelligence Chief Views Tasks

AU1103133896 Budapest REFORM in Hungarian 5 Mar 96 pp 22-23

[Interview with General Laszlo Botz, head of the Military Intelligence Office, by Janos Kecskes Szekely; place and date not given: "We Are Quasi-NATO Members...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some kind of sober mysticism surrounds the secret services. However, General Laszlo Botz, head of the Military Intelligence Office [KFH], resembles more of a charming world traveler than a mysterious intelligence agent.

[Szekely] Your career is almost a symbol of the changes of the past years. You have been a military attache in several Western countries, the previous government accredited you to NATO, and you were called back from there to the KFH. This story is probably not unique, but there might not be another example of someone becoming an honorary citizen of a former target country's city. Please tell us how it happened.

[Botz] When, in the 1980's, I was a military attache in Italy, although the issue of representing the Hungarians and fostering the memory of Hungarian soldiers was not among my tasks, I took it on. Especially because I discovered a chapel in the cemetery of a Sicilian town which had been raised in memory of the Hungarian prisoners of war from World War I who died on the island. During the joint work in connection with the chapel's restoration, the idea came to set up a museum in a barracks of the camp of the former prisoners of war, showing bilateral military links. This was inaugurated in December 1995, and I was given honorary citizenship of the town of Vittoria on this occasion. As a matter of fact, Comiso, where NATO's cruise missiles [szarnyas raketa] were to be placed at the time, was in the immediate neighborhood. It is indeed symbolic that I was accommodated at this base because, at the time, it had been my task to find information on this place.

[Szekely] I requested this interview before your departure, in November. At that time, according to the BBC's analysis, the Croatian attack on eastern Slavonia was imminent. You did not find this probable but asked us to wait until the end of the Dayton talks because much could change after that. You were right, the Croatians did not attack and "peace broke out." Has the KFH always given accurate assessments to the politicians or has luck also helped you?

[Botz] Luck cannot be excluded, but we are here to serve the process of political decisionmaking in the most efficient way possible. In November, it was not difficult to make forecasts because, in certain situations, in addition to what the intentions of a country or a smaller group are, it also matters if it can "fit itself and its intentions" into a wider environment. At this time, we could already see the intention of the Yugoslav successor states to "fit in." The Slovenes were the first, but the Croatians have also shown signs of adjusting to the "European line." Although the danger of conflict could not be excluded then, either, because the situation was extremely tense, the opposing politicians concluded that they had to put a stop to the events at some point. Naturally, many other factors also influenced the events.

For example, it could also be expected that the military maneuvers would be stopped as the winter set in.

[Szekely] Did you perhaps also know that the winter would be so tough?

[Botz] Even we did not know this. Of course, it would be self-conceited to claim that we always manage to gather enough information to be able to put down a 100-percent correct prognosis for the leadership. Success has many components. One of them is "the most terrible military tool," namely money, but luck also plays a role.

[Szekely] However, the situation has changed a lot since then, and our soldiers are also participating in the activities of the Implementation Force [IFOR]. Remembering the massacre of the 40,000 Vojvodina Hungarians out of revenge at the time, do you know what reaction can be expected from the Serbs if Hungarians happen to shoot Serbs in a skirmish?

[Botz] We have not before dealt with similar issues so it is expedient for us to follow the policy of the participating major countries. This corresponds to the attitude we also consider humane, namely we have to pay special attention to the protection of personnel. It is no accident that the deployment of the U.S. soldiers was also preceded by big debates. All IFOR countries tried to assess if a conflict which would affect their own contingent could happen, and what response they would have to give to it. We also tried to assess, although not model, it.

[Szekely] Our situation is different from theirs because of the hundreds of thousands of Hungarians living there. They are in a hostage situation; therefore, the Hungarians are taking the biggest risk. Have you gathered any information on whether certain extremist Serbian groups would act against the local Hungarians in a given situation?

[Botz] I would not go into this to such a depth. We have thought about this too, but in my view the situation cannot deteriorate to such an extent. Even there, matters are not settled the same way now as they used to be 50 years ago. This is the reason I do not consider the situation of the Vojvodina Hungarians to be dangerous.

[Szekely] I wish you were right. In the past, one could read a lot about the Pakistani-Indian border situation or African arms smuggling in your reports. According to the law on the secret services, the KFH operates abroad. However, what does this abroad mean now? Are Third World events still so important or has the target changed?

[Botz] The office and all its predecessors worked abroad. Fortunately, the law precisely defines our tasks. At the beginning of the list, we can read: "It acts in defense of the Hungarian Republic's interests." We have to remember here that Hungary does not have an enemy image. Therefore, target countries, what the NATO countries used to be, do not now exist. Instead, we are paying attention to certain crisis areas. We watch all issues and areas which can influence Hungary's and our region's security from a military political point of view. As our human and financial resources are limited, we also have to set priorities. We concentrate our biggest force on the possible direct sources of danger. For us, the south Slav crisis is still the major danger, but we are already trying to analyze where the next crisis also affecting Hungary can emerge. For example, it is to be seen if the Chechen-Russian crisis can spread in the region in such a way as also to affect us. Unfortunately, we do not have as much money as some [illegible] countries do for the preliminary analysis of this issue.

[Szekely] What percentage of the staff has been replaced at your office in recent years?

[Botz] Fluctuation, or that people had to be replaced because of the change of the regime has not been typical. We did not have a political cleanup because it was not necessary. Unfortunately, people tend to leave this profession—and here there is some connection with the events of the past six years—because we cannot pay as much to our highly qualified experts as civilian private companies can.

[Szekely] Most of our soldiers were trained in Moscow just like the officers of the other socialist countries. Can it cause a problem if someone now recognizes his former classmate, for example, as a businessman abroad?

[Botz] I would like to correct this because, rather than in the Soviet Union, Hungarian officers normally learned intelligence in Hungary. We work according to our own methods. I would not exclude your premise because we did have courses in the Soviet Union but this was not typical. For a short time, I also had the chance to gain an insight into the work there. It was possible to draw interesting conclusions, but this does not mean that we followed or copied their methods. It was never in fashion for the military intelligence agents of the various countries to know everything about each other.

[Szekely] Russia can still have a large influence on our fate because it opposes our admission to NATO. For example, Primakov, the new foreign minister, recently said that this would also threaten them because nuclear weapons would be stationed in Hungary. From a military point of view, would there be any point in doing this?

[Botz] NATO does not at all need to have nuclear weapons in Hungary. Everyone can now have experience—from the catastrophes, if nothing else—of the destruction caused by a nuclear explosion and what dangers the use of nuclear weapons carry. Their use should not be imagined in such a way that we send a nuclear warhead here and there and this solves the problem. At the time, I also learned at the academy that nuclear weapons could be used even in case of a clash of minor tactical units. Today this is impossible to think of. And strategic-level clashes do not require a blow to be dealt at the enemy at close quarters.

[Szekely] Both in the United States and in Russia, presidential elections will soon be held; therefore, our integration will become the subject of domestic political battles. In your view, to what extent will this influence our potential NATO membership?

[Botz] These events can influence the time of the concrete admission or even the process leading to it, but I am convinced that Hungary has formed such relations with NATO in recent years—which was even confirmed by our role in forwarding the IFOR forces to Bosnia—that it is now a quasi-NATO member. We look upon the membership in such a way that it is not directed against anyone because, rather than mainly for our security, we need to integrate ourselves because this would make the "whole Europe" structure complete. The emphasis is on economic and political integration, rather than on membership in the military organization. After the use of Taszar, many people think that we can join because our territory has become strategically important, but I would remind people that the situation now is different from what it used to be when, for example, the territory of Spain was needed in particular. We can become a member of the changed NATO because the security situation of the whole region has evolved in such a way that we cannot stay out of it. We have to work on this actively because we have to form the new European security system together. Because of this trend, Russia will also have to realize that it has to give up the myth of being threatened and it at last will also have to give up always blaming others for its domestic problems.

Hungary: Union Leader on Strategies, Alliances

96CH0029A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 13 Jan 96 pp 49-50

[Interview with Janos Borsik, Railroad Engineers Union leader, by Maria Mink; place and date not given: "Janos Borsik, Railroad Engineers Trade Union Leader, Responds: 'Like Its Predecessor, This Government Does Not Care About Trade Unions, Either'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On 1 January railroad engineers did not stop the trains after all, the mere threat of a strike sufficed to fulfill their demand for increased wages. Janos Borsik (age 49), managing vice president of the Railroad Engineers Trade Union, acknowledges that in this instance the prospect of work stoppage divided most railroad workers. Notwithstanding disputes, railroad engineers are the ones who adhere to traditional trade union values in Hungary, Borsik claims.*

[Mink] Has there ever been a question about the final outcome of the latest negotiations with MAV [Hungarian State Railroads] leadership? So far, your argument—if the trains stop running, the entire country becomes paralyzed—has been effective in virtually every instance. This was the tenth labor action in the history of strikes involving MAV since 1989; not counting the 1991 solidarity demonstration with MSZOSZ [National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions], negotiations were always concluded to the satisfaction of railroad workers.

[Borsik] The conditions we established for negotiations would have resulted in an almost 50-percent increase in earnings, and we also included the introduction of a few new benefits, such as supplemental pay for railroad engineers and extraordinary paid leave. Despite our prior record of successful negotiations, the supplemental pay and the extraordinary paid leave demands made the consummation of an agreement risky, and could easily have led to conflict.

[Mink] But you won again. Would you not say that the railroad engineers' wage demands were excessive? Their average gross earnings of 52,000 forints [Ft] last year were well above the national average, which barely exceeded Ft36,000.

[Borsik] We set the bar high by demanding a 50-percent base wage increase; we did so as a matter of negotiating technique because we knew that we would have to lower our demand. Other than that, it has been the eternal dilemma of groups best positioned to enforce their interests—such as bus drivers, pilots, and railroad engineers—whether to accept offers: they are helpless if the rest of the groups do not to stand up for their own interests; in that case, they should do nothing in their own interest. Thus, the question could be reversed, but including this consideration, I do not believe that we abused our situation. The average earnings of railroad engineers are not unusually high, we did not seek unjustified increases. Not even within the railroad workers' trade do we see an inordinate disparity as a result of the 27-28 percent-increase in earnings that we achieved.

[Mink] Even among railroad workers the word is that "the horse ran amok" as a result of the railroad engineers' action. It has been alleged that even before the wage negotiations began you encouraged your membership by saying: "Well, boys, tell us how much your wages should be, and that's how much they are going to be."

[Borsik] This is not true the way you put it. Quite naturally, before we began to negotiate we asked our members whether they agreed with the demands stated, and the membership unanimously encouraged us to act forcefully and consistently in the course of negotiations.

[Mink] Nevertheless, there must have been some in-house opposition to the railroad engineers, because VSZ, the Railroad Workers Union, the largest of the three railroad workers unions, did not join your call for strike. Why didn't they pledge solidarity to you?

[Borsik] There were two reasons for this, in my view. One was based on a technical mistake. The VSZ did not properly assess the chances for successful negotiations and yielded at the end of negotiations, at a time when it should not have yielded. MOSZ, the Railroad Engineers Trade Union, and the Free Trade Union of Railroad Workers, the VDSZSZ, won further concessions after 20 December, the day when the VSZ announced that it would accept MAV's offer. At that point in time, negotiations stood at an average base wage increase of 19.5 percent; subsequently this figure changed to 20.33 percent for all railroad workers. The other reason why VSZ stayed away could have been a fear of fiasco. Only one-fourth, at most one-third of the VSZ membership, joined the call for a strike last March, as compared to 95 percent of the railroad engineers. Even in earlier days, the VSZ membership has been unable to independently organize strike actions; undeniably, this creates tension between the railroad engineers and the other two trade unions. We believe that MOSZ is best suited to strike, it is the best organized group at the MAV, and this, of course, is disputed by the rest. I always recommend to them to test this course of action and to prove that they are capable of pursuing independent action.

[Mink] Could it be that your separate demands and separate agreements divided the railroad workers? In response to the 5-percent railroad engineers' supplement you forced out in addition to the 20.33-percent base wage increase, some workers were rather direct in asserting that the supplement had sanctioned a caste system among railroad workers.

[Borsik] Having a caste system is out of question. Doubtless, the income of railroad engineers is higher than that of the rest of railroad workers, but I do not see this as an injustice crying out to heaven. The situation is the same in West Europe, but aside from that, I am no advocate of pseudo-egalitarianism, because this conjures up some bad memories in me. Having said that, I acknowledge the fact that the mere mention of supplemental pay for railroad engineers took the rest of them aback. The separate demands—which I would prefer to call independent demands—had more than just negative effects insofar as they were concerned. The agreement with MAV provides that corporate finances permitting, MAV would also pay performance awards to other railroad workers in December. The fact is that excess income can be expected based on the lifting of the embargo imposed on Small Yugoslavia, and the transit of NATO troops across Hungary to the South, for example. True: railroad engineers were also guaranteed to receive their own 5-percent supplement in the course of the year. Furthermore, a yet to be publicized part of the agreement will be extended to cover the rest: MAV is going to provide life and accident insurance for railroad engineers beginning on 1 June. Incidentally, this offer prompted us to agree to reduce the railroad engineers' supplement from 10 percent to 5 percent. At the same time, one could also observe that the other two trade unions joined in support of the MOSZ proposals. This is how two days of extraordinary supplemental leave was granted for the rest along with the three days granted to railroad engineers. MOSZ members voiced this recognition: "Why are they upset about separate demands as long as we are the ones who pull their chestnuts out of the fire?" Having said this, I do not believe that the division among railroad workers is a fortunate situation, and hope that if we try to find an appropriate path, it will be possible to establish the long-planned railroad workers' alliance. On our part, however, the establishment of such an alliance must be conditioned by the rest of the railroad workers' acceptance of MOSZ's leadership role.

[Mink] Earlier you said that in Hungary MOSZ represented the pure model for trade unions. What did you mean by that?

[Borsik] I was referring to my dispute with Sandor Nagy. The model presented by MSZOSZ is not functioning in my view. Sandor Nagy stated that more can be accomplished from the inside, by cooperating with the larger ruling party, than by manifesting open opposition, as I do from time to time at the helm of MOSZ. I believe that the past year and a half proved me to be correct, not him. Like its predecessor, this government does not care about trade unions either, we do not weigh heavier in the eyes of this government, than we did before. To this date, the present government has not manifested gestures which a left-wing government in a West European country would have manifested in the first year after its ascent to power. To mention just one thing: The government has made no provision concerning the return of former trade union realty, even though negotiations had been going on in this regard with the former, as well as with the present government. So that it is apparent that this model has become a spectacular fiasco.

[Mink] And your model?

[Borsik] Our model did not produce results. We are weak. But the Association of Autonomous Trade Unions, of which I am the copresident, is able to exert pressure because it is well organized. It also includes so-called strategic groups, and it has a chance to develop a lasting trade union model, independent from any political party. As long as opposition parties are as weak as they are in Hungary, it would be very important to have strong, functioning trade unions. The trouble is that the Hungarian trade union movement has fallen apart, it is divided by many kinds of endeavors, and for this reason, in this situation, I feel that we must return to the traditional, "pure" trade union values, and this is what we are trying to do.

[Mink] You want to march into parliament on the backs of railroad engineers, according to your opponents. Although without success, two years ago you ran in the elections as a social democrat. Your nomination could have been supported by the fact that you had become known as the leader of the radical Railroad Engineers Trade Union. How would you respond if one of the parties asked you once again to run in the 1998 elections?

[Borsik] Two years ago I was nominated as a result of my own, individual action, and I did not use MOSZ as a background for my personal image, even though I realize that my name cannot be separated from the organization I represent. But I could lose credibility if I used MOSZ in order to become publicly known by the parties seated in parliament. I do not deny being interested in politics, I like to deal with politics, and I might not rule out such an opportunity in 1998. But I am absolutely certain that I would discontinue trade union work if I were to say "yes" to one or another party.

Hungary: Survey Assesses Prejudices in Society

AU0303211296 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 1 Mar 96 p 16

[Unattributed report: "The Hungarian Gallup Institute's Survey—Voters of the Parliamentary Parties Do Not Have Prejudices"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In November 1995, the Hungarian Gallup Institute carried out a political public opinion poll on a sample of 1,000 representing the country's adult population (over the age of 18) according to gender, settlement type, age, and schooling. The sample's standard error margin is 3.2 percent. This means that the published data can deviate from the result we would have gottn after questioning the total adult population by a maximum 3.2 percent. The values published here are the most likely result.

In the survey, the Gallup wanted to find out among other things how much prejudice exists in Hungarian society, what people think about people of color, Gypsies, and Jews.

Statements were read to people who had to say if they belonged to the group of people whom the statement characterized.

The Gallup has been asking these questions since 1991 with some regularity, so it is possible to follow the changes in the public's opinion.

Comparing the results of the survey carried out directly before the May 1994 elections with the results gained at the end of 1995, we can see that Hungarian society has not become more prejudiced or more tolerant.

This is not surprising because the changes in these types of issue can usually be measured over decades and centuries, rather than years or months.

In spring 1994, some 42 percent of people listed themselves among those who "dislike Gypsies," and the result was essentially the same, 41 percent, at the end of 1995.

In 1994, 11 percent of Hungarians identified themselves with those who "do not like Jews," but this proportion was only 9 percent in 1995.

However, in the 18 months that passed between surveys, the number of those according to whom "it would be good to limit the number of people of color staying in the country" increased somewhat, from 27 percent to 31 percent.

Major differences can be seen among voters of the various political parties as regards their replies to the above questions.

We find it important to note that our data give information on the voters and they do not qualify the official policies of the parties. The voters' attitudes do not always and necessarily reflect the parties' official stance—although, naturally, they are not entirely independent of them.

Voters of the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP], the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] would limit the proportion of people of color in Hungary to the largest extent among voters of the parliamentary parties. If we also take parties outside Parliament into account, it is worth noting the high proportion of Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] voters regarding the issue of limiting the number of people of color.

In the level of dislike of Gypsies, no significant difference can be found among voters of the parliamentary parties. Voters of all parliamentary parties listed themselves close to the national average as regards dislike of Gypsies, the highest number was among KDNP supporters and the lowest among Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] supporters. It was again the attitude of the voters of a miniature party, the MIEP, which was significantly different from the supporters of the parliamentary parties and from the population's average: Almost three-quarters of MIEP voters listed themselves among those who "dislike Gypsies."

More than 10 percent of FKGP and KDNP voters listed themselves among those who "do not like Jews." The proportion of those who have antagonistic feelings toward Jews was lowest among SZDSZ, Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP], and Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] supporters. Out of the nonparliamentary parties, more than half of the MIEP's supporters said they "did not like Jews," and this proportion was 21 percent among voters of the Workers' Party.

Our data indicate that differences between the voters of the parliamentary parties are dwarfed by the difference between supporters of the parliamentary and the nonparliamentary parties. According to indications, intolerance and prejudices are more common among voters of parties outside Parliament than among voters of the parliamentary parties. This attitude is especially strong among (the not too many) voters of the MIEP.

It is noteworthy that the high proportion of self-description as "having national feelings" among the MDF's supporters does not go together with a large amount of prejudice or higher than average level of intolerance—in fact, in the case of the people of color and Jews, we can see an above average level of tolerance and acceptance. Contrary to this, among MIEP voters, the high proportion of self-description as "having national feelings" is coupled with a rather high level of prejudices. It might not be premature to conclude that we have managed to pinpoint two different kinds of understanding of nation, and two different forms of the perception of national consciousness through our data.

Agreement or disagreement with the various statements does not in itself mean that someone has or has not prejudices as a basic attitude and, according to our data, this is especially true for the dislike of Gypsies. However, if someone would reduce the proportion of people of color, "dislikes Gypsies," "does not like Jews," and even "has strong national feelings," then these opinions together do indicate the person's basic prejudiced attitude.

For this reason, we processed the replies to the individual questions through so-called factor analysis. This makes it possible to analyze the individual answers together. This way, we formed a tolerance index. The first diagram shows the tolerance index in case of the six parliamentary parties and the MIEP in spring 1994 and winter 1995. The 0 line indicates the population's average, and the diagram shows the positive and negative deviation and its level.

Voters of the SZDSZ, MDF, and FIDESZ proved to be more tolerant than the population's average at both points in time and, in fact, their tolerance index has actually increased in the past period. Therefore, in the past 18 months, people who are less prejudiced than the population's average have gathered among the voters of these parties. The intolerance of MSZP voters decreased in the assessment period—and the number of supporters was halved at the same time.

Intolerance has also decreased among voters of the FKGP. This is not independent of the fact that the party's voting base has almost doubled. These newcomers have diluted the basically prejudiced and intolerant Smallholder core. A basic change of attitude has taken place among voters of the KDNP: The higher than average level of tolerance in spring 1994 changed into a higher than average level of intolerance.

However, all these differences are nothing compared to the extreme prejudices and intolerance which characterize the MIEP's voters and whose level even increased in the examined period.

We also asked people to say if they were more of "liberal thinkers" or "conservative thinkers." The second diagram shows the answer in the case of the parliamentary parties.

Apart from the KDNP, the number of people describing themselves as liberals is higher among the voters of all parliamentary parties than those describing themselves as conservatives. The highest proportion calling themselves "liberals" could be found among the FIDESZ's voters.

It is also noteworthy that more than half of the FKGP's voters saw themselves as "liberals." This observation also supports the claim that the voters' protest against the policies of the governing parties stand much more in the background of the significant increase of the FKGP's voters than deliberate identification with the FKGP's official ideology.

The MDF has the most divided supporting base because roughly as many people see themselves as "liberals" as "conservatives"—although a slight "liberal" dominance can also be observed here.

	Has Strong National Emotions	It Would Be Better To Limit the People of Color Staying Here	Dislikes Gypsies	Does Not Like Jews
	Percent			
FIDESZ	48	15	48	6
FKGP	66	42	43	12
KDNP	65	35	50	11
MDF	73	18	44	6
MSZP	59	34	42	7
SZDSZ	40	25	33	4
MIEP	86	57	72	57
Workers Party	50	17	40	21

Diagram 1 on Tolerance Index in 1994 and 1995

	Tolerance		Intolerance	
	1994	1995	1994	1995
SZDSZ	0.18	0.22		
KDNP	0.11	0.12		
MDF	0.05	0.12		
FIDESZ	0.03	0.13		
MSZP			0.12	0.02
FKGP			0.31	0.18
MIEP			0.79	1.03

NOTE: Numbers indicate factor scores showing the level of deviation from the population's average.

Diagram 2 on Proportion of "Liberal" and "Conservative" Thinkers Among Voters of Parliamentary Parties

	Conservative	Liberal
	Percent	
FIDESZ	11	76
SZDSZ	25	65
MSZP	22	58
FKGP	37	51
MDF	36	41
KDNP	44	30

NOTE: Remainder do not know.

B-H: Izetbegovic Warns Against Settling Serbs in Brcko

LD0903195396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, addressed a letter today to Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community for the implementation of the civil part of the Dayton agreement, and to Admiral Leighton Smith, in which he says:

With the evacuation of Serbs from Sarajevo suburbs, the Pale leadership is continuing its genocidal policies of ethnic cleansing, which they have carried out throughout the war. You claim you have neither the means nor the resources to influence this policy, which is obviously contrary to the spirit and letter of the Dayton peace agreement.

However, I believe that there is one absolute exception to the freedom to choose a place of residence which the Serb leadership cites. That is Brcko.

The Serbs have no right to settle their unfortunate compatriots in Brcko, whom they have evacuated from their homes without any justified reason, because, under the Dayton agreement, the final fate of this city will be decided by international arbitration.

This means that, in the meantime, Brcko is under a special regime and that all actions which prejudice the arbitration decision are inadmissible. If the Serbs' settlement in the houses of Bosniaks in Zvornik or Foca is against the law, their settlement in Brcko doubly violates the Dayton agreement, because, among other things, it obviously has the aim of creating a fait accompli and making a just solution to this extremely sensitive issue more difficult.

I believe you are obliged to find a way to prevent this gross unlawfulness and action contrary to the Dayton agreement. I wish to assure you of our determination to ensure our rights regarding the city of Brcko, the letter says in conclusion.

B-H: Muratovic Says Serbs Destroying Sarajevo Economy

LD0903202396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Serbs in Ilidza have caused enormous damage to economic facilities and administrative buildings. In this connection, Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has said that, in the presence of UN troops more than 10,000 citizens were killed, while in the presence of IFOR [Implementation Force] the economy of the town [is being destroyed], and without its recovery the town is economically dead. Asked whether something can be done to prevent such economic devastation, the prime minister said that there is not a citizen of Sarajevo who would believe that the international community was not capable of preventing this scale of vandalism that is happening by the hour in the presence of thousands of representatives of the international community.

B-H: PM, U.S. Ambassador Discuss Foreign Soldier Issue

AU0803212996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic today met with U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia John Menzies to discuss the statement by the State Department spokesman that, contrary to the Dayton agreement, there are more than 200 foreign Muslim soldiers.

The prime minister expressed concern about this statement and pointed out some incorrect information in it that could damage our country at a time when we are striving, along with our efforts to implement the Dayton agreement, to ensure the world's economic support. Dr. Muratovic offered Amb. Menzies a joint commission that would consist of representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and representatives of the United States and IFOR [Implementation Force] to investigate the claims, establish the true situation, and provide objective information to the public.

In a Memorandum of Understanding that was signed by both sides, it was previously demanded that the United States send a team to establish Bosnia-Herzegovina's full compliance with the agreement on the departure of foreign troops. The team was given permission to investigate any piece of territory in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and any fact concerning the presence of foreign troops and instructors. However, the team never arrived.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government also demands that the spreading of unfounded information and that which cannot be proven be stopped.

B-H: Ganic Comments on Meeting With NATO Delegation

AU0803214996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, met with the NATO ambassadors led by NATO Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino and General George

Joulwan, NATO commander for Europe, in Sarajevo today.

Ejup Ganic said that today's meeting with the NATO representatives in Sarajevo represents an historic day. This meeting is a great support towards the road that will establish the final and stable peace in the region. NATO's presence in Sarajevo is a message to all Balkan countries and I think that Sarajevo is again the venue of main events in the positive sense of the expression, Ejup Ganic said.

We are very satisfied with the IFOR [Implementation Force] mission in Bosnia, although we expected even more. We would like to see more activity on removing people accused of war crimes so that a basis for democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be established, Ganic said. He expressed the hope that NATO will positively solve Bosnia-Herzegovina's appeal to be accepted into the Partnership for Peace before the IFOR troops leave our country, so that one can continue to take into consideration the positive results that IFOR achieved here. We waited for four years for the mandate of foreign troops in our country and these are the first foreign troops with a mandate to understand the meaning of that mandate, and this is why they achieve results. Peace prevailed with their arrival, Ganic said. He added that all soldiers on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina are in barracks and that IFOR will be able to engage itself more in the civil implementation of the peace agreement.

We are very pleased with the positive comments that Vice President Ganic made on IFOR's work. The mandate that IFOR has now is sufficient for officers and soldiers to have a lot of work, Ambassador Balanzino said. The NATO Council is aware of the fundamental importance of the international community's civilian mission in rebuilding the country and, whenever it is possible and according to the case-by-case principle, IFOR will ensure help with the available means and within the framework of its mandate, Balanzino said.

He said that the Alliance hails the possibilty of Bosnia-Herzegovina joining the Partnership for Peace program and added that he is certain that, when conditions are created, the NATO Council will be glad to consider Bosnia-Herzegovina's application to join this program.

Deputy NATO Secretary General Sergio Balanzino confirmed today's statement by the IFOR spokesman in Sarajevo, (Simon Hazelock), that the NATO Council has not decided on expanding the IFOR mandate. Rumors have appeared in the media, but the NATO Council has not approved the expansion of the IFOR mandate. The Council only authorized IFOR to establish how and in what regions it can ensure help to civilian agencies, but within the available capacities and the set mandate, Balanzino said, and added that it is only in these cases that IFOR can help in the civilian implementation of the peace agreement.

B-H: Gen Delic, OSCE Envoy Hold Talks in Sarajevo

LD1003130096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As part of the process of establishing confidence-building measures and implementing regional stabilization—in line with Annex 1D, Point 2 of the Dayton agreement—Army General Rasim Delic had talks in Sarajevo today with Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, personal envoy of the OSCE chairman.

The meeting was attended by Brigadier Gen. (?Momir) Ristic and a large team of officers in charge of the implementation of this important process. Forms of direct activities on the ground were examined with regard to the inspection of arms and equipment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croat Defense Council, and the Serb side following the Vienna talks. The verification agency's specific powers were discussed, as well as [words indistinct] and safety in the course of inspection.

Army Gen. Delic insisted on consistent and [word indistinct] work of expert teams, and adherence to the agreement on regional stabilization and the established IFOR [Implementation Force] and OSCE activity on the implementation of this part of the Dayton agreement.

B-H: Deputy Interior Minister Views Hadzici Police Issue

AU1003164896 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 96 p 4

[ONASA report: "Leutar Is Also Announcing Clashes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Mar—Jozo Leutar, deputy minister of internal affairs in the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated yesterday for ONASA that the events in Hadzici (the arrival and departure of Croat policemen) were the result of earlier misunderstandings between the federal partners regarding the organization of the federal police.

"We have warned the representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and [Interior] Minister Avdo Hebib that misunderstandings could take place if the law on internal affairs, which was recently passed at the session of the federal parliament, was not strictly observed. According to that law, the federal police should be made up of policemen from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Ministry of

Internal Affairs of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and not only from the Central Security Service (CSB) of Sarajevo, as this has been the case up until now," Leutar said.

He stressed that the uniforms of the federal police display only one insignia and that the Croat representatives have requested that the insignia of both peoples together with the "federal police" badge be represented equally. Leutar claims that when the original list of federal policemen was being drawn up for Vogosca, there were 84 Bosniaks on the list. It was only after the Croat officials intervened and sent a warning to Michael Stainer, deputy high representative of the international community for the implementation of the civilian part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement, that some corrections were made.

"Even after our warnings, the policemen were again drafted from the Sarajevo CSB and not from the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs of Herzeg-Bosnia," Leutar claims.

He denied the claims by IFOR [Implementation Force] that policemen from Mostar with Croat insignia and uniforms were sent to Hadzici.

"Why would we send Croat policemen from there when we have a police station in Kiseljak, from where the federal policemen left for Hadzici," Leutar said.

He is of the opinion that some undesirable misunderstandings, "even clashes," could occur if an agreement is not reached between the federal partners that will respect and satisfy the interests of both peoples. Responding to a question whether he had ordered the policemen from Kiseljak to go to Hadzici, Leutar said the policemen acted "according to the rules," which in fact means that they had obeyed his order.

B-H: Federation President Examines Croat-Muslim Relations

LD0903135396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A session of the Chamber of Deputies of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia continues in Mostar today. Mostar was also visited by (Istvan Gyarmati), the Hungarian representative with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]. HINA journalist Pejo Gasparevic reports:

[Gasparevic] Kresimir Zubak, Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation president, gave the introductory speech on the relations between federal partners [Croats and Muslims] at the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia's Chamber of Deputies' session. He said the federal partner [Muslims] has not changed its attitude toward the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation project in any substantial way. According to Zubak, the federal partner keeps deploying the tactic of publicly supporting the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, but in practice does everything to solve important issues outside the federation itself.

President Zubak warned against the unconstitutional expansion of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] republic's executive bodies at the expense of the federation. He mentioned the example of the formation of the Agency for Research and Documentation. Practice shows, Zubak added, that the federal partner has not changed its political ideas, which favor civic Bosnia-Herzegovina. The federation is our aim, while for them it is a means to an end.

He also warned that we can expect an anti-Croat campaign with claims that Croats are allegedly opposed to the federation. Zubak maintains that we should act in a politically deliberate way and show good will toward the federation. He believes that current problems can be overcome through the creation of federal institutions and the greater presence of Croatian personnel in Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

B-H: Muslim-Croat Federation Disintegration Considered

LD1003144996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1407 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar 10 (TANJUG)—As the second anniversary of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia approaches (March 19), there are frequent reports on enmity between the two federal partners which could even lead to a disintegration of their 'pre-arranged marriage' concluded at Washington's insistence.

Politicians who have been trying to convince people that the end of the war between Bosnian Muslims and Croats was an essential achievement and that all other issues would be resolved in time, are now once again rattling arms, Muslim Radio Sarajevo said Sunday in a commentary.

All peace missions of world politicians were hindered by the intransigence of local leaders unwilling to abandon positions conquered with arms, and it is therefore high time to think about the foundations on which the federation rests, the radio said.

The radio commentator criticizes Federation President Kresimir Zubak for describing himself as president of all Bosnian Croats, thus attempting to revert back to the starting point of the federation forming process.

Croatian Radio, however, broadcast Zubak's statement that federal partners (Muslims) were still using the tactics of publicly supporting the federation while in fact still favoring the idea of a unitary Bosnia.

For the Croats, the federation is an end in itself, and for the Muslims it is only the means to an end, Zubak said.

West European analysts meanwhile increasingly often note that the Muslim-Croat alliance was effective only as an anti-Serb military alliance.

The escalating disputes between federal partners are also demonstrated by the fact that the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna (HRHB) continues preventing the free flow of goods between Muslim areas in Western and Central Bosnia, regardless of agreements to this effect.

Muslim Radio Sarajevo reported Sunday that Croat authorities at a checkpoint in Drvar (south-western Bosnia) were demanding taxes and dues for goods transported by Muslims from one canton to another.

Relations between Muslims and Croats in the Una-Sana Canton are also strained due to problems in Kulen Vakuf, 30 km from Bihac, which remains occupied by HRHB police.

B-H: TANJUG Reports on Mojahedin Presence in Country

LD1003142096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1340 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 10 (TANJUG)—Latest western military reports say that there are five to seven secret military camps in which Mojahedin, including Iranian Interior Ministry members, train future Muslim intelligence officials.

The U.S. Administration said on Friday [8 March] that 200 out of a few thousand Mojahedin had remained in Bosnia. Under the Dayton Agreement, the Muslim Sarajevo Government had to send all Mojahedin home by January 15.

The U.S. Administration is extremely concerned about the Mojahedin presence in Bosnia, fearing that they would retaliate against U.S. troops in Bosnia.

Some Mojahedin, who were granted Bosnian citizenship, work in the Muslim army or civil services, others are diplomats in the recently opened Iranian Embassy in Sarajevo and still others, who are illegally in Bosnia, engage in intelligence and terrorist activities.

'We have not come to go as soon as the Americans come. We live at a time when Islam will rule. Bosnia belongs to the Muslims and we have to defend it,' said leader of a group of Mojahedin in the central Bosnian town of Zenica Abu Salim of Algeria, publicist and retired Yugoslav Colonel Stojan Jovic told TANJUG.

Muslim extremists believe that 'Islamic fighters should defend every Muslim country, regardless of where it is,' Jovic said.

The Islamic conference held in Khartoum last year said that Jihad had to spread to the West and that Bosnia was a stepping stone to Europe. The conference decided that Mojahedin activities in Bosnia would be coordinated by a headquarters in Tehran.

Muslim countries sent experienced saboteurs and terrorists to Bosnia, but Iran was the only one to send a regular military unit—the 2,000-strong 7th Revolutionary Guard Brigade, which was based in Zenica, Jovic said.

Mojahedin units, including 40 terrorists sent by the Egyptian fundamentalist organization Muslim Brotherhood, were deployed in Zenica, Konjic and Kakanj in Central Bosnia and Tesanj in northern Bosnia.

The units were trained in centres in the villages of Mehuric near Busovaca in central Bosnia, Pazaric near Sarajevo and Bistricak, north of Zenica, Jovic said.

Mojahedin were the backbone of elite reconnaissance and saboteur units, Jovic said and added that they formed special units, the so-called Muslim Defence Force, reinforced by about 1,000 local volunteers who had undergone religious and military training.

Mojahedin became instructors for special actions, intelligence officers, religious commissioners and quite often commanders of tactical units, Jovic said.

Mojahedin left a bloody trail behind them. They carried out a large number of sabotage operations, infiltrating into serb units. They also attacked civilian population and tortured and mutilated Serb troops and civilians with unparallelled brutality.

They had no prisoners of war, committing ritual killings of the 'non-believers,' Jovic said, mentioning a photo of a Mojahedin holding three severed heads of Serb troops near Tesanj, which was published all over the world.

B-H: Koschnick To Leave Mostar 2 Apr; No Successor Yet

AU1003194896 Paris AFP in English
1908 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 10 (AFP)—The European Union administrator in Mostar, Hans Koschnick, will leave the divided southern Bosnia city in April, although no successor has yet been appointed, European sources said Sunday [10 April].

Koschnick, who announced last month that he wished to step down, will leave the town which is bitterly divided between Moslems and Croats on April 2, the sources at the European administration in Mostar said.

Earlier Sunday, the top civilian official in Bosnia, High Representative Carl Bildt, said European foreign ministers attending a weekend meeting in Palermo, Sicily, could not decide on a replacement for Koschnick.

Bildt said several names were being considered for the post as administrator of Mostar, but he did not reveal who they were.

He said the successor to Koschnick must be a politician or a diplomat.

"Experience of politics or diplomacy is essential," he said, adding that the EU should decide on a successor to Koschnick, a former mayor of the German town of Bremen, during the "coming weeks."

When he announced in February his decision to step down, Koschnick said he would remain in his job until a successor was named, but no later than July 22 when his two-year term in office was originally scheduled to expire.

He also said that he considered a successor should be designated by the end of March.

Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, who chaired the weekend EU foreign ministers' meeting, said Koschnick would be replaced for six months, "but not for longer."

"We are looking for a candidate who has already had experience as a mayor," Agnelli added.

The current EU mandate for administrating the town of Mostar runs out in July.

According to European diplomatic sources, its extension to the end of the year is not yet guaranteed.

Regarding Bosnian reconstruction, Bildt said further that a conference of donor countries would probably he held in Brussels on April 12 and 13, but that several countries must first confirm their willingness to contribute funds.

European Commission President Jacques Santer, who attended the meeting, said funds were available for the first quarter of the year, but a further 1.2 billion dollars must be found by the end of the year.

"We must create the conditions to ensure the conference on April 12 and 13 is a success," Santer said.

Sources close to the commission said the 15 ministers consider that the EU should be responsible for one-third of the "burden" of rebuilding Bosnia. Another third should be paid by the United States, and the final third should be paid by countries such as Japan, Russia and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

The sources said the conference on April 12-13 will take place only if these countries demonstrate their willingness to contribute funds.

A delegation from the European Commission and from Italy, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, will travel to the possible donor countries during the coming weeks "to see what their commitments are," one source said.

B-H: Koschnick Reportedly To Run Mostar's Central District

LD1103130096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1157 GMT 11 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 11 (TANJUG)—E.U. administrator in Mostar Hans Koschnick has decided to take over direct administration over its central district, Croatian radio reported on Sunday evening.

The radio specified that all decisions and permits relating to the central district would be within the competence of the E.U. in this city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The decision followed a Croat demand on Friday that the central district be divided into Croat and Muslim sections, which heightened tension in the city.

A Muslim woman was killed in the Croat section of Mostar on Saturday and a Muslim policeman of the Muslim-Croat patrols who crossed into the Croat section of Mostar in mufti was badly beaten up on Sunday.

Mostar Muslim radio pointed out that 18 Muslims had been killed in the Croat part of Mostar over the past two years, since the signing of the agreement on forming a Muslim-Croat federation, and that three Muslim policemen were beaten up in the past week.

This is evidently an attempt to intimidate Muslim policemen so that they abandon the idea of joint city patrols, radio said.

Under Koschnick's decision, Mostar is to consist of three Muslim and three Croat municipalities and a central district for the joint Muslim-Croat organs.

B-H: EU Official Comments on Croatian Demands in Mostar

AU0803215296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The main topics at today's news conference at the EU Administration headquarters in Mostar focused on the local elections in Mostar which, according to the Dayton agreement, should be held by the end of this May, the issue of the central city zone, and the meeting between Koschnick and Kapetanovic. Addressing journalists on these issues was (Karl) Metscher, EU ambassador and Koschnick's deputy. Here is a report by Mirsad Behram and (Deni Fila):

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The next big step forward in the Mostar process will be the elections in the city. They are going to show if the city will unite or the whole project will collapse. This is how Koschnick's deputy (Karl) Metscher assessed the significance of the forthcoming local elections, which, according to the Dayton agreement, are planned to take place by the end of May. According to him, technical preparations for the elections will begin soon. The first step is to form local electoral commissions for six municipalities and the whole of the city. According to Metscher, the electoral system is based on the laws from 1992, the time of the last elections, and the important element [words indistinct] lists.

[Words indistinct] today touched upon on last night's meeting of Koschnick's Advisory Council, which to a large extent dealt with the central city zone. Namely, as we have learned from sources that wished to remain anonymous, the Croatian side demanded that the central district be divided. About that Metscher says that, according to the transitional city statute, the central city zone is in the jurisdiction of the City Council and the mayor. However, we still do not have that, Koschnick's deputy said, and added that elections are expected now.

[Metscher, in English with sentence by sentence Serbo-Croatian translation] This is why we had only two options, either a joint administration by the existing local authorities or direct administration by the EU Administration. We discussed this problem.

[Correspondent] (Karl) Metscher told journalists that Hans Koschnick had met Federation Prime Minister Kapetanovic yesterday.

[Metscher, in English with sentence by sentence Serbo-Croatian translation] Mr. Koschnick offered the Federation Government our help in the development of the central zone in the administrative sense. You probably know that the statute envisages the central zone, among other things, to be for building the Federation and cantons, as well as the institutions of the entire city.

[Correspondent] Koschnick's deputy also said today that no consensus on housing rights had been reached at the Advisory Council session yesterday. This decree confirms the right of expellees to return to their flats. However, the Croatian side failed to give its consent on this issue.

B-H: Bosnian Presidency Member Visits Mostar

LD0803233996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tatjana Ljujic Mijatovic, member of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, had talks in Mostar with the European administrator Hans Koschnick and Mayor Safet Orucevic. Although Mrs. Ljujic-Mijatovic had expressed her desire to have talks with Mijo Brajkovic, this meeting did not take place. Mirsad Behram from Mostar:

[Behram] Talks with Hans Koschnick and his main consultant from the Bosniak side, Safet Orucevic, focused on the solution for Mostar. Mrs. Ljujic-Mijatovic said that Koschnick's and Orucevic's resignations were highly ethical, principled acts of persons who have been fighting in the last two years for a united, multicultural Mostar, where all its residents, irrespective of their nationality, could return.

Speaking on the situation in this city, she said that Mostar was not only a litmus test for the federation but for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

B-H: Croats Said To Demand Division of Central Mostar

LD0903163796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1553 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar 9 (TANJUG)—Croats from Mostar are demanding a division of the central city district, Muslim Radio Sarajevo reported Saturday morning.

The Muslims strongly reacted to the Croat request presented to the European administrator Hans Koschnick, demanding that he immediately inform the European Union Ministerial Council of the situation.

To ease the renewed tension in the city, outgoing administrator Koschnick will issue a decree in line with which E.U. will administer the central district on a temporary basis until municipal elections, when a democratically elected city council and a new mayor should take over, Muslim radio reports.

According to Koschnick's plan accepted both by Muslims and Croats at the Rome conference in February, Mostar is to be a united city with three Muslim and three Croat municipal districts and one central, joint district.

Croat authorities from Mostar also rejected the decree on housing rights, which should enable refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in line with the Dayton Accord.

Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be held by September 1996.

About 45,000 Serbs had fled Mostar in 1992 from the terror of the then Muslim-Croat coalition.

In line with the housing rights regulations pushed through by the E.U. administration, 500 Serbs presented requests to return home to Mostar through the Italian Embassy in Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

B-H: Herzeg-Bosnia Chamber of Deputies Ends Session

LD0903174496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A two-day session of the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia ended in Mostar this afternoon. HINA journalist Pejo Gasparevic reports:

[Begin Gasparevic recording] The Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia adopted a decision on the gradual transfer of civil powers of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to the government bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The decision comes into force today. The executive bodies of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia will undertake the necessary measures to implement the decision.

The deputies also adopted the report of Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ivan Bender, president of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, on the political and security situation in the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Ivan Bender said, among other things, that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina belongs to the Croats as much as it belongs to the Muslims.

In a discussion on the political and security situation that lasted several hours, the deputies expressed strong criticism of the federal partner [Muslims] for the way in which the Sarajevo suburbs are being taken over by the federal authorities.

Deputies from Bosnian Posavina indicated the need to link the regions of Orasje and Samac with Odzak, and to take control of the bridge over the Sava River between Slavonski and Bosanski Samac which, they recalled, belonged to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Dayton agreement. They also stressed the importance of financial support for the reconstruction of Odzak.

The Chamber of Deputies also named Bozo Rajic and General Zivko Budimir as new members of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, who replace Dario Kordic and General Tihomir Blaskic.

Mariofil Ljubic, chairman of the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, announced a session of the Constitutional Assembly on 18 or 28 March. The assembly will discuss new canton borders. [end recording]

B-H: Croats Protest Muslim Implementation of Dayton Accord

LD0803190496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Over 3,000 Bosnian Croats from the Lepenica valley staged a peaceful protest today against the implementation of the Dayton agreement. Marica Ivankovic reports:

[Ivankovic] Over 3,000 Croats from Kiseljak, as well as expelled Croats from Vares, Fojnica, Sarajevo municipalities and elsewhere, gathered at 1200 today outside the post office in Kiseljak, peacefully protesting against the way in which the Dayton agreement is being implemented in this area, especially against the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation takeover of the municipalities, which had until recently been under Bosnian Serb control, also expressing dissatisfaction about the present role of IFOR [Implementation Force] in the latest events.

We are in favor of Dayton, but IFOR is not. The federal police are Muslim. Two sides are needed for the federation. Where are the Croats? These are just some of the messages displayed by the demonstrators today.

The meeting was first addressed by Branko Golub, the deputy president of the Lepenica-Lasva-Vrbas grand county committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], who said among other things: Unfortunately, the Croat people have once again been brought in a situation to take a historic exam and their survival in Bosnia-Herzegovina may depend on the results of this exam. Once again they are trying to turn us into second-class citizens at the time when the Croat men scored a victory at the price of their own blood, and at the time when the historic mistake was corrected for the first time and we could finally have our own army, police, and uniforms.

Addressing the participants in the meeting, Pero Madjar, chairman of the Kiseljak HDZ city committee, said that we were witnessing a dirty and complicated game staged by the Muslim leadership, which is particularly evident in the handover of power in Sarajevo's suburban districts.

Using the phrase—Bosnia-Herzegovina, the federation of Croats and Muslims—Muslim federal officials are entering the above areas on their own, without us—their federal partners.

A letter to this effect was sent out from the protest meeting to the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Chamber of Deputies, which is meeting in Mostar today. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosnian Croats Refuse Muslims' Return of Kulen-Vakuf

LD1003231796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to the Rome agreement, the deadline expired today for the return of the southernmost local community [of the Bihac municipality] of Kulen-Vakuf [Croat-held town south of Bihac] to its original status [within the Bihac municipality] and the definite return of its [Muslim] inhabitants to their homes. However, HVO [Croatian Defense Council] soldiers did not allow this to happen today. Mirza Sadikovic reports from Bihac. [passage omitted]

According to official [Croat] insignia, this southernmost local community of Bihac is still part of the [Bosnian Croat] Livno-Duvno grand county, i.e., the municipality of Drvar to which it never belonged according to land registries.

The charade is continuing and the federal partners [Bosnian Croats] have found new ways to mask their activities. After a series of meetings, promises, and agreements, they are still refusing to allow the return of about 7,000 people of Kulen Vakuf, currently refugees in Bihac. [passage omitted]

In addition to [Muslim] representatives of the Una-Sana cantonal and Bihac municipal authorities, today's talks in Kulen-Vakuf were also attended by HVO, IFOR [Implementation Force], and OSCE representatives. Efforts to convince the Croats were in vain, and the heated atmosphere was illustrated by a decision to introduce a higher state of combat alert among the present HVO soldiers. Reporters were not allowed and IFOR did not help them to cross to the left bank of the river Una, i.e., the disputed larger part of Kulen-Vakuf. The people of Kulen-Vakuf have been patient so far, waiting for the Croat [federal] partner to fulfill his promises. Only time will show what lies ahead.

B-H: Croats Request Control of Sarajevo Suburb Ilidza

LD0903164496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1338 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar 9 (TANJUG)—Croats from the Sarajevo area warned Saturday [9 March] that chaos would ensue if federal police which is to enter the Serb Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza does not comprise police officers from the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (HRHB), Croat radio said.

A statement addressed to HRHB parliament on behalf of Croats from Lepenicka valley north-west of Sarajevo by the leaders of the ruling Bosnian Croat party Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) expresses concern at the manner in which the federation has been taking control of Serb districts of Sarajevo so far.

We do not consider the police force which has taken control of Vogosca, Ilijas and Hadzici as federal police, and we demand that the takeover be carried out differently in Ilidza, HDZ statements from Kiseljak, Fojnica and Kresevo say.

Several tens of thousands of Serbs have fled the Sarajevo districts where Serbs used to be in majority and which are to be taken over by the Muslim-Croat Federation by March 20.

Over 5,000 Croats protested Friday in Kiseljak against the absence of Croat police officers in federal police force.

B-H: Gen Walker To Visit Ilidza To Calm Situation

AU0903170396 Paris AFP in English 0905 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 9 (AFP)—Senior NATO commander, General Sir Michael Walker, was due to visit the tense Serb-held suburb of Ilidza Saturday [9 March] in an effort to calm the situation after a day of torching and looting.

Walker, in command of NATO's peacekeeping ground troops, is to address Serbs in Ilidza who want to remain in the area after it is transferred to mainly Moslem control on Tuesday, aides said.

"What General Walker is going to do in Ilidza is try and address the people concerning their right to choose whether to leave or stay," Major Tom Moyer, a spokesman for NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR), said.

Harbouring genuine fears of retribution for the brutal siege of Sarajevo that have been whipped up by propaganda from their hardline leadership, tens of thousands of Serbs have fled the five city suburbs ringing the capital they held through the war. Only two, Ilidza and one other suburb, Grbavica, remain to be transferred.

Though chaotic, the Serb exodus has passed largely without incident until recent days when an upsurge in looting and burning has heightened fears of a loss of life and widespread destruction.

Moyer said that many Serbs appeared not to know they had a right to stay in their homes if they wanted. "(Walker) has watched the (Serb exodus) with concern and he feels that a lot of people believe that they do not have any right to choose and he wants to address those people remaining," he said.

Leaflets have been passed out and posters pasted up in the suburb in an attempt to attract Serbs to a school building in Ilidza where Walker is hoping to speak to some people Moyer added.

B-H: Mayor Appeals for Transport for Serbs Leaving Ilidza

LD1003152696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1450 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 10 March (SRNA)—The mayor of the Serb municipality of Ilidza, Nedjeljko Prstojevic, today appealed to directors of all public firms and owners of private vehicles to make their transport means available for the evacuation of people and their property tomorrow, 11 March, the last day of Serb rule in this municipality.

Vehicles should be brought outside the Ilidza town hall at 0800 [0700 GMT] tomorrow morning, from where they will be directed to specific destinations. [passage omitted]

Commenting on widespread speculations about Herzeg-Bosna police entering the Serb municipality of Ilidza, Prstojevic said that the keys to the town hall would be handed over to Serb representatives remaining in Ilidza in the presence of IFOR and international representatives.

From 12 to 19 March the interests of the Serb people in Ilidza will still be protected by Dusan Sehovac who, according to Prstojevic, "is obliged to recognize the federal police, which is also recognized by IFOR and the international police force." [passage omitted]

According to Prstojevic's calculations, only one to one and a half per cent of Ilidza's residents will remain there after 12 March, when this Serb municipality becomes part of the Croat-Muslim federation.

B-H: IFOR Provides Escorts To Tackle Sarajevo Arson

AU1003141496 Paris AFP in English 1026 GMT 10 Mar 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, March 10 (AFP)—NATO peacekeepers have stepped up efforts to tackle an outbreak of arson and looting in abandoned Serb-held suburbs of the Bosnian capital, providing for the first time escorts for firefighters in the districts, they said Sunday [10 March].

Firefighters from the government-held suburb of Hrasnica entered the Serb-held district of Ilidza overnight Saturday under escort from French Implementation Force (IFOR) troops, an IFOR spokesman said.

Ilidza, which passes to the control of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation on Tuesday, has been shaken by an eruption of arson and looting in recent days, after thousands of Serbs left the district ahead of its transfer.

UN officials warned Saturday of a rapidly deteriorating situation in Ilidza and Grbavica, the other Serb-held suburb due to revert to the control of the mainly-Moslem government.

IFOR, which has said it is unable to stop the unrest, said it had put extra soldiers on patrol in the suburbs because of growing tension.

The exodus from the Sarajevo suburbs has complicated the task of refugee aid groups trying to help civilians return to their homes elsewhere in Bosnia. [passage omitted]

B-H: IFOR Says Karadzic Rally Attendance 'Exaggerated'

AU1003142196 Paris AFP in English 1258 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 10 (AFP)—Hundreds of Serbs have staged a rally in the northern Bosnian town of Doboj to express support for the Bosnian Serb leadership, a peace Implementation Force (IFOR) spokesman said Sunday [10 March].

Major Terje Myklevoll told AFP that the rally in support of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and army chief General Ratko Mladic was held Saturday in the Serb-held town.

The Norwegian IFOR officer could not say exactly how many people attended the rally, but said Bosnian Serb media reports of 10,000 people flocking to the demonstration were "exaggerated."

He said the rally heard a series of speeches expressing support for the two leaders, both of whom have been charged with crimes against humanity, genocide and other war crimes.

The rally followed a similar gathering organised last month in Banja Luka, the largest Bosnian town under Serb control.

B-H: Karadzic Threatens 'Heavy Losses' in Arrest Attempt

AU1103124496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "NATO Cannot Arrest Us!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, against whom the Tribunal in The Hague has brought in an indictment for war crimes, warned that they will resist any attempts of the international force to arrest them.

"They have to understand that any such attempt will cost them dearly and that people will defend me," Mladic said in an interview for Mega, a private Greek TV channel.

Karadzic said that there were not enough NATO troops currently deployed in Bosnia to arrest him.

"They will need a lot more troops than they have now. I do not think that they will dare to arrest me, because they know my bodyguards are very well trained," Karadzic said, adding that he cannot be arrested without there being heavy losses on both sides.

"I do not think that they are even thinking about arresting us, because they are guests in our homes. This is our house," the leader of the Bosnian Serbs added.

Referring to NATO's arrest warrant for him, Karadzic noted that his photograph on the warrant is a very poor one, adding that he would have given them a much better photograph himself.

"They cannot arrest me. I shall be traveling whenever I consider it necessary. I am meeting with people throughout the country, sometimes publicly, and sometimes secretly. I do not know how long the farce pursued by the Tribunal in The Hague is going to last," Karadzic added.

B-H: Karadzic: Bosnian Serbs Want Independent State

LD0903114396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0920 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 [as received] March (SRNA)—The president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, Radovan Karadzic, said in Pale today [8 March] that those who worked against the conclusions of the Lisbon conference in 1992, which divided Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the ethnic principle, should be held responsible for a crime against peace.

At a meeting dedicated to solving the problem of the status of the fighters of the homeland war, President Karadzic said that "after three and a half years of war we reached a solution very similar to the one from Lisbon," and that the Serb Republic's stance is that those who discarded that solution are responsible for the war.

"Someone must be held responsible for that," Karadzic stressed: "If the Hague Tribunal tried people for the crime against peace—and it has failed to punish this crime—then Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Warren Zimmerman, Alois Mock and Alija Izetbegovic should appear in court."

The Serb Republic president warned that the international community's ultimate goal is, after all, the integration of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that it would not—as he put it—"cry if this fails to happen."

"It seems that the federation's days are up, and the federation was the basis of the whole Dayton plan," the Serb Republic president stressed and added that this "is further confirmed by the atmosphere in U.S. media, which are painting a picture of a disintegrating Croat-Muslim union in former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

President Karadzic recalled that the Serb nation's ultimate goal was either an independent state or a federal unit within a common state with Serbia and Montenegro.

"If as a people we present a united front, the international community will have to meet our demands," the Serb Republic president said in conclusion.

B-H: Serbs Torch Houses, Apartments in Sarajevo Suburbs

LD0903145196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs are setting houses and apartments on fire in Ilidza and Grbavica, parts of Sarajevo which are supposed to come under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation soon.

In this connection, Mirko Pejanovic, a member of the [Bosnian] state presidency and chairman of the Serb Civic Council, received Michael Steiner, deputy of the High Representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement. The meeting was also attended by Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Ljubomir Berberovic and Rajko Zivkovic, members of the Serb Civic Council.

The purpose of the meeting was to try and find a common solution so that people who wish to remain in currently occupied areas after the transfer of power might be protected, and so that further burning of property and other forms of devastation and coercion might be prevented.

There is evidence that over the past two days Serb extremists have been burning buildings and that they have killed one woman. It has also been learned from people fleeing Grbavica that there is evidence that since last night Serb extremists have been taking away the children of those who wish to remain in parts of Sarajevo which are soon due to be taken over by the authorities of the federation.

After the meeting with Steiner, Avdo Hebib, the minister of internal affairs of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, told BH PRESS: [announcer continues] During the meeting with Mr. Steiner, I received the latest reports—that a large part of Ilidza is in flames, that it is burning, and that buildings are continuing to be set alight. Minister Hebib said that, according to Ilidza Serbs, there is complete anarchy in this part of the city.

Representatives of citizens who wish to remain in Ilidza after the transfer of power yesterday sought protection from the international community until federation forces enter Ilidza. The reply of the international community is still unknown, but the destruction by the Serb extremists is increasingly in evidence as every moment passes.

B-H: IFOR Assails Media Over Images of Sarajevo Suburbs

AU1003152196 Paris AFP in English 1432 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 10 (AFP)—The NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) said Sunday [10 March] it has increased its security presence in Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo hit by looting and arson but criticised "exaggerated" press coverage of the unrest there.

"Sarajevo is not a city of tension on the verge of insurrection, the real Sarajevo is not spinning out of control, and IFOR is not standing idly by," IFOR spokesman Major Simon Haselock said.

IFOR troops had "intensified" their patrolling in the Serb suburbs of Ilidza and Grbavica which are to transfer to the control of the mainly Moslem government in coming days, and were providing security for "a number of power and utility sites and plants that have been deemed essential to sustaining life among the residents," he said.

Ilidza and Grbavica have been hit by fires and looting in recent days as they prepare to revert to the control of the mainly Moslem Sarajevo authorities in coming days.

And firefighters from the government-held suburb of Hrasnica, entered the Serb-held district of Ilidza overnight Saturday under escort from French IFOR troops.

But Haselock said the problems in Ilidza and Grbavica had been exaggerated by the press.

"We are confronted with two Sarajevos," one which has suffered "up to 40 or 50 fires in the past week or so in Grbavica and Ilidza" ranging from "fully fledged fires that might have burned a building to a barrel of oil that caught fire."

In the other, "the blood-splattered Sarajevo, lawlessness is rampant, the police and drunken gangs prey on the weak, looters and arsonists roam around and people live in unheated flats, by day and night, counting the minutes before they are brutalized and murdered."

"We are convinced that this Sarajevo is an exaggeration...a product of fear and not fact.... We believe there is no reason for hysteria or panic," he said.

B-H: IFOR Disarms Serb Police After Civilian Assaulted

LD1003180396 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The police of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina who are deployed near the Implementation Force's [IFOR] Loncari checkpoint on the Arizona Road linking Orasje and Tuzla have assaulted a civilian. Mario Ivkic reports:

[Ivkic] IFOR's U.S. soldiers do not intend to tolerate incidents in their vicinity any longer and this has been confirmed by what happened at the Serb checkpoint in the village of Loncari on the Arizona Road.

The police of the Serb Republic deployed near IFOR's checkpoint assaulted a civilian. IFOR representatives reacted promptly. They protected the civilian, disarmed the Serb Republic police, and removed them from the checkpoint. [passage omitted]

B-H: Krajisnik, Smith End Talks on Burning, Looting

LD1003211596 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] News just in: Talks between Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic People's Assembly, and IFOR [Implementation Force] Commander Leighton Smith have ended. Most attention was paid to Muslim manipulations regarding territorial division in the Novi Grad area, particularly in the suburb of Dobrinja, and the exchange of prisoners. Here are the statements they made after the talks:

[Begin recording] [Smith, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croat translation] The president [Krajisnik] has asked me to do several things, which I have agreed to do. I think the most important and the immediate problem is to convey to those who might be listening to this that we both deplore the looting and burning and the allegations of intimidation that are occurring in the areas where the Serbs are residing in Sarajevo.

We both urge those people who choose to leave to do so, if they wish, but we also urge them to recognize that the actions that some are taking now are clearly inflammatory, threatening their neighbors, and inflicting damage on the prospects for peace.

We also talked about the release of some of POWs that are being held. I have agreed to convey some messages from the president on this subject. He has agreed to look into a couple of issues that I asked him to do.

We also discussed some concerns about the map, and I told the president that I shall try to resolve those discrepancies. But, I think, given the sensitivity of these issues, further details, probably, are not at this point available.

As always, I appreciate the hospitality of President Krajisnik; it is always good to meet him. Every time we meet something positive comes out of it.

[Krajisnik] I would only like to thank Admiral Smith, who, within his very busy schedule and with all the problems burdening him, came to resolve some issues at our request and intervention. What the admiral has just told you are the problems linked with Sarajevo.

We would like to appeal to the people not to burn houses, to disqualify [Serbo-Croat: diskvalifikovati] all those who are looting and who are making people leave Serb Sarajevo. We have have conveyed to the admiral the concern of the association of the families of POWs, appealing that all POWs be released from prison as soon as possible. The admiral displayed a desire to convey this to the other side as soon as possible; he will urge to a maximum degree that all POWs be released.

We also discussed the issue of the maps; in the forthcoming period this will also be examined. What I can say is that as with all other issues that we have raised so far, the admiral has remained completely convinced that obligations that IFOR has assumed both regarding the freedom of movement and the taking of property out and providing security within the limits of their capabilities—that IFOR Will do everything in its power to observe all this [sentence as heard].

We have to do everything to maintain good relations with IFOR in the future. I would like to thank the admiral for everything that he has done, including what he is going to do regarding the aforementioned issues. [end recording]

B-H: Pejanovic Seeks More IFOR, International Police

LD1003224596 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council [SCC] assesses the situation in Ilidza and Grbavica as alarming and is sending an urgent message to the international community, that is their representatives in Bosnia-Hercegovina, to take more concrete and decisive measures.

[Begin SCC Chairman Pejanovic recording] We have asked Mr. Steiner for new measures to be taken that are within the powers of the international community. The Serb police, irrespective of what it may be like, are not any more in these areas; chaos and lawlessness reign there. The extremists, who have been active there anyway, have stepped into that vacuum. They may bring about very, very serious consequences, two kinds of consequences. One is complete exodus of people, and the other is complete destruction of property and buildings, arsons.

We do not know what the international community will be able to do. What we can do is to suggest to them to take new measures. One of these measures should be larger forces, both IFOR [Implementation Force] and international police, in these areas. Maybe IFOR should take extraordinary measures to protect these areas in order to prevent arson of bulidings, arson of houses, and eviction of people from their homes. [end recording]

B-H: Territorial Demarcation Carried Out in Sarajevo

AU0903195296 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The evacuation of Sarajevo Serbs continues. The main task of the committee for accommodating the refugees is to evacuate the remaining families from the municipalities of Ilijas, Vogosca, Rajlovac, and Centar.

The territorial demarcation between the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was officially carried out today in Novo Sarajevo, or rather the area between the memorial park in Vrace and Trebevic.

With this demarcation, the road between Lukavica and Pale has been split in two places, the area from the memorial park to the intersection on Ohridska Street and at Trebevic. Italian IFOR [Implementation Force] troops are marking the future border between the two entities.

B-H: Serb PM, Yugoslav Officials View Cooperation

LD1003221296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2045 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 Mar (SRNA)—[Bosnian] Serb Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic received a Yugoslav business delegation in Banja Luka this evening.

Prime Minister Kasagic and Banja Luka businessmen acquainted the Yugoslav delegation with the current economic situation in the Serb Republic and the possibilities for economic cooperation.

"The Serb Republic has huge economic resources, particularly in mining and forestry—in some cases even larger than Yugoslavia's," Kasagic said and expressed his hope that many Yugoslav companies would establish economic cooperation with Serb Republic businessmen.

He said he was pleased that Serbian and Montenegrin businessmen had visited the Serb Republic immediately after the war and added that "the Serb Republic would have found itself in a very unfortunate situation without their aid and economic ties."

"Serbia and Montenegro will never abandon their brothers in the Serb Republic," the chairman of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, Mihajlo Milojevic, said and added that bilateral economic cooperation must be continued.

"With its economic resources, efforts, and with our aid, the Serb Republic will become a modern state with good prospects" Milojevic said in conclusion.

B-H: UK Troops on Alert for Alleged War Criminal Martic

LD0803172296 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1653 GMT 8 Mar 96

[By defense and diplomatic correspondent Charles Miller]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] British troops are to be placed on alert for an alleged war criminal after the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal issued its first arrest warrant today.

Croatian Serb separatist leader Milan Martic had been indicted for allegedly ordering rocket attacks on Zagreb last May.

But the tribunal's decision in The Hague to go further and issue a warrant for his arrest is a clear indication it believes it has sufficient evidence for prosecution.

Martic is believed to be living in the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka where more than 200 British troops from the 2nd Battalion The Light Infantry and the Light Dragoons are based.

The tribunal's presiding judge, Claude Jorda of France, said the warrant would be sent to the Nato-led peace implementation force in Bosnia.

Martic's photograph is among those of the 53 alleged war criminals already indicted and British troops in Banja Luka will be asked to look out specifically for him.

But Nato has insisted the troops would not be expected to launch a manhunt in the town.

"If we come across him in the normal course of our duties, we will detain him," said a spokesman.

"But there will be no manhunt. The responsibility for arresting these people in an active way falls to the parties under the peace agreement. It is not a military task."

Martic has admitted ordering the attacks with Orkan rockets which killed seven and injured hundreds more. He claims they were aimed at saving the lives of Croatian Serbs fleeing a Croat army offensive.

Tribunal judges heard prosecution evidence last week after Serb and Croat authorities failed to arrest Martic.

A former police inspector, Martic was indicted by the war crimes tribunal last July charged with ordering rocket attacks on civilians on May 2 and 3 in what prosecutors have said was an act of sheer terrorism.

The warrant naming him as an international fugitive from justice marks the first time the tribunal has issued such a specific mandate to IFOR troops to arrest a war crimes suspect.

Martic was "president" of the former Croatian enclave of Krajina until last August when the Croatian army launched a strike through the Serb-held territory and 150,000 Serbs fled.

According to a military expert, who gave evidence, the Orkan rocket is mainly intended as an anti-personnel weapon as it is difficult to target accurately and built to kill and maim with showers of fragments and steel spheres within a 10 metre radius.

"The choice of Orkan rockets would not be appropriate had the purpose been to damage military targets," Judge Jorda said. "The military expert believes that the main reason for using such rockets was attacking and intimidating the civilian population," he told the chamber.

B-H: Martic Denies Being War Criminal

LD0803205496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2029 GMT 8 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, March 8 (TANJUG)—President of the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) Milan Martic said on Friday [8 March] in a statement to TANJUG that he was not regarding himself as a criminal but as a man who has struggled for his people.

Martic, in a statement to TANJUG's journalist, said that he was experiencing The Hague tribunal's decision to issue an international warrant for his arrest as 'indicting and issuing a warrant for the entire Serb people.'

'If the court in The Hague really were a court of justice, I would very gladly appear before it and prove that I am not a criminal but a man who has struggled for his people,' said Martic, adding that, unfortunately, 'arguments are not essential for world power wielders.'

'With a trial in The Hague, the world power wielders want to shake guilt off of themselves for the breaking of the sovereign state of Yugoslavia,' said he.

Asked whether he feared arrest, Martic said that that would be 'specific terrorism, to which one responds in a specific way' and that he was not either afraid or upset.

The Hague Tribunal for War Crimes Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia issued on Friday an international warrant for Martic's arrest under charges of being responsible for war crimes.

The Hague Tribunal in its indictment against Martic says that in May, 1995, he ordered the shelling of the Croatian capital city of Zagreb.

Croatia: Granic, Milutinovic Call Talks 'Constructive'

AU1103141596 Paris AFP in English 1336 GMT 11 Mar 96

[Report by Sonia Bakaric]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 11 (AFP)—Croatia and rump Yugoslavia have taken a step towards normalising relations with the first visit Monday to Zagreb by Belgrade's foreign minister since the independence war, government spokesmen said here.

Milan Milutinovic, the foreign minister of rump Yugoslavia, held two hours of "constructive" talks in Zagreb with his Croatian counterpart Mate Granic, Yugoslav deputy foreign minister, Zivadin Jovanovic, said.

The visit was the first official visit at this level since Croatia declared independence from Belgrade in 1991, setting off more than four years of war in the region.

Croatian deputy foreign minister, Ivan Simonovic, said Zagreb was "happy with these first negotiations."

Saying an agreement could be signed "soon" and that a joint text was to be published later Monday, he said the two sides had discussed six economic agreements covering the reopening of the main Zagreb-Belgrade highway, closed since 1991, the resumption of rail and air links, consular questions and telecommunications.

The two sides had also discussed the questions of missing people, the liberation of prisoners and the recognition of rump Yugoslavia as successor state to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, Simonovic said.

"Obviously the central issue was the normalisation of relations," he said.

For Jovanovic: "The most important thing is that the two foreign ministers showed their committment to creating the conditions for a complete normalisation of relations."

"There is a visible effort on both sides to find agreement on all the topics discussed," he added.

He said this would help the implementation of Bosnia's Dayton peace agreement and the agreement on the east Slavonia region, due to revert from rebel Serb to Croatian control.

The two delegations were to continue talks during the afternoon and later meet Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

The visit of the Yugoslav minister follows a groundbreaking visit by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic to Belgrade on January 10.

Brussels considers the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb as the key to stability in the Balkan region and the European Union has pressured Croatia to normalise relations with Serbia which were shattered by the war that broke out between Serbian-backed Serb rebels and the Zagreb regime when Zagreb declared independence in 1991.

That rebellion effectively ended last year after a Croatian offensive which gave Zagreb back its control over all but a tiny scrap of Serb-held land in eastern Croatia.

Among other topics expected to be discussed was the problem of the disputed Prevlaka peninsula and the fate of the Croatian Serbs, both in Croatia and living as refugees in Serbia after fleeing Croatia last year.

Reports in the Belgrade press have recently suggested that the problem of Prevlaka, a Croatian peninsula which dominates a Yugoslav navy port in Montenegro, will be settled with a demilitarisation of the area.

Belgrade meanwhile has insisted that before it recognise Croatia, Zagreb must recognise rump Yugoslavia as the sole "legitimate" successor to the former Yugoslavia.

Recognition of Croatia would finally bring the curtain down on Serb ambitions for the eastern Slavonia region of eastern Croatia, still held by Serb separatists but due to revert to Croatian control over the next one to two years.

Croatia: B-H Parliamentary Delegates, Tudjman Discuss Ties

AU0803142796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A parliamentary delegation of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Assembly Speaker Miro Lazovic, held talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb this morning. [Words indistinct] Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa. Currently underway are the final talks with the delegation of the Croatian Sabor. Nada al Issa reports from Zagreb: [Begin recording] No official statements were made in the presidential headquarters. However, I have learned unofficially that they discussed the overall relations of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia. As our source claims, the talks could not bypass the forcefully imposed crisis in the Sarajevo quarter of Hadzici, which, as it is known, the Croatian police tried to create by attempting to enter this quarter unlawfully, for some peculiar reason, even before the federal police and the Implementation Force.

With Croatian Prime Minister Matesa the delegation of the Assembly and the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed, as Matesa himself said, the project of the federation. He did not explain what he understood under this term. However, he announced a new meeting of the representatives of the two government in 10 days. The Bosnia-Herzegovina assembly delegation is ending its official visit to Zagreb today.

While the parliamentary delegations of the two countries are discussing the improvement of relations, the Croatian media have unfortunately continued with the attacks on the Bosniak side today, blaming it for all the evil in the delay of the federation's setup. [end recording]

Croatia: Iranian Ambassador Views Aims, Ties to B-H

AU1103112896 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 96 pp 11-12

["Exclusive" interview with Mohammad Javad Asayesh Zarchi, ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Zagreb, by Igor Alborghetti, in Zagreb; date not given: "I Have Suggested That One Should Start Defending Doctoral Dissertations on Iranian Origin of Croats at University in Tehran!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] I would not like you to put Salman Rushdie's name in large, bold letters in the headline of this interview! That is insignificant in comparison to other, more important, things that we have talked about today. This is what I was requested by the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Croatia Mohammad Javad Asayesh Zarchi as he rose from a bulky three-seater sofa in his office.

For an hour, as long as this exclusive interview for GLOBUS lasted, the winter sunshine had shone through the large, closed glass door, into the ambassador's office in the elite Zagreb residential area.

The air inside was heavy, suffocating, from time to time refreshed by the smell of the hot fruit tea served by a taciturn bearded man.

"To begin with, I would like to say," he started, "that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century. The Muslims and Bosniaks have suffered the most in that war. If we look back at recent history, we will see that the situation was no different then. Our advice: In Europe one has to create conditions for Muslims, such as there are in Iran for Christians. You see, 98 percent of our population are Muslims. Less than 2 percent of the population are members of other religions, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, but their religions are official in Iran. So in our country there is no difference at all between Christians and Muslims. Moreover, Islam is in the religious sense the closest to Christianity, and I can say that the message of Jesus is familiar to us and more sacred than in some European Christian countries. After three years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Dayton agreement was signed. A new situation was created. All sides to the conflict have signed the Dayton agreement, and Iran supported that. Yet the Dayton agreement is not fair toward the Bosniaks."

Bosniaks—Biggest Losers

[Alborghetti] Why do you think that the Bosniaks have lost the most by signing the peace agreement? What would be your appraisal of the position of Croats after Dayton?

[Zarchi] The Bosniaks are real losers. They have lost more than the others. However, it is all the same. They have signed the peace agreement. It is also clear that the Serbs have won the most after the genocide they had committed.

[Alborghetti] Could the injustice of the agreement cause a new war?

[Zarchi] I hope it will not cause a new war, but wars break out in Europe much more frequently than elsewhere in the world...

[Alborghetti] Iran and the United States, although otherwise assuming opposite political positions, want to achieve the same political goal in Bosnia today: peace. How do you see the crucial role of the United States in reaching peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zarchi] I do not know whether the United States means it sincerely when it says that it wants to help Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am not sure if that is the truth or merely propaganda from the American political parties in the preelection campaign. Nevertheless, the result is the policy that helps Bosnia, which is good.

[Alborghetti] There are often rumors that some of the Bosnian politicians, assisted by certain foreign factors, want to establish Bosnia-Herzegovina as a distinctly Islamic country. Do you think that Bosnia-Herzegovina can be a strictly Islamic state?

[Zarchi] Regarding the fact that Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina make up 46 percent of the population, nobody sees Bosnia as a religious Islamic state. Even to consider it indicates that one is not aware of the real situation.

In the Balkans, there is a different ratio of nationalism and religion. In fact, religion equals nationalism. Every Serb is Orthodox. You will hardly find a Serb Catholic or a Croat Orthodox. There is no border between nationalism and religion in the Balkans. It is one and the same thing. True, that is more a sociological than political question. It is all the same with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina—to belong to a religion is in fact to belong to a nation.

Iranians in Bosnia

[Alborghetti] Foreign citizens, who were arrested by the American units of IFOR [Implementation Force] at the Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP [Ministry of Interior] Antiterrorist Training Center near Fojnica a couple of weeks ago, had Iranian diplomatic passports. In your view, what happened there and what were those people doing there?

[Zarchi] I do not know what happened there, but you, certainly, know what the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic said about that case.

[Alborghetti] Have they come as a part of the military help sent to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army from Iran?

[Zarchi] I heard about it for the first time then. However, I can say that from the beginning of the war, to today, Iran has been trying to help Bosnia in a humanitarian sense. That propaganda about Islamic terrorists was caused by the animosity of the United States toward Iran. Twenty-four hours after entering the house, IFOR realized their mistake and released the people. They told them: "You can go!"

[Alborghetti] Where are those Iranians now?

[Zarchi] They are no longer in Bosnia. They returned to Iran via Zagreb. The United States and IFOR spread the theory about Iranian terrorists, and they know it is not true. It is pure propaganda. They have released them, and I am convinced that even before they barged in they had known that there was nothing there. That was a propaganda activity organized in advance. I have already said in one interview that one of them was a qualified agronomist. They held him for an hour. Apart from that, if one country invites someone to come to visit, what is the guest to be blamed for?

[Alborghetti] But they found plastic explosives, weapons, plans of the IFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo, in the very same house. What do you say about that?

[Zarchi] I myself am not sure that those things were actually there. It is possible that it was an insinuation by IFOR—the United States respectively. I tell you that from experience because I know that the attitude of the United States toward Iran is unjust and unrealistic. Perhaps the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina knows the truth. They have better information. Those American soldiers, heavily armed, attacked that house near Fojnica with the combat helicopters and arrested Iranian citizens in it.

[Alborghetti] Do you have any information about the organized sending of Iranian citizens into Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight in the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army?

[Zarchi] Among the people you call mujahidin, there is nobody from Iran. Not only today, but there was nobody there even before. Nobody from Iran has spent even a minute fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not need warriors. It has enough of them. The government in Zagreb, with which we have excellent cooperation, is also familiar with this stand of ours.

[Alborghetti] On Monday THE NEW YORK TIMES published an article in which anonymous officers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army claim that already several hundred members of their army have been training in Iran. Can you confirm those quotations?

[Zarchi] Those American claims are groundless and false. However, if the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina asks that of us, we are ready to enable the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army to receive their military training in Iran.

Israel and Palestine

[Alborghetti] Some Western journalists claim that in the heart of Zagreb, in the Iranian Embassy, terrorist attacks on western targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been planned. What can you say about that?

[Zarchi] I have never read anything like that. Some journalists from the West, as well as those from the United States, exaggerate things. The United States Government is not sincere when it talks about relations with Iran. They talk about terrorism, although the U.S. Congress has recently approved $20 million to finance groups that threaten Iran by terrorist attacks and by toppling the Iranian Government. That is not good for the United States. I think that this allocation of funds for terrorist activities in Iran will remain a black spot in American history.

In the world, Iran is the country that opposes terrorism the most because that form of violence has had the greatest death toll. [passage omitted]

[Alborghetti] I would like to ask you about the recent arrest of nine Iranian citizens near Jajce. At the news conference held after that event, among other things, you invited Croatian authorities to be more cooperative. You also said that this group of Iranians had been on a religious visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you think there are problems in relations between Croatia and Iran?

[Zarchi] There are many different trade, cultural, and other delegations from Iran visiting Croatia. It is the same case in Bosnia. We have been trying to help in order to recover Bosnia's economy and enable it to start producing. From time to time, this is not good for our mutual relations. Even at the time of the Croat-Muslim war, Iran was helping to stop it. We were patient and we helped in the creation of a positive picture of Croats. These occasional HVO actions, particularly the murder of two Iranians, one of which was a journalist...

[Alborghetti] Are you talking about the murder that occurred several years ago in the vicinity of Mostar?

[Zarchi] The murder took place in Mostar 18 months ago. The murdered man, Mohammad Hossen Navab, was a KAYHANA correspondent and he was in a taxi. I think they took his money and killed him. His buried corpse was found 20 days later.

[Alborghetti] Have the Mostar authorities found the murderers?

[Zarchi] We have not received any information about it to this day. But we persistently continue to raise that question. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Martic 'Unmoved' by Hague Indictment

AU0803172196 Paris AFP in English 1655 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 8 (AFP)—Former Croatian Serb separatist leader Milan Martic said on Friday [8 March] he was "unmoved," after an international arrest warrant was issued against him.

The warrant "does not surprise me in the slightest, neither does it move me ... and I am not afraid of being arrested," Martic said in a statement to journalists.

Journalists were allowed to meet Martic in a locality in eastern Bosnia on condition they did not reveal his whereabouts.

Martic reiterated that he would consider any attempt to arrest him as "a terrorist act" and that he would respond in "an appropriate manner."

"If the ICT (International Criminal Tribunal) truly represented justice, I would willingly surrender with my collaborators to prove that I am not a war criminal, but my arguments do not interest the powers of this world," Martic added.

On Friday, the International War Crimes tribunal in the Hague upheld an indictment issued in July 1995 against Martic, who is accused of ordering a devastating shelling attack on civilians in Zagreb on May 2 and 3 last year in which at least seven people died.

The international arrest warrant was delivered to the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) enforcing the Dayton peace accords on Bosnia.

Croatia: Martic Rejects Authority of Hague Tribunal

LD0803162296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1550 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 8 Mar (SRNA)—The charges which the Hague tribunal has brought against me neither surprise nor alarm me. This is a trial of the Serb people, Milan Martic, [former] president of the Republic of Serb Krajina, told SRNA today.

According to him, "the men of power in the world are using the court in The Hague to absolve themselves of the blame for the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia."

"At the time when the Republic of Serb Krajina was a [UN-] protected zone the Croats carried out an act of aggression against it five times and committed hundreds of crimes for which no one was held responsible," Martic said. He added:

"If the Hague tribunal were really a court of justice I would very gladly appear and prove that I am not a war criminal. However, after everything that has happened in western Slavonia and Krajina one cannot believe in the objectivity of a court which stays silent about the crimes committed against the Serb people."

Croatia: Lawyer Says Blaskic To Appear at Tribunal

AU0903172196 Paris AFP in English 1319 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 9 (AFP)—Croatian General Tihomir Blaskic, accused of ordering a massacre of Moslem civilians in Bosnia in 1993, should be ready to appear before a war crimes tribunal in April, his lawyer said Saturday [9 March].

"We still have some small procedural points to settle... I am not yet able to give a precise date but it will not be before April 15," Blaskic's lawyer Zvonimir Hodak, told an independent Croatian radio station.

Blaskic, accused by the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICT) of ordering the 1993 massacre at Ahmici in central Bosnia, was willing to give himself up voluntarily "to prove his innocence," Hodak said on March 1.

On Saturday, Hodak said he wanted assurances of unlimited access to Blaskic "at all hours, day or night" and not "at fixed hours as the ICT wants."

Hodak said Blaskic still intended voluntarily to appear before the ICT in The Hague.

If he does appear, Blaskic would be the first Croat to go before the ICT on war crimes charges. He was among six Croats indicted by the ICT in November.

Earlier this month, Bosnian Serb General Djordje Djukic pleaded not guilty to charges of crimes against humanity before the ICT. Djukic is the second Serb official in custody to be charged with war crimes. Dusan Tadic is to stand trial in May.

In total, 53 Serbs and Croats have been indicted for war crimes. The tribunal has announced it will soon indict a number of Bosnian Moslems.

Blaskic, a former Yugoslav army officer, was commander of the Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Democratic Community] militia units when about a hundred Moslem civilians were massacred on April 18, 1993 in Ahmici.

Hodak, a lawyer known for high-profile political cases, said earlier this month that in return for giving himself up before Croatia introduces an extradition law, Blaskic would not be jailed, but would be under "residential surveillance with his family and be free to move around."

Blaskic was an "educated officer who has insisted that human rights and international conventions be respected," Hodak said.

Croatia: Unions Start Petition for General Strike

*AU0803082596 Paris AFP in English
1736 GMT 7 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 7 (AFP)—Croatia's main trade unions on Thursday [7 March] began distribution of a petition to factories and work places throughout the country, aiming to whip up backing for a general strike later this month.

"We started distributing the petition today (Thursday). We hope we will get more than 400,000 signatures," Dragutin Lesar, the president of the Society of Independent Unions of Croatia (SSSH) said.

The SSSH, the largest trades union organisation in Croatia, late last month announced it would call a general strike later this month if the government did not agree to a higher minimum wage and changes to a range of laws governing salary negotiations and social costs.

The unions would be ready up until March 15 to meet with Prime Minister Slatko Matesa to discuss the claims, Lesar said.

"We want real negotiations," the union leader said.

"We are determined to start a general strike," around March 20 if there is no real negotiation, he added.

If it took place, the strike would be the first in Croatia since it gained its independence from Belgrade in 1991.

It would be also be the most significant sign of social discontent since the Serb rebellion in Croatia was crushed last August.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who knows he cannot dismiss social discontent lightly after his rightwing ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party scored a weaker than expected victory in legislative elections in October, has nonetheless attacked the strike plans.

The strike "is the work of people wanting to overthrow the democratically elected Croatian authorities," he said last month.

Government ministers have meanwhile dismissed the unions' claims as "unrealistic" and liable to "wreck the state's budget."

Croatia: President Tudjman Appoints New Press Secretary

*LD0803194496 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 8 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Article 106 of Croatian Constitution and Article 6 of the ruling on the president of the republic's office, President Tudjman decided on 1 March to appoint Tihomir Vinkovic as his public relations secretary.

The decision came into effect on the day of it was adopted.

Poland: Commentary on Chinese Maneuvers in Taiwan Strait

WS0803135296 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Mar 96 p 7

[Commentary by Krzysztof Darewicz: "Rockets or Pragmatism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chinese maneuvers that are beginning today near Taiwan are a dangerous escalation of tension that pose a threat to regional stability and economic development. This tension is not good either for the Chinese, who stand a historic chance of overcoming poverty, or for the Taiwanese, who want the prosperity they have already achieved to be based on democratic foundations.

The first free presidential elections to be held in Taiwan on 23 March are not good news for the communists in Beijing. This is because it will no longer be possible to impose on the Taiwanese a type of reunification model that would ignore their aspirations. Rockets may temper the enthusiasm of the biggest advocates of Taiwan's independence, but they will not halt the process of the country's democratization. Incidentally, the more Beijing tries to intimidate Taipei, the greater sympathy the island will enjoy in the international community.

For the time being, nothing reportedly indicates that Beijing intends to carry out an armed invasion of Taiwan. Advocates of the island's independence do not have a big chance to win the elections, whereas incumbent President Li Teng-hui, who is considered to be the favorite, supports reunification. However, will this be enough?

Li Kuan-yew, a Singapore patriarch who is trusted by both Beijing and Taipei, proposes a compromise. Taiwan might give up trying to obtain the status of UN member, which it should not count on as long as Beijing has a veto right, and the Taiwanese leaders might stop paying visits to the United States, which China finds irritating. Beijing, in turn, would renounce the use of force and would allow Taiwan to have greater "international room" in economic and cultural spheres. Confrontation can be averted only if the scope of Taiwan's connections to the world is precisely specified and, first of all, if there is a peaceful atmosphere and if both sides are prepared to make concessions.

The Chinese people, from Beijing through Taiwan to Singapore, are famous for being pragmatic. Let us hope that this time also pragmatism will prove stronger than rockets on both sides of the Formosa Strait.

Poland: Government Lacks Funds for Battalion in Bosnia

WS0803143596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 7 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by "LUZ": "The Army. No Money for Polish Soldiers; Will One More Battalion Go to Bosnia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The costs of keeping the Polish battalion in Bosnia will be twice as high as predicted, warned the Ministry of National Defense [MON] at a closed session of the Senate Defense Commission. Last December the government agreed to spend 30 million zlotys [Z] on the operation (but it has failed to indicate where the money is to come from), yet military estimates claim Z68 million is needed.

"It is impossible to meet all of the demands raised by the ministries," says Deputy Finance Minister Halina Wasilewska-Trenker.

Despite this, as we learned at MON, calculations are already being carried out to establish the costs of sending another group of soldiers to Bosnia to repair one of the major roads.

Meanwhile, we have been receiving alarming signals from Bosnia, where 600 Polish soldiers from the 16th Airborne Assault Battalion have been stationed since January. Only recently, two Serbo-Croatian translators were sent there and several more were hired on site to enable the soldiers to communicate with the locals. Soldiers who want to make phone calls to Poland use our only R-140 radio station. Huge lines form, so everyone gets to call home only once or twice a month. There is a local telephone switchboard in Teslic, but one minute costs 36 German marks. The Danes and Americans, for example, use their own satellite phones.

Polish soldiers are complaining about their uniforms (daily temperature differences can reach as much as 20-30 degrees Celsius), mostly about their bullet-proof vests. "The instruction tells us to protect our vests against moisture. What can a soldier who stands out in the rain all day do?" asks one of the men.

The Krakow-based KOMANDOS (Special Military Magazine), which is closely tied to the 16th Battalion, goes as far as to say that the vests are not bullet-proof at all because "even a 9-mm Makarov bullet slices through them like through butter."

The magazine claims the soldiers are complaining not only about uniforms and vests, but also about "antiquated, pocket P-64 pistols, which are very dangerous for users."

Some soldiers (the group housed in tents) do not have civilized sanitary devices—toilets and mobile washrooms with real showers. All soldiers feel the lack of a canteen and the prohibition of leaving their quarters. "Did anyone ever think about what more than 600 soldiers could do in their free time?" asks KOMANDOS.

Poland: Daily Reports Pope Refused To Meet Kwasniewski

LD0903102896 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0356 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 9 Mar—The Vatican has definitely refused President Aleksander Kwasniewski's request to meet Pope John Paul II, ZYCIE WARSZAWY reports. The president has been making efforts to meet the pope since the beginning of his term of office. The Vatican diplomacy justifies its position by citing the delay of over two years in ratifying the Concordat, for which the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is mainly blamed.

Delicate negotiations with the primate [Cardinal Glemp] and Stefan Frankiewicz, the well-established Polish ambassador to the Vatican, have not helped Kwasniewski. The ambassador brought the refusal to Warsaw at the end of February. Because of the Vatican's position, neither Kwasniewski nor the new prime minister will pay an official visit to the Italian Republic. So far, all heads of government and Lech Walesa have met Pope John Paul II while on trips to Italy.

Meanwhile, diplomatic conventions require Kwasniewski to visit Italy as soon as possible, mainly because Italy is now chairing the European Union, Cezary Gmyz of ZYCIE WARSZAWY stresses.

Because of the refusal, efforts have started to make the Italian president's working visit to the Central European Initiative [CEI] summit in Lancut [southeastern Poland] in June official. With this, diplomatic duties will be fulfilled, and Kwasniewski will not have to go to Italy, the ZYCIE WARSZAWY journalist forecasts.

Poland: Envoy Denies Pope Refused To Meet Kwasniewski

LD0903154696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Stefan Frankiewicz, the Polish ambassador to the Vatican, has denied the report published in today's ZYCIE WARSZAWY that the Holy See has firmly refused [President] Aleksander Kwasniewski's request for an audience with Pope John Paul II.

Vatican press spokesman Joacquin Navarro-Valls refused to comment on this report.

The Polish ambassador said the paper's report is merely what he called journalistic speculation.

Poland: President Kwasniewski Interviewed

LD0803195996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0620 GMT 8 Mar 96

[Studio interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by an unidentified correspondent—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Your guest, ladies and gentlemen, our program's guest is Aleksander Kwasniewski, the president of the Polish Republic. Good morning, Mr. President.

[Kwasniewski] Good morning.

[Correspondent] Let us begin with what everyone has lately been talking a lot about—that is taxes, gifts, and your opinion, which, let's face it, we are glad to hear. You said that regulations must not be changed during the tax year.

[Kwasniewski] That is my opinion, and I think it is one of the fundamental principles that the accepted rules, approved by the Sejm, signed by the president and made public should remain the same throughout the budget year. Of course, if the following year the legislators or the government want to draw conclusions and change them, they are entitled to do so, but that requires the whole procedure and should apply to the new period, the new year. That is why I said what I did. That is what I believe, and I think that would be a better position than any kind of experiments now or changes during the tax year.

[Correspondent] So, even were the Sejm to pass such an amendment, you would not sign such an act?

[Kwasniewski] I would not sign it if it meant a change in the taxation principles in the course of the year.

But for the moment I would like us to take a calm look at all of the plans that are being discussed now because there is a lot of noise but few facts. It will be useful to examine in detail the things that are being proposed or spoken of by government representatives. I am not sure it will be possible to convince the Sejm of the need for changes of this kind.

The argument concerning the budget and its fulfillment, the revenues that were planned for the budget is not trivial. All of these issues are not trivial. But there are two arguments in collision here: a strictly economic argument and a legal argument, which, especially in tax issues, should take priority.

[Correspondent] Have you perhaps talked about this with Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, because this issue has been with us for many weeks, I have talked with Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko and Prime Minister [Wlodzimierz] Cimoszewicz. And solutions are being sought that will not expose the law to unnecessary experiments but will also make it possible to find solutions to possible budget difficulties.

But as I have said, all of these things are still fairly uncertain and unclear, and it is hard even to estimate the magnitude of the potential shortfall as far as budget revenues are concerned. I think that, in the next few days,. the government will be able to speak more specifically about the effects of the taxpayers' use of the provision for gifts. But we will see what transpires.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, should anyone bear the consequences because of the presence of this provision in the act?

[Kwasniewski] Undoubtedly, but I would like us to be fair. It is a fact that success has many fathers, whereas no one willingly admits defeat. But seeing as we know the procedure through which these decisions are made, I believe there are a great many coauthors of this solution. It was born somewhere at the level of Finance Ministry officials; it was approved by the government, not by the finance minister alone; it was passed onto the Sejm, where commissions worked on it—the commissions also approved this provision; later it was passed by a majority in the Sejm; and it was signed by the president. So I think that, if we were to speak of those who took part in this procedure, there would be a great many of them.

But I would like to say the following: The very idea of gifts and allowances for these against tax is, I think, valuable. Of course, if it were to be merely a source of abuse, that would be a very bad thing, and it would discredit us. But I think that right now there is the risk that with this gifts story we could throw out the baby with the bath water. It could turn out that we could give up all allowances in the tax system because we might decide that every allowance could be abused, be it for gifts, maintenance, or other allowances—for instance, education. That will be a bad thing because I believe that a tax system that allows some maneuver connected with such public acts that assist others, which are charitable, is necessary. And I still tend to believe that it will turn out that the Poles use this mechanism in a rational and sensible way, and there are no abuses of enormous magnitude here or the use of a back door for effectively reducing the tax that is being paid.

[Correspondent] You are putting the legal issues in order, Mr. President. You have withdrawn from the Sejm the last president's, Lech Walesa's, veto against amendments to the act on the takeover of the assets of the former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR].

[Kwasniewski] That was a decision that you have rightly described as putting things in order. This issue is causing all sorts of problems—pure legal problems because the courts are having problems in establishing clearly to what extent the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] is liable and should account for the assets it took over.

Let us remember that we are talking about issues that are already several years old. The assets of the PZPR were shared out or taken over in various ways. Some were taken over directly by the State Treasury, a government commission dealt with it, some—those that were made up from the members' dues—were passed over and held by the SdRP.

I have decided that to put all this in order we need to sign an act that allows a more precise definition of the parties' responsibilities in court proceedings and also allows creditors—that is, those individuals who have claims against the assets of the former PZPR—to pursue their rights more effectively. And I think this act will put things in order that will be equally useful for public life in Poland and useful for those who have justified claims against the assets of the former PZPR.

[Correspondent] But Mr. President, there have already been accusations by deputies from the opposition coalition, from the opposition, saying that at first the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] was intentionally delaying the issue in parliament, waiting for the elections, so that if you won the elections you could withdraw your predecessor's veto.

[Kwasniewski] Well, you know, if someone formulates such views, he must clearly think very highly of the SLD politicians, who were so certain of the presidential victory that they had pursued the whole of this procedure. It was not so. The delays in the work on the act in the Sejm resulted from legal doubts that the act gave rise to, on both sides, among the proponents and the opponents of the act. Various specialist opinions were sought. It became delayed. It was not an act that was treated by the Sejm as the most urgent or fundamental, which was also connected with the passage of time. But developing a scenario based on a probable but highly risky outcome of presidential elections is a gross exaggeration.

[Correspondent] But the newspapers are full of quotes. This is not even Falandization. This is a clear mockery of the law, Professor Falandysz [former Walesa adviser] himself said.

[Kwasniewski] Prof. Falandysz as a critic of legal actions is a special case in Poland. I see no transgressions in this case. As a president who has taken office, I have the right, and I have made use of this right, to uphold some of the acts of my predecessor and to withdraw others. This veto was one of such unfinished cases, and I decided to withdraw it and sign the act, especially because I am not convinced by the arguments used by my predecessor in this case. I believe the opposite to be true.

This act is not going to make things easier for the SdRP; it will put this matter in order. Furthermore, I made this decision once I heard a very clear declaration by SdRP General Secretary Szmajdzinski, that all of these claims or all of these sums awarded by the courts, all that which follows from final rulings by the courts will be paid by the SdRP albeit with difficulty because it is not a very affluent institution. So here we have a guarantee that a political party that has obligations of this kind to the State Treasury is going to fulfill them.

[Correspondent] This is not the only Lech Walesa project that you have withdrawn from the Sejm. Others relate to the Concordat.

[Kwasniewski] This is also a project with a long history. Lech Walesa made an attempt to ratify the Concordat in a somewhat roundabout way—that is, by submitting to the Sejm a draft resolution obliging the president to ratify it in a sense instead of the parliament. And he made several proposals, which I think could be made use of, concerning amendments to the so-called Concordat—related acts, in the civil law, in issues connected with marriages, and so on.

[Correspondent] But could you tell us, please, whether President Aleksander Kwasniewski is in favor of ratifying the Concordat or not.

[Kwasniewski] I have expressed my position on this many times. I believe that, unless new facts come up that dispel the doubts surrounding the Concordat...

[Correspondent, interrupting] But what new facts are these?

[Kwasniewski] Unless new facts come up, it will be very difficult to change the opinion of what appears to be a parliamentary majority, to which I also belonged while in parliament, against ratification of the Concordat.

These new facts are above all the clarification of the doubts that have been voiced for several years now and that have to be cleared up in respect of the will of the Concordat signatories—I mean here the Holy See and the government—and confirmed in acts that should be passed by the Sejm and that concern the issues of marriages, burials, instruction, and financial and tax matters of the church...

[Correspondent, interrupting] Could these new facts—I am sorry...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] I believe—just one more moment—there is another matter, tremendously important as far as I am concerned, which I believe could change the atmosphere surrounding the Concordat, which is the adoption of a compromise notion regarding relations between the state and the church in the Constitution.

If we manage to achieve this kind of compromise, I believe it could constitute an important new fact and could encourage those who are undecided today to take a different look at the Concordat. Because many of the allegations go as follows, that the Concordat in some of its components goes a long way beyond the constitutional provisions and could be abused, for instance, for strengthening or excessively expanding the position of the Catholic Church in Poland. I think that, in order to remove these doubts, it would be useful if we could adopt this kind of constitutional compromise, especially because is easy to see, it is within reach. The things written in the draft that is being prepared by the Constitutional Commission appear to be very much compromise provisions.

[Correspondent] Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek is counting on some kind of initiative from you in this case. Will there be any such thing?

[Kwasniewski] They are there, but, as far as the Concordat is concerned, I have decided for myself that I would prefer not to talk too much about it but, instead, tell the public clearly about how we want to clear up these doubts because I get the impression that, as far as the Concordat is concerned, there are many stereotypes, who is for and who is against, and there is too little work on really trying to clear up these doubts.

So, as far as the Concordat goes, I prefer calm actions, not necessarily publicized at once, which would lead to clearing up the doubts. If we were to succeed in this, then I believe it could change the atmosphere around the Concordat. If we fail, the Sejm is going to face a very simple, although complex, decision, and there is no paradox here because it will have to decide about saying yes or no to the ratification with of course every consequence of this.

[Correspondent] Thank you for this part of the interview. We will meet President Aleksander Kwasniewski in a few minutes. And now the main news in brief. [break in program for news bulletin] [Correspondent] Mr. President, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the work of the National Assembly Constitutional Commission? There were even rumors that you wanted to appoint a constituent assembly so that it could pass...[pauses] prepare the constitution.

[Kwasniewski] I spoke about an emergency solution, which, who knows, perhaps should be introduced if it turns out that this parliament is unable to adopt the constitution. I stress the conditionality of this solution. We should recall that fundamental transformations and changes in the system of government in Poland began in 1989. Seven years have passed, and we still do not have a constitution.

[Correspondent] But you yourself were the chairman of the Constitutional Commission.

[Kwasniewski] Today, I have to tell you, journalists stress that, when I was the chairman, work proceeded quite briskly.

[Correspondent] But eventually you did not keep to the schedule.

[Kwasniewski] I did not because we began a number of political campaigns, which are never helpful in such circumstances. On the other hand, now it seems that we can maintain this schedule. I am glad that changes were made in the commission; it is clear that words of encouragement or criticism produced a result—the commission is about to convene and start work. Deputy Mazurkiewicz [chairman of the National Assembly Constitutional Commission] shows plenty of resolve, which is very good. Therefore, I think that, if the commission's work on the missing chapters could conclude before June, experts could be able to start work in the summer to ensure linguistic consistency of the constitution, so that it can be sent to the National Assembly in September.

Then a scenario in which the constitutional referendum could be carried out in the spring of next year becomes quite real. But the referendum should be preceded by a genuine social debate, so that the constitution extend as far as possible. I declare my readiness to travel and meet people; I think this should become a general task for the world of politics not to make the constitution a social orphan; it should be understood, accepted, or consciously rejected, not just on the basis of a label or somebody's opinion. If we could do this in such a manner—and I see such an opportunity—this emergency option will remain just the reserve solution.

[Correspondent] Have your opinions on the division of power, which will be entered in the constitution, changed since you ceased to be the chairman of the Constitutional Commission and become the president?

[Kwasniewski] No. I think that what we wrote in the constitution was right and perhaps reflects the principle of political balance that we should have in Poland. More or less this maintains today's presidential prerogatives. To exclude any doubts, we certainly have to show great precision in certain clauses that concern mutual relations of the top state bodies. And it also is essential; yesterday I spoke about it with the Constitutional Tribunal [TK]. At some point, laws have to be modernized and conformed to European standards—for example, the position of the TK, the finality of its rulings—which has absolutely become a Pan-European practice. We stand out at this background in a negative light.

[Correspondent] Will you be amending the small constitution?

[Kwasniewski] I still have to talk with the head of the Constitutional Commission and ask him if the deadline I talked about can be kept. Because if it turned out that the deadline could not be kept, then I think that amending the small constitution would be necessary in the part pertaining to the TK.

And, as Judge Garlicki, Professor Garlicki, rightly said in our conversation, it could even turn out to be worthwhile from the point of view of certain experiences we could gain even before the adoption of the full constitution. This is a very sensitive point, one in which the TK obtains wide-ranging powers, since it will decide about legality or illegality [of rules, actions], and its rulings will be final. This also incurs financial commitment, the constitution, therefore, envisages a period of 18 months for the implementation of such rulings so that it does not become a burden for the budget in force and does not break the principle we spoke about, i.e., that rules should not be changed during a tax year, but it will have to be taken into consideration in the next budget. This is a very sensitive, very serious instrument of the law-governed state and it has to be done properly, in a modern way. Perhaps a trial period could be instructive to all of us to become accustomed with the idea that over the legislator there is still the sword of the TK, which gives the final ruling.

[Correspondent] You are the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. Defense ministers keep changing, secretaries and under secretaries keep changing, too. Using the slogan of civilian control over the Army, each of them brings in new ideas. What is the position of the General Staff in all pg this? Don't these ideas bring about the deconstruction of the brain of the Armed Forces, which the General Staff should be?

[Kwasniewski] No. No, no. I am in constant touch on this matter, and in just over two months of my presidency I devoted especially a lot of my attention to this matter—I visited the General Staff, and recently in the Palace we held a discussion on the main constitutional rules concerning the Armed Forces, we spoke about the law on the public defense duties. I think we have reached agreement on the shape of this law. I would say this: No general questions the principle of the civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces because this is a principle of a democratic state ruled by the law, the principle respected in all modern states, the principle that is binding in NATO structures—and there is no doubt about that.

What does it mean in practice? It means that political decisions, decisions that define political strategy, defense strategy, the implementation of these strategies are formed in political circles, and the Armed forces implement them. On the other hand, it obviously does not in the least change the responsibility of the General Staff and the whole structure of the Armed Forces for what is happening in the Army, i.e., for the condition of training, for modernization processes, equipment and its replacement that has been continuing now, for the participation of the Army in international operations—for example, the Polish battalion in Bosnia. Here the responsibility of the [General] Staff and the responsibility of particular military districts and commanders is unquestionable, and I think this is as it should be.

The principal change that has taken place recently was a result of the adopted law on the [post of] minister of national defense. This law constitutes now the final answer on what relations between the General Staff and the civilian leadership of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] are. This means that the civilian leadership of MON has the priority as far as fundamental decisions are concerned, and it is the head of this system.

[Correspondent] But, Mr. President, some people expected that when you became the head of the state it was plainly interpreted by some military people that a number of people would be changed in certain military posts; there were rumors of General Wilecki's departure, but none of this happened nor can these changes be foreseen.

[Kwasniewski] Well, because I am not an adventurist. I am a man who, first and foremost, views people sympathetically and tries to notice what is good in them and not what can only be criticized. I think we have very well trained and educated generals in the Polish Armed Forces and that they perform an exceptional job. I have already spoken about that: They belong to this generation of Polish officers who have to lead the Army from one era to another. And all of the problems, all of the difficulties rest on their shoulders; they have to bear the cross of transformations. And those young colonels, or even other junior officers for that matter, will be privileged to serve in the Army that will, in most likelihood, be in NATO structures, which will have modern equipment, which will have all the transformations behind it. At the moment we are at a very difficult and sensitive stage, at which we have to show prudence when taking any personnel decisions...

[Correspondent, interrupting] But also as far as the military personnel...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] Let me just finish my thought. The military personnel keeps changing in a natural manner after all. Admiral Waga retired at the respectable age of 60 and was replaced by Rear Admiral Lukasik, who is 10 years his junior. Such changes ensue from the timetable and they will be implemented. We cannot have any adventurist approach here. I have never said in any of my public addresses that the new president was a new broom that would sweep clean the General Staff. In my opinion, this would be a bad approach.

[Correspondent] As far as military personnel are concerned, last year, for instance, 100 percent more professional servicemen than planned left the Armed Forces, and among the officers there is anxiety about the ideas that appear regarding amendments to the act on old-age pensions for professional servicemen. On the other hand, you have said that you will not sign any act that will change the professional servicemen's financial standing, including changes to the existing pensions system. So how are we to view this?

[Kwasniewski] That is how it will be. I believe that the really worrying thing is the first report you have cited because we are facing this phenomenon. It is not a forecast but a fact that at present there are a great many submissions or reports of resignation and this concerns those who have opportunities to find new jobs in the labor market, that is specialists. This is a very dangerous phenomenon with which we have to cope, above all by ensuring proper pay and proper working conditions for these people whom the Polish Army—that is, to be more modern—needs.

As far as the amendments to legislation are concerned, I could give some reassurance here. I believe we are dealing with speculations here rather than intentions. As far as I am concerned, there is no doubt whatsoever that today we cannot amend the legislation that was only recently drawn up. Some of it was drawn up two or three years ago and, at the time, it was treated as a clear way of meeting the needs of the forces, the servicemen and officers. I think we should leave it. Perhaps it requires some corrections, but we certainly should not go back on it.

But the thing that is of key importance is to give the Polish Army prospects. In unofficial talks I have with generals, they say that every president had an opinion on the Armed Forces. About Jaruzelski it was said that he knew the forces, that he was a specialist; about Walesa, that he liked the forces. Whatis it going to be with Kwasniewski? And I told them that I would like to go down on record as the one who modernized the forces, who indeed was able very specifically to help along the road of which we have traveled only a third.

Two-thirds of the road is still ahead of us—equally the sorting out of internal, financial issues, as well as the issue of rearmament and, above all, the determination of which strategic system these Polish forces are to operate in, because undoubtedly the prolonging debate about the presence in NATO does create an impression of a vacuum in the international dimension. I would like to do everything in my power so that these conditions of modernization can be very consistently determined, so that we do not have the situation where one year we have so much of something, but next year there might not be any, or perhaps there could be some. Here we do need plans for several years.

[Correspondent] Mr President, perhaps we could change the subject a little. You spoke about NATO...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] Well, today is 8 March, Women's Day, but you, gentlemen, keep on about the military...

[Correspondent] But we wanted yet another subject, also a serious one...

[Kwasniewski, continuing] All the nice girls love a soldier, as we all know, but I think we should somewhere at least refer to today's holiday.

[Correspondent] You have spoken about the forces, you have spoken about NATO, but apparently when prioritizing our foreign policy and its main objectives you sold the issue of NATO entry in favor of first joining the European Union. The union is more important than NATO.

[Kwasniewski] I do not know on what basis you maintain this...

[Correspondent, interrupting] Such commentaries have appeared after your visits and statements, about what was being said abroad...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] These commentaries are wrong because I believe that this problem is altogether presented artificially. When I am asked by Western politicians for instance about how I see this—should it be the Union first and NATO later?—I say: Gentlemen, this cannot be determined like this. Why? Because we have two different matters.

The European Union—politically that is an easier decision, we could say that to all intents and purposes it has already been made. But in practice it is a horrendously difficult decision. We will begin negotiations six months after the end of the intergovernmental conference, these negotiations are going to continue, they are enormous, they mean writing several thousand pages about actions both on the Union side and on the Polish side. Well, we will do everything to complete these negotiations as soon as possible. So politically it is easier, but in practice it is difficult.

With NATO we have exactly the opposite situation. In practice this is a lot easier because it is an issue of entering structures, it is an issue of one aspect of life in Poland, that is the Armed Forces. But politically...

[Correspondent, interrupting] We need agreement.

[Kwasniewski] That is right. Politically this is incomparably more difficult, because for the time being we have Russia's very sharply expressed opposition. It was being expressed especially decisively during the course of the presidential elections. And I believe we will still have to make great efforts and convince our partners so that we end up overcoming this Russian reluctance.

So seeing as we have here the decision about NATO that is politically difficult although easier in practice, how can we coordinate these two issues in time? They have to run side by side. It could happen that they will take place at a very similar time; it could happen that one of them could come first and the other second.

[Correspondent] And how do you want to convince the Russians? You speak about overcoming the Russian reluctance. How is this to be done in practice? (?And also the issue of the Suwalki corridor)...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] I can tell you right now...

[Correspondent] That is right. What are your contacts with Russia going to be? Because, as we know, you are very active in the international arena, because we have had Bonn, Paris, Brussels, Davos, Budapest, Vilnius, and let us nominally say Bratislava because we had Slovakia? But when is Russia coming?

[Kwasniewski] In early April. We will pass on the decision or information about the dates during the approaching visit by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Primakov, who is coming here next week. And there we will also talk about these fundamental issues.

How do we convince Russia? Well, it is difficult, but I believe possible on one condition. Russia has to overcome its stereotype of seeing NATO. During my conversation with the ambassadors in Brussels, with all 16 of the NATO ambassadors, one of them asked me how I wanted to convince Russia, which is against NATO expansion. And I said: You know, you are mistaken. Russia is not against NATO expansion because that is still a theoretical issue. Russia is against NATO. Russia is more against you than it is against me. Because the Russians see NATO as a component of the old system, as a child of the Cold War, as a bloc that was oriented against Moscow, against the Soviet Union, and there they have no basic confidence that the function of NATO has changed in the modern world. It has changed because now NATO is becoming a necessary component, the basis of a new system of European security in which there has to be room equally for Poland, for the Czech Republic, and for Lithuania, and also in the long term for Ukraine and Russia because, if we want to speak of a comprehensive security system, that is how it should be seen and that is what it should be called.

I believe that if there is so much distrust of NATO, my argument to the Russians is as follows: If you want to see a different NATO, it has to expand. Because NATO will have to undergo a fundamental change, reform, the moment the first countries of the former Warsaw Treaty enter. Because it will no longer be the conservative structure that has been operating for years and has its own internal procedures. It will have to change because it will have to absorb new members with other experiences and with somewhat different traditions.

And, as I say, this will not be directed against Russia. It will not be an attempt—because that will be a real mistake—to erect a wall now or to erect a bloc border on the Bug [River]. With that we will lose a great deal.

It has to be a component of the construction of a new security architecture in Europe, and I believe that some Russian politicians understand this although they do not say so aloud, although among a great many there still prevails imperial thinking, the thinking that if we do not have to have NATO closer to our borders then let's not, what's the point.

But I think this runs contrary to the logic of the process that began in Europe in 1989 and that is continuing, and I think the most important Western politicians also know this. When I hear NATO Secretary General Solana or German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, they say the same thing. And that is the logic of the process that is taking place in Europe. It has to be connected with NATO expansion, because otherwise it will mean regression.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, and what about this well-known Suwalki corridor? Is it a minor issue that has suddenly grown into a problem by being magnified by the media, or could it indeed be a problem in talks? Could the Russians raise it somewhere?

[Kwasniewski] We will see. So far it has not been raised anywhere. From what I hear, the Russian and Belarusian sides have also started to backpedal somewhat.

Well, our reply is clear and unequivocal and there can be no doubts here. Prime Minister Cimoszewicz has spoken about this, Minister Rosati has done so, as recently have I in public during the visit to Vilnius. Whoever asks Poland for an exterritorial corridor will receive a negative response. Because generally in the practice of international life this idea has never worked, it was always a source of much conflict.

On the other hand, if someone wants to talk to us about a transport system, the system of roads in Poland, and what needs to be done so that these roads are safe and so that Poland's position is used as a transit country, then we are open to suggestions. Poland is interested in this. We are building, we have plans for highways between the east and the west, which will connect Western Europe and Russia. There is Via Baltica, which is the road that is to connect the north and the south.

We are certainly not going to run any highways there, in the north of Poland, because these are ecologically exceptional areas, there is the Bialowieza Forest, the Augustow Forest, it will be a crime against nature to do so. But, of course, the roads that are there, we want to widen them, we want to make them safer, better, to have greater capacity. There are no doubts about that.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, let us finally change the subject for a moment. Have you heard the names of the new candidates for the head of public television in place of Chairman Walendziak? And, generally, how did you receive Mr. Walendziak's resignation?

[Kwasniewski] Gentlemen, I think it is very lucky for the president that he does not have to take part in this. And as a viewer I am in luck because I have cable television and I have so many programs to choose from...

[Correspondent, interrupting] You do not watch our public television?

[Kwasniewski] I do from time to time, but when it exasperates me I can always switch over to CNN, for instance, where I receive news without the ideological poison and that is very comprehensive.

But to put it clearly, I do not deal with this. The decisions are up to the Television Supervisory Board and we will see what they will amount to.

[Correspondent] We ask because today's papers, among others, are full of reports about the new candidate's name, Ryszard Miazek, and it is being said that the SLD has finally reached an arrangement with the PSL [Polish Peasant Party], betrayed Mr. Walendziak, and Mr. Miazek is going to be new (?chairman)...

[Kwasniewski, interrupting] The SLD betrayed Walendziak?

[Correspondent] That's right.

[Kwasniewski] So there was some secret arrangement between them? Well, I did not know that.

I will say this slightly tongue in cheek. Until my name appears on that list, I am not going to lose any sleep over it. There is no point examining candidacies here. We will see. I think it is a question of a few weeks' time.

At any rate, I would like public television to stabilize and be a true public television in the sense of that word. And I am glad that I am here, at Polish Radio, which, unlike its younger sister is not undergoing such shocks. I think this is evident from the quality of programs, it is also evident from the credibility of its rating among the listeners—it has one of the highest—and that's what I would like to congratulate you for, gentlemen.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much.

[Kwasniewski] But I would like one more word here, because we are about to finish and today is 8 March, and I would never be forgiven for this. I would like to take this completely exceptional opportunity to wish all ladies...

[Correspondent, interrupting] Did you buy anything for your wife, Mr. President?

[Kwasniewski] I am in favor of the idea of Women's Day lasting throughout the year, so that you can bring flowers not just because of a special occasion. But, seeing as we have such a day, I would like to wish all ladies best wishes, to wish them success, love, satisfaction with their experiences both at home and at work. I would like the coming days and months to be the best possible for all of us and especially for the ladies.

And to the gentlemen I request that they treat women with respect throughout the year because 8 March is often the day when men manifest what I call expansive courtesy, and it would be good if this courtesy were to last not only today, but also throughout the year.

[Correspondent] Did you get anything for your wife apart from a flower, Mr. President?

[Kwasniewski] Well there will be a very nice bunch for all the ladies with whom I work and also something small, something symbolic.

But to all the ladies—my best wishes.

[Correspondent] The president of the Polish Republic, Aleksander Kwasniewski, was your guest, ladies and gentlemen.

[Kwasniewski] Thank you very much.

Poland: Prime Minister Visits Police Headquarters

WS0803135096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 8 Mar 96 p 6

[Article by "WROB": "Cimoszewicz Visits Police Headquarters; No More Changes in the MSW"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no additional money for the police for the time being. During yesterday's meeting with Police Chief Jerzy Stanczak, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz did declare that combating crime belongs to the government's priorities but advised seeking improvement of the situation in organizational changes within the police and cooperation with self-governments instead of in additional subsidies. MSW [Interior Ministry] Chief Zbigniew Siemiatkowski suggested that the Vistula Military Units can relieve the police of some tasks but did not disclose which ones. Asked about the role of the police following the reform in the MSW, he announced "evolutional transformations, along with reform of the center and the administration structure of the country." "I have exhausted the quota of changes in the ministry," he added.

Poland: Skepticism About Changes at Interior Ministry

96EP0033A Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA in Polish 15 Feb 96 No 7, p 1

[Article by Andrzej Patula: "Continuing the Change"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In one of his public comments, the new minister of internal affairs, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, has declared that the initiatives of his predecessor, Jerzy Konieczny, will be continued. From the mouth of this longtime PZPR activist, close associate of Aleksander Kwasniewski, and party colleague of Jozef Oleksy, such a prediction sounds menacing, to say the least.

For, what had Konieczny been able to initiate within less than a month? What steps were taken by that formere minister that are so much liked by the current minister?

We certainly do not know about many of them, but as for those which public opinion has found out about, they place both Konieczny and Siemiatkowski in an unfavorable light.

As recently as last December, Jerzy Konieczny, as the adviser to Prime Minister Oleksy at that time, tried to prevent the transmittal to the military procurator of a motion to institute criminal proceedings against a person with the pseudonym "Olin," on the grounds of activities on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. Ryszard Bugaj recently disclosed that Konieczny undertook this mission on the recommendation of President-elect Kwasniewski, who had already, on 12 December 1995, learned about the charges against Oleksy.

Konieczny was to persuade Minister Andrzej Milczanowski to suppress this affair. Moreover, he discussed with the then presidential chief of staff, Stanislaw Iwanicki, the possibilities for averting the transmittal of that case to the military procurator. We do not know what "trade" offers Konieczny made to both politicians. What matters is that they were unequivocally rejected, and so the machinations of Oleksy's adviser foundered. How else can Konieczny's role in this affair be characterized, other than as an attempt to impede or subvert criminal proceedings?

Moreover, Konieczny did not quit trying. Apparently moved deeply by the weight of the charges against his patron, he continued, after being appointed minister by Kwasniewski, to try and influence the course of the proceedings in the Oleksy affair. At a hearing of the Sejm committee investigating the participation of Polish special services, Konieczny did not hesitate to try and undermine the credibility of the UOP (Office for State Protection) materials incriminating Oleksy. He also had no qualms about declaring that two high UOP officials, the generals Czempinski and Fonfara, shared with him their doubts about the credibility of the charges. During a confrontation it turned out, however, that Konieczny had departed from truth.

The role which Konieczny tried to play in the further course of the affair—as keeper of the related documents and the probably agreed-upon, but odd, letters sent to the UOP by the military judge advocate general—is unclear and ambiguous. Moreover, almost immediately upon assuming the post of minister, Konieczny declared publicly that Andrzej Milczanowski had been too hasty in transmitting materials on the Oleksy case to the procurator. It was only the appeals of Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych for a restraint to his comments that put a halt to Konieczny's tendency to speak like an unauthorized counsel for the defense.

The strenuous attempts of Minister Konieczny to convince public opinion about Prime Minister Oleksy's innocence were nothing other than an inadmissible attempt to influence the procurator's decision. And it is not at all unlikely that Zbigniew Siemiatkowski now intends to continue these attempts. Even more so considering that it was precisely Siemiatkowski, like Konieczny, who spoke out in favor of Oleksy's innocence even before the procurator's decision. He claimed, for example, that the evidence in the case of the prime minister "is insufficient for charging him with deliberate actions injurious to the Polish state." The grounds upon which Siemiatkowski made this claim are unknown, but it is surprising that both the former and the present ministers of internal affairs are of the same opinion on the Oleksy affair.

Both may boast of their skill in executing the political orders of their employers. Both deemed it right to commit themselves to defending "Olin." As the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Siemiatkowski, like Konieczny, does not, at any rate, present the impartial and nonpartisan stance required for exercising his office. What is more, Siemiatkowski has openly declared his intention to continue the actions of his predecessor.

By now few remember that it was precisely Jerzy Konieczny who, as the head of the UOP in 1992, signed Secret Instruction 0015 authorizing the Office for State Protection to conduct the surveillance and investigation of groupings of the political opposition. To be sure, that instruction was waived, but now no obstacle exists any longer for Zbigniew Siemiatkowski to revert, by way of "continuation," to the methods tried and tested by Konieczny.

Poland: MON Department Chief Dismissed for Arms Sales

WS0803141496 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by "LUZ": "Cleaning at MON"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The dismissal of General Henryk Mika (chief of the MON [Ministry of National Defense] Department for Supplies of Military Equipment and Armament) was connected with recent reports by NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control]. Thus, ZYCIE WARSZAWY's report of 7 March was confirmed by MON Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak. Mika was considered to be closely connected with [former Presidential Chancellery Chief] Mieczyslaw Wachowski and [Chief of General Staff] Tadeusz Wilecki. NIK criticized the activities of the general—his organization of tender sales of military jeeps and sales of combat vehicles to Angola without the knowledge of the former MON chief. The MON spokesman added that, as recommended by NIK, the activities of Gen. Mika will be subject to assessment by the MON Commission for Budgetary Discipline.

Poland: Jaskiernia Heads Sejm Legislative Commission Again

WS0803135396 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 8 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by "LUZ": "The Sejm. Jaskiernia Chairs the Legislative Commission; He Did Not Go to Canada but Became Commission Chairman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The only deputies who objected yesterday to Jerzy Jaskiernia's returning to the post of Sejm Legislative Commission chairman were two Freedom Union representatives.

Jaskiernia chaired the commission early in this parliament's term. However, when the Oleksy Cabinet was formed, he abandoned the commission in favor of the Justice Ministry. He was soon accused of defending the interests of his own party—that is, Social Democracy of the Polish Republic—by exerting influence on the legal proceedings conducted in the cases of Aleksander Kwasniewski and Ireneusz Sekula. Jaskiernia decided that public prosecutors who were negatively assessed six years ago should be put back in their posts. Also, he did not agree to the resumption of the proceedings in the case of the "Moscow loan" for the Polish United Workers Party.

Four highly respected prosecutors and one deputy minister protested the introduction of politics into the ministry; some of them left of their own accord, and some were dismissed.

Because (as a result of protests from Polish Peasant Party politicians) there was no place for Jaskiernia in the new cabinet, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] decided to once again entrust him with the chairmanship of the constitutional commission.

"It is a very good thing that Jerzy Jaskiernia is coming back to us. He is a good lawyer, mediator, and organizer," SLD's Wit Majewski said, while recommending him for this post. No other candidacies were submitted.

Jaskiernia was backed by 14 deputies of the coalition and Janusz Szymanski of the Union of Labor. "Please accept my sincere congratulations," he told Jaskiernia, overjoyed.

The new chairman thanked the deputies for the confidence they had placed in him.

Poland: President Makes SdRP Successor of PZPR Property

WS0803152096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 8 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "AN": "The President Signed a Law Advantageous for the Social Democracy. The PZPR Supports the SdRP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *President Aleksander Kwasniewski has withdrawn Lech Walesa's veto and signed amendments to the law on taking over the property of the former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], which are advantageous for the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic].*

The SdRP is now the successor of the PZPR's property. Owing to this law, an inventory of the former PZPR's property will be taken. It will become known what has remained of it and what has been taken over by the State Treasury and the SdRP, we heard from presidential spokesman Antoni Styrczula. It is impossible to end legal procedures connected with settling the former PZPR's financial commitments to its creditors without signing the amendments.

There have been several court sentences against the SdRP for using the former PZPR's property, to which the Social Democrats had no right according to a law passed in 1990. Nonetheless, they have sold a building in Krakow and a company and vehicles in Gdansk, for example.

A Remedy for the SdRP's Condition?

According to Tadeusz Iwinski (SLD [Democratic Left Alliance]), member of the SdRP Supreme Council, the president's decision will improve the material situation of the SdRP: "We will not be able to pay our debts without the amendments. The SdRP is so poor that the party's voivodship headquarters are located in deputies' offices, and SLD parliament members had to give a few millions [currency not specified] each for Kwasniewski's campaign."

At the same time, Walesa substantiated his veto in the following way: If the amendments are implemented, the SdRP will be able to legally grab a portion of the former PZPR's property. Let us recall that, according to the old law passed in 1990, the property, except for "money coming from membership fees," became the property of the State Treasury.

Seemingly Minor Amendments

The amendments to the bill adopted in July 1994 were vetoed by Walesa in August. For a year and a half the Sejm has not dealt with the veto, and this has enabled

Kwasniewski to withdraw it. Although we pressed for examining the veto as quickly as possible, we were not listened to, Henryk Wujec (UW [Union of Freedom]) told GAZETA WYBORCZA.

Apparently the amendments are cosmetic. However, they legalize "using" the former PZPR's property by the SdRP, even though the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that "there was no succession between the PZPR and the SdRP."

Walesa recalled that nobody "gave the SdRP possession of the former PZPR's movables and immovables." Meanwhile, the amendments passed by the Sejm, which is dominated by the SLD, give the SdRP the title of user, which may result in a situation in which the State Treasury will be unable to demand compensation from the SdRP, to which it is entitled as the owner for "using its belongings without any agreement."

The second amendment makes it possible for the SdRP to keep a building, for example, if it was purchased for membership fees. One will be able to argue that, in general, the PZPR purchased its entire property with membership fees, we can read in Walesa's explanation [to his veto]. Because the first amendment "legalizes the succession between the PZPR and the SdRP," the SdRP will become the owner of the former PZPR's property, which has not been taken over by the State Treasury.

We have asked Styrczula why Kwasniewski signed amendments that are disadvantageous for the State Treasury and make it possible for the SdRP to become rich. I have already said everything I had to say, the spokesman replied.

Poland: STP Leader Wants Good Relations With Russia

LD1003202296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Real Politics [Stronnictwo Polityki Realnej—STP] believes that Poland should strive for good relations with Russia and fears that joining NATO in its present form is disadvantageous for Poland. The first congress of the party has been holding its proceedings in Warsaw. It brings together several hundred former members of the Union of Real Politics [UPR], who do not recognize Janusz Korwin-Mikke's leadership.

Party Deputy Chairman Antoni Goliszewski said underestimating Russia was a mistake.

[Begin Goliszewski recording] Better political and economic relations with Russia are a necessity for Poland. Of course, this raises the question of whether that is possible. Well, to all intents and purposes we do not know. But much has certainly been done in Poland in the past to make these relations very bad.

Of course, we are also aware of the fact that the Russian side, too, is at fault.

Russia is a permanent component of Polish international policy. We cannot bypass Russia. We cannot in reality avoid the subject of Russia. And those who maintain that it is merely marginal to Poland's international interests are either wrong or misunderstand the Polish state imperative. [end recording]

UPR Chairman Mariusz Dzierzawski said that our ineffective efforts to enter NATO result from the West's indifference and worsen our security. He is also convinced that joining the North Atlantic pact is not a sufficient guarantee of Poland's security.

[Begin Dzierzawski recording] For the United States, relations with Russia are a much more important issue than relations with Poland. And we should consider whether in the Western states, above all in Washington, there is a political will to die for Bialystok or for Przemysl. I am convinced that the Americans, and even more so the Germans, have no intention of dying for Przemysl. [end recording]

Poland: Prospects of Olszewski's Party Analyzed

WS1103101796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by Wojciech Zaluska: "Is Olszewski's Party a Giant on Clay Legs? Only the Strongest Will Survive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Jan Olszewski has launched a political offensive. He does not want any blocs or coalitions. He is trying to dominate the right side of the political scene.*

Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] is growing stronger. Other parties are becoming increasingly weaker. "Perhaps the establishment of ROP marked a period of political Darwinism on the right wing," activists are saying.

What Do Sociologists Say to That?

ROP was formed after the presidential elections. It began to climb all ranking lists almost immediately. Here is what sociologist Pawel Spiewak has to say about this: "Many people still see the fact that the postcommunists have come to power as the biggest problem. They feel depressed and betrayed. The Freedom Union, as the party of the intelligentsia, seems helpless. Walesa does not satisfy either the moderate voters or the more 'radical' ones. The latter are trying to find some 'formula' that would be a 'substitute for him.' Olszewski, with his sharp anticommunist rhetoric, meets this demand."

A similar opinion was expressed by sociologist Andrzej Rychard: "When one political camp monopolizes the entire power in the state, it is natural that someone who symbolizes the opposite camp becomes more popular. Sharp polarization is favorable to clear-cut politicians, and Olszewski could not be more clear-cut."

A Flower of One Night?

Jacek Kurski is making efforts to maintain this image. He is the person responsible for ROP's "advertising campaign." He is controversial but efficient. In February (according to various polls), ROP enjoyed the support of 6-13 percent of the voters. Recently, at a rally in Warsaw, Olszewski said the following: "We are the only major force on the right side of the political scene. The remaining parties are in a state of disintegration."

The right wing is regularly supported by 30 percent of the electorate. A system of connected vessels is at play here. If a party's popularity goes up, others must lose out. Today all of the right-wing parties are losing out—except for ROP.

However, ROP is still a giant on clay legs. It lacks a political platform; it does not have enough experts, either. Behind Olszewski there are extreme politicians (such as Macierewicz and Parys). ROP exists thanks to the popularity of the former prime minister [Olszewski]. However, popularity is a passing thing. A person who could say something about it is Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz. Last summer she would have been elected president. However, the elections were held late in the fall. She lost quite noticeably.

ROP can also turn out to be a political "flower of one night." This is because it does not have any structures—it is only hastily trying to create them. At a rally, Olszewski shouted: "The parliamentary elections may be held as soon as the fall. We have only half a year to consolidate."

The problem is that politically active people are not numerous. In addition, most of them are already members of other parties. While building up his ROP, Olszewski must try to win over the activists of other parties. It looks like he is ready to do that. Asked about his relations with the Center Accord [PC], he replied: "There are great differences between the PC leaders and us. In regions, we readily cooperate, though."

Olszewski at the Gate

The former prime minister is aspiring to establish the main (and only?) party of the right wing. He predicts "disintegration" of most of the other groups. When Marian Pilka, newly elected chairman of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], proposed cooperation to ROP, the Patriotic Camp, and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, Olszewski replied: "It looks like Mr. Pilka has been abroad for too long. He is not familiar with the current configuration of forces." There are first signs of concern to be seen in the right wing. Support for the ZChN dropped from 1 or 2 percent. This was one of the reasons the party's leadership and image were changed. Under Ryszard Czarnecki, the ZChN abandoned fundamentalism. Frightened by Olszewski's success, it made a sudden turn to the right. Jan Lopuszanski is again in favor with the party's leadership. The ZChN is pinning great hopes on his contacts with Father Rydzyk [head of the Catholic Maryja radio station]. The Maryja radio station is to help the party regain its popularity. "The presidential elections showed its strength," says one of the party's activists. "At the beginning of the campaign, Walesa was supported by only a few percent of the voters. Thanks to the Maryja radio station, it went up immediately."

Only the Strongest Will Survive

The postcommunist left wing also has its 30-percent electorate. Instead of quarreling, it closed its ranks and formed the Democratic Left Alliance. After the the 1993 parliamentary elections, the right wing attempted to do the same. Nothing much resulted from that. More and more coalitions were formed (the Alliance for Poland, the St. Catherine Covenant...) and they broke up very quickly. Animosities were stronger than the instinct for self-preservation. Here is what a ZChN politician had to say: "Perhaps Olszewski's offensive marked a new period of political Darwinism in the right wing." "What do you mean?" "Weak parties will break up, the strongest will survive."

This is not at all so certain. Lech Walesa has returned from his political vacation. He may attract those whom Olszewski has written off.

Romania: Ethnic Hungarians To Set Up Cultural Institutions

AU1003143496 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 4 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Liviu Man: "The Ethnic Hungarians Will Set Up Their Own Schools and Cultural Institutions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Coordinating Council of the Hungarian Minority represents the Hungarian civil society in Transylvania, and it is also the representative forum of the professional and cultural organizations of the ethnic Hungarians. This Coordinating Council met in Cluj on 2 March and approved the personal autonomy draft of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], which stipulates the creation of institutions to ensure that education, culture, and other spheres of social life are administered by the representatives of the Hungarian minority.

UDMR Executive President Csazba Takacs submitted to the Coordinating Council of the Hungarian Minority the personal autonomy draft, as it was approved by the UDMR Council of Representatives last January, in Odorheiul Secuiesc. According to Takacs, the draft stipulates the creation of legislative and executive bodies of the Hungarian minority, which will administer the Hungarian language education and culture in Romania. The UDMR leader believes that "it is impossible for the Romanian men of culture, who have no idea or do not wish to study the Hungarian culture, to make specialized or administrative decisions for another culture. Decisions on the Hungarian culture and education should be taken only by those who practice them—that is, by the ethnic Hungarians themselves. Moreover, through the creation of orphanages or retirement homes, which, according to the personal autonomy draft, will also be administered by the institutions of the ethnic Hungarians, the UDMR wants to become involved in the social protection of the Transylvanian Hungarians." For the personal autonomy draft to become valid, it must be approved by the Romanian Parliament.

Romania: Police Catch Serbs Smuggling Radioactive Osmium

AU1003164396 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 4 Mar 96 p 10

[Report by "P.M.": "Radioactive Osmium Smugglers Caught at the Bors Border Crossing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the Bors border crossing, police discovered five steel cylinder containers, all vacuum sealed with the inscription "Radioactive Osmium 187," in a Mercedes with the license plates: NI 31-9999. Passengers in the car were identified as Serb citizens Alexandr Neskovic (44), Miloje Uradovic (52), and Zivorad Vranik (69). The German-language documents accompanying the shipment stated that the osmium has a concentration of 99.4 percent, and described other characteristics of the material. The papers also described the way in which delivery and payment is to be made, and as well as the addressee—namely, the Inoventure Medical Incorporated company in Switzerland. The only unspecified point is the source of the shipment. However, this is precisely what the Bihor County Police hope to find out now that they have handed over the three smugglers as well as the seized "merchandise" to the Bihor County Prosecuting Magistracy.

Slovenia: PM Drnovsek Discusses Foreign Policy With Press

AU1003184496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference today Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek spoke about certain domestic and foreign issues. Among other things, he said that the issue of foibe [caves in the Carst] raised by Italy was an anachronism incompatible with the idea of a united Europe. He also said that the relevant services are already preparing a reply to State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc's criticism of the lack of cooperation between the government and the State Chamber. Biserka Povse Tasic has some highlights from the news conference:

[Begin recording] [Drnovsek] The state is functioning normally, as is the government. The government consolidated itself following the coalition changes, and my opinion of its work in the past month is that things are running normally and the new ministers have familiarized themselves with their work.

[Tasic] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek devoted special attention to the foreign policy platform that the government forwarded to the State Chamber. The government document, according to him, represents Slovenia's optimal strategy towards the European Union, NATO, and other foreign policy aspirations of our country.

[Drnovsek] I would like to point out that we have decided to propose to the State Chamber that Slovenia file a request for full membership in the European Union this year regardless of whether it signs the associate membership agreement in the meantime.

[Tasic] The government expects the signing to take place during Italy's mandate. In the opposite case, its opinion is that Slovenia has done everything within its power. Some other foreign policy highlights from today's news conference are:

At some point the government anticipates a referendum on Slovenia's membership in the European Union. Due to the internal political blockades in Italy, it is questionable whether Slovenia will sign the associate agreement during Italy's presidency.

Regarding domestic economic policy in the future, the prime minister stressed: First, the government is studying the option of a general reduction in the contributions for the entire economy, which would boost the effectiveness and competitiveness of our economy. Second, the prime minister supports the idea of regulating the position of physicians with a special law, as some of their expectations in this direction are justified. [end recording]

Slovenia: Italy Expects Cooperation on Genocide Charges

AU0803181396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The news from the Italian judiciary that the investigator of the massacres in foibe [caves on the Carst] had prepared a list of 82 suspects for these crimes has been circulating in the Italian and domestic public for quite some time. It includes Slovenes, Croats, and Italians. The judge in question is supposedly also preparing arrest warrants for all the suspects. According to him, these acts can be classified as genocide; therefore, a crime that never becomes obsolete. Our Rome correspondent Jure Pengov visited prosecutor Pititto and learned, among other things, the following:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] Investigating Judge and Prosecutor Pititto claims that the investigation is still under way, that there is still a long way until it is concluded, and that he will use all possible sources and proofs before closing it, including contacts with historians and archives wherever they may be. He did not even exclude the possibility of ordering the exhumation of victims in foibe on Italian territory.

He has issued assurances that the news about the number and the names of the suspects did not leak from his office, but he refuses to either deny or confirm them, maintaining that the investigation continues.

When asked whether he expected that Slovenia and Croatia would hand over any possible suspects, Pititto says:

[Pititto in Italian with superimposed translation] I believe that it is in the interest of everyone—the individuals and the country—to prevent crimes of this sort from being repeated. I am, therefore, confident that I will receive everyone's cooperation when needed. [end recording]

Slovenia: Poll Shows No Major Changes in Party Popularity

AU0603185696

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene in its 4 March edition on pages 1, 2, and 3 carries the results of its monthly opinion poll on the popularity of Slovene politicians and political parties. The author of the report, S.P., in the introduction explains that the poll was conducted among 718 randomly chosen telephone subscribers on 27 and 28 February.

As he says, 221 respondents voted Prime Minister Drnovsek "the personality of the month." He was followed by Foreign Minister Thaler, who reportedly won half as many votes as Drnovsek, President Kucan, Social Democratic Party President Jansa, and Defense Minister Kacin. With the exception of Drnosvek, the article does not specify the exact number of votes won in this category.

However, S.P. observes, "the traditional DELO barometer of popularity and recognition of the Slovene politicians in public did not show any substantial change in mood compared with the previous month." Respondents were asked to rate each politician on a list of 20 with the grades: positive, in-between, negative, and don't know. As an accompanying table shows, Kucan tops the list with 69.2 percent of positive marks, followed by Drnovsek, People's Party President Podobnik, Jelko Kacin, and Janez Jansa.

Asked which party they would vote for if parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, the pollees gave the following answers:

	Percent
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	15.6
Slovene People's Party	8.6
Social Democratic Party of Slovenia	8.3
United List of Social Democrats	6.0
Slovene Christian Democrats	5.8
Slovene Democratic Party	2.4
Slovene National Party	2.0
Greens of Slovenia	1.7
Democratic Party of Pensioners	1.5
Slovene National Right	0.8
None of them	10.5
Do not know	27.0
Would not vote	9.8

Slovenia: United List Becomes Leading Opposition Party

96BA0158B Maribor VECER in Slovene 27 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Stane Pucko: "Drnovsek Without a Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The balance of power in parliament between the ruling regime and the opposition is now 45:45, and the United List has become the strongest opposition party.*

Yesterday a few minutes after noon, the State Assembly passed into the hands of the opposition. This happened at the moment when the head of the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD] caucus, Miran Potrc, said that his party was leaving the government coalition. Dr. Janez Drnovsek thus lost a majority in parliament, since his coalition had 59 seats in the State Assembly (the Liberal Democratic Party [LDS] had 30, the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] had 15, and the United List had 14). With the departure of the United List, he is left with 45 of the 99, i.e., one too few for a majority, which is needed for the more important decisions.

The balance between the ruling regime and the opposition in the State Assembly is now as follows:

—Ruling coalition: The LDS has 30 and the SKD has 15, for a total of 45.

—Opposition: The ZLSD has 14, the SLS [Slovene People's Party] has 11, the SDSS [Social Democratic Party of Slovenia] has 5, the SND [Slovene National Right] has 4, the DS [Democratic Party] has 3, the SNS [Slovene National Party] has 3, the minorities have 2, and there is one independent deputy, for a total of 45 votes.

This, of course, is the formal ratio, whereas the actual one will depend upon the cohesion of both the ruling coalition and the opposition. By crossing over to the opposition, the ZL [United List] has become the strongest opposition party. [passage omitted]

Federal

FRY: Belgrade Weekly on New Constitution Rumors

96BA0181A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 96 pp 10-12

[Article by Dragan Bujosevic: "Somebody Told Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Is official Belgrade secretly writing a constitution that will alter "Zabljak Yugoslavia" and solve three problems overnight: the relationship between the two federal units, the Albanians' dissatisfaction, and a new job description for Slobodan Milosevic beginning in 1997?*

In our country, the number of people who understand soccer is equal to the number who know anything about constitutional law, which is perhaps a completely natural consequence of the fact that since the death of Josip Broz, more people here have written state constitutions than have filled out tax returns. It costs nothing, but you can use your imagination and be important.

Certainly more interesting than these amateur attempts are the forebodings that, at this very moment, behind closed doors, some powerful person is "producing a document" that will soon be interpreted, praised, attacked, and so on, for days on end, and that will become the basic tool for judges on the Constitutional Court. After all, the quick adoption of the first constitution of the third Yugoslavia (concluded in Zabljak amid the isolation guaranteed by an altitude of 1,450 meters above sea level, the highest inhabited place even in Greater Yugoslavia), the clandestine behavior of top political figures here, the fact that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's term of office ends in 1977 [as published], the U.S. insistence on a new approach to the situation of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija—all of this has spurred curiosity and increased the number of people on the hunt for a new constitution.

The Montenegrin weekly MONITOR is the latest to brag about its catch, citing circles "that are very well informed about activities at the top echelons of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]." These circles have told MONITOR that once again it is Ratko Markovic who is drawing up a new constitution, based upon Miodrag Jovicic's model and emulating the German Constitution, under which Yugoslavia would comprise four provinces (Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo and Metohija, whereby the first two would have higher status), with autonomy for Sandzak.

Slovene Amputation

The Federation would "be based, de facto, on a unitary concept," while its president would be exceptionally strong. Finally, MONITOR alleges that "talk of constitutional changes will begin to unfold with the opening of dialogue between Belgrade and the Albanian leadership in Kosovo." (This story is very similar to the one that "circulated" around Belgrade two months ago.)

The MONITOR author is obviously saying that "a new constitutional reform under the strictest embargo" will be a cure for three of official Belgrade's problems: Montenegrin statehood, the pacification of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, and a new job for Slobodan Milosevic.

Flirting with ambiguity as usual, Dr. Mira Markovic subsequently responded in MONITOR to three questions at once—"Will Slobodan Milosevic be a candidate for president of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in the next elections? Are changes in the federal constitution being prepared for that reason, the goal being to define the president's position, as rumor has it? There are already indications that Montenegro will not support changes in the constitution"—by saying, "To tell you the truth, we here have not yet discussed changing the constitution, at least not in a manner that would indicate that these changes will be radical. And as far as the other matter is concerned, we have not yet discussed that."

One NIN source with close ties to the state, the SPS, and the people considered to be in charge of writing a constitution, Ratko Markovic and Vladan Kutlesic, alleges that there is no talk whatsoever of a new constitution, and that this story was floated in order to "test Belgrade." Another NIN source with similar qualifications says that official Belgrade is occasionally dissatisfied with relations between the two federal units, but that it is not even considering a Slovene-type amputation ("If the people of Montenegro were to decide to leave Yugoslavia, the JUL [Yugoslav United Left] would have, at the very least, a resigned attitude toward that," Dr. Mira Markovic in MONITOR), nor is it considering doing anything more serious and sweeping to change the existing situation. Finally, Professor Jovicic tells NIN that he sees no connection between his regionalization project and the matter discussed in MONITOR. Based on how his project is being received by government circles, it can be concluded that Jovicic does not enjoy the confidence of official Belgrade. Confirmation of this can be found in the words of one of his colleagues whose knowledge is being tapped by the authorities: "Jovicic is an extreme unitarian."

The Minimum of Energy

However, Jovicic describes his model as something between a federation and a unitary state, a "third sex"—a regional state, like Italy and Spain. According to Jovicic, the existing federation cannot survive. "I have provided for 13 regions—Srem, Banat, Backa, Belgrade, Podunavlje, Sumadija, Western Serbia, Eastern Serbia, Southern Serbia, Kosovo, Old Raska, Metohija, and Montenegro—which would be represented in the Council of Regions, one of the two houses of the Federal Parliament. The president would be elected by parliament and would not have anywhere near the amount of authority that President Milosevic currently has," says Jovicic, adding that the only unitarian in Serbia is Vojislav Seselj. (We did not ask the professor why punishment was meted out to JUL figure Zoran Cicak and businessman Bogoljub Karic, who think that Yugoslavia should have one government and one assembly.)

It would be a good thing even now for NIN to enlist the aid of Zoran Djindjic, the chairman of the Democratic Party; Milan Bozic, an advisor to Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement; and Dragoljub Popovic, a member of the main committee of the Democratic Party of Serbia and its deputy in the Serbian Assembly, to find an answer to whether official Belgrade needs to write a new federal constitution in order to solve the problems noted above: relations within the federation, the status of Kosovo and Metohija, and the transformation of the weak post of Yugoslav president into one that is as strong as the current post of Serbian president.

According to Djindjic, after meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the Serbian president seemed a broken man, but the chairman of the Democrats is not drawing any far-reaching conclusions from that. On the contrary, "right now it will suffice for Milosevic to signal that he wants to negotiate with the Albanians. He has already attempted to install Bakali and Vllasi as negotiators, but it was he himself who extinguished that fire six years ago, and he will not be able to relight it. Clearly, the negotiations will drag on, Milosevic will buy time, and there will be no great drama here. The entire Yugoslav crisis has been approached on the basis of the principle of the inviolability of the republics' borders, and it would be absolutely incredible for that principle to be abandoned now, at the end of it all, in the case of Serbia. Right now, Serbia's position is 10 times stronger than it was at the onset of the Yugoslav crisis, while the Albanians' position is 10 times weaker," says Djindjic.

Milan Bozic is of a similar mind. "Milosevic will not have to change the constitution because of the different status of Kosovo. The goal of the Americans will be to preserve the reasonable authority of their policy. We must not forget that the Americans are afraid of a possible disintegration of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and this affects their policy toward Kosovo as well. Milosevic will be able to solve all the problems regarding Kosovo by legal means, not by changing the constitution. It would be more likely for the Albanians to emerge as supporters of changing the constitution." Regarding Kosovo, Bozic also recalls one of his "general conclusions" about Milosevic: "He operates according to the principle of minimal expenditure of political energy. He needed four votes to elect the chairman of the Serbian Assembly, and that is how many he secured. Then he was six votes short in forming the government, and he found exactly six votes, not seven or 10."

They Are All Federalists

Dragoljub Popovic uses the subject of Kosovo to elaborate on the concept of regionalizing Serbia, which is advocated by the Democratic Party of Serbia. "Milosevic is more likely to be forced to change the constitution from the outside, because of Kosovo and Metohija, rather than because of the internal situation: relations within the federation or his new functions. And since he is a conservative man, he might reach for a partial solution and give autonomy to Kosovo. We think the Kosovo problem should not be solved partially, but instead, the basic principle should be the equality of all citizens of Serbia. That is why we are in favor of the regionalization of Serbia, for several regions that will have equal status, equal rights, and an equal level of home rule. Regions are a modern European idea, and provinces are an anachronism. Regions lead to a decentralization of power," says Popovic, explaining that his party still does not know how many regions there should be in Serbia, that its members are currently examining that very question out in the field, but that it is essential that the question of the Albanians not be resolved separately, because "why should they have more rights than others?"

And what do Popovic and his party think about relations within the federation? "In principle, we are federalists, in part because everyone in Montenegro is a federalist, aside from the separatist liberals and Seselj's unitarians. We have no problem with a two-member federation, and I think that the problems regarding its existence are being exaggerated. The tradition of there being two Serb states in the 19th century is reason enough for the survival of the two-member federation." Precisely because they respect the Montenegrins' sensitivity with regard to their own nationhood and statehood, Kostunica's Democrats do not extend their regionalization concept to Montenegro. Naturally, one element of this respect is Popovic's fear that any moves toward unitarization by Belgrade would provoke opposition from Podgorica, "and then Milosevic would be able to arrogantly tell them to go ahead and secede."

Yellow Beam

"The opposition has been much more concerned about relations within the federation than the Socialists have, and that is the last thing that would be a point of contention between the SPS and the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists]. That is why relations between Montenegro and Serbia are insignificant as regards changing the constitution," Bozic says, shortly and succinctly.

"Milosevic is certainly not worried about relations within the federation." ("Well, of course, if the Montenegrin prime minister decides that it will not succeed, then it will not succeed. What can we do?!" was Mira Markovic's response to MONITOR's question, "What is your assessment of the JUL's prospects in Montenegro, especially in light of the statement by Prime Minister Djukanovic that the JUL will not succeed in Montenegro?") "They can be a cause of concern to him only if the Montenegrins rebel because of his new job. But I do not believe they will. Even now, they treat him like the uncrowned czar of Yugoslavia as they manage his fief unimpeded. Milosevic does not even think about Montenegro; he has more pressing matters," says Djindjic.

But that takes us to the third question regarding a possible change in the constitution if Milosevic decides to replace Lilic, whose term also expires in 1997.

"If Covic were to send the police to throw Zoran Lilic out of the president's chambers in the Palace of the Federation right now, only NASA BORBA and Studio B would report that story. That fact is the best indication of the degradation of the federal state. Such an impression could be remedied by a propaganda campaign, traces of which can be seen in the increased quantity of television reviews of Lilic's activities. But the post of president would also have to be strengthened. For that, Milosevic would have to gain the political consent of the authorities in Montenegro by offering them a decent price. If they asked for too much, they would be hit over the head with a yellow beam.' For them too, it is better to decide on this change in political dialogue, because if they set out to change the constitution, they lose their sole right to make changes. Nevertheless, that post would gain real legitimacy if the president of Yugoslavia were chosen in general elections, but that, too, would require changing the constitution," says Bozic.

American Permission

It is interesting that both Bozic and Djindjic leave open the possibility that Milosevic will remain the top figure of Serbia, even though its constitution states that no one can be elected president more than two times. (Both of them told us their method for circumventing the constitution.) The problem is that by moving to a federal post, Milosevic would leave behind a job with many powers that his successor would not be able to resist utilizing.

"Moving to the post of president of Yugoslavia, Milosevic would first create a way in which he can assume that post through general elections, while at the same time entrusting the selection of the Serbian president to the Assembly. But that would require a change in the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Or he would attempt to shift power to the new post without a major uproar, just as he did when he abolished the republic's trade payments service, placing large quantities of 'gray money' under the control of the National Bank of Yugoslavia," says Djindjic.

Dragoljub Popovic thinks that in the post of president of Yugoslavia as well, Milosevic would be able, without changing the constitution, to act just as he does today, and thus with the consent of the Americans he would be the head of Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Srpska.

Djindjic, however, thinks that this "American permission" is only temporary: "A diplomat told me in jest that he had good news. He said that in six months the territory of the former Yugoslavia will be pacified, and it will not be important who the president of Serbia is, because he will not be able to pursue foreign policy without us. At that point Milosevic will no longer be important to us."

Thus, in all this talk about a new constitution, which, like the earlier talk about a so-called Avalski constitution, is by necessity founded on a level of credibility along the lines of "I can't tell you who told me this, but it is reliable...," we have established several indisputable facts. President Lilic's and President Milosevic's terms of office expire in 1997. The former could be reelected to his current post, the latter cannot. A change in the Federal Constitution requires the consent of two-thirds of the Federal Council of the Yugoslav Assembly and of both federal units. A change in the Serbian Constitution requires the support of two-thirds of the deputies to the Serbian Assembly, followed by 50 percent plus one of the votes cast in a referendum.

FRY: Kontic on Normalization With Ex-SFRY Republics

AU0803205996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 96

[Report by Marina Stojadinovic on statement by FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic at the ceremony marking the 60th anniversary of Radio Yugoslavia in Belgrade on 8 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stojadinovic] This anniversary is a chance to recall the role the radio has played as one of the oldest and most important information means. The truth about Yugoslavia, its state policies, and the aspirations of its citizens have always been present throughout the world thanks to Radio Yugoslavia, FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said. He added that this truth is a strong contribution to Yugoslavia's European and progressive roots, as well as the promotion of our liberation and antifascist tradition.

The basic commitment in our foreign policy, Kontic stressed, is a consistent implementation of the signed peace agreements to which the FRY would continue to give its full contribution. In that connection, the federal prime minister stressed:

[Kontic] Now we have entered the period of normalization of diplomatic relations with the world and their promotion into the ambassadorial level, which is very important for the recognition of the continuity of our state. In that connection, the normalization of relations with the former Yugoslav republics is of particular importance. The FRY is conducting very lively diplomatic activities to that end.

Now that peace in the Balkans has finally been achieved following so many efforts, it is necessary that the efforts by the international community should be directed without discrimination at the reconstruction of the entire area of the former Yugoslavia and the region in general. [passage omitted]

FRY: Official on Normalizing Relations With Zagreb

LD1003161796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1540 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, Mar 10 (TANJUG)—The head of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's bureau in Zagreb Veljko Knezevic said Sunday [10 March] that Croatia had finally understood and accepted Belgrade's view that the normalization of bilateral relation can be achieved only step by step.

Knezevic said in an interview to Radio Kragujevac (town in Central Serbia) on the eve of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic's visit to Croatia that many steps had yet to be taken until full normalization.

Tensions between Yugoslavia and Croatia have abated thanks to both countries' efforts, Knezevic said, adding he personally wished the situation was even better.

However, even the present situation is favorable for talks and reaching agreements in a calm atmosphere, in peace and far from war, and in line with the Dayton Agreement that Yugoslavia is implementing to the letter, Knezevic said.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milutinovic and his Croatian counterpart Mate Granic will discuss especially the draft agreements on road, railway and air transports and air corridor, Knezevic said, adding he expected some of these ageereements to be signed during the visit.

Knezevic added that the agenda of the Zagreb talks should also include the implementation of the agreement reached between Zagreb and representatives of Serbs from the Srem-Baranja region (eastern Slavonia, Baranja, Western Srem) on finding a peaceful solution for the region, as well as some other issues.

FRY: Foreign Minister Milutinovic Leaves for Croatia

LD1103091096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0818 GMT 11 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic left today for a visit to Croatia, during which current bilateral issues will be discussed.

Milutinovic will hold talks with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, and is expected to be received by President Franjo Tudjman.

Milutinovic is on a return visit, because Granic visited Belgrade in early February.

Special attention will be paid to possibilities of improving certain aspects of bilateral cooperation, such as the normalization of transport, postal and other links.

FRY: Possibilities for Cooperation With Moldova Viewed

LD1003210796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2014 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, March 10 (TANJUg)—Yugoslavia and Moldova have excellent possibilities for an all-round development of their mutual political and economic relations, Yugoslavia's Kiev-Based Ambassador to Ukraine and to Moldova Gojko Dapcevic said Sunday [10 March].

Dapcevic told TANJUG that the upcoming visit of a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation to Chisinau would be an opportunity for the two sides to define the legal framework for the regulation of their mutual relations.

The Yugoslav ambassador said Moldova was highly interested in cooperation with potential partners in Yugoslavia, especially in the agriculture and industries.

The Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, headed by Lower House Speaker Radoman Bozovic, is due in Chisinau Monday for talks with Moldova parliamentarians on the promotion of political and economic cooperation between the two countries.

The talks will be the first official contact between the parliamentarians of the two countries.

The three-day visit will take place at the invitation of Moldova's Parliament President Petru Luchinskiy.

Bozovic is to hold talks with Luchinskiy and to be received by Moldova President Mircea Snegur, according to sources here.

FRY: Lilic, Belarus Prime Minister Discuss Cooperation

AU0803152696 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the second day of his official visit to the Belarus Republic, FRY President Zoran Lilic held talks with this country's Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir. Here is a report by Dusan Vojinovic:

[Begin recording] [Vojinovic] At the beginning of the talks, President Lilic thanked Belarus for its consequent and principled policy regarding the FRY, and assessed the talks he held with Belorus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Supreme Soviet Chairman (Shareckiy) as very successful.

Important interstate agreements were signed yesterday; parliament President (Shareckiy) said that the Belarus Supreme Soviet will ratify them as soon as possible.

Mikhail Chigir stressed that the visit paid by President Lilic and the Yugoslav delegation will provide strong stimulus to the relations between the two countries. Yugoslavia experienced strong development until 1990, Prime Minister Chigir said, and added that the resolution of the crisis that hampered the further development of Yugoslav economy had created conditions for an economic renewal of the country.

Following the talks that the two delegations held behind closed doors, President Lilic and Prime Minister Chigir addressed journalists:

[Lilic] [Words indistinct] tried to talk in more detail both about the agreements that have been signed, as well as about those that have been put aside for (?hypothetical) reasons, but that will be very soon considered by both delegations, and signed in a very short time. This is why we wish to improve on these (?texts) as much as possible. There is also the thought of the possibility of establishing a free trade zone or some form of customs union. [Word indistinct] will think about and take care about all that, and [words indistinct] in the interests of both the Republic of Belarus and the FRY to find the best possible solution.

Today we [words indistinct] talked about it, and I thank your president... [corrects himself] your prime minister for the possibilities that will enable us to reach arrangements that will be very useful; for the economy of the FRY. However, I am certain that the FRY also has something to offer the Republic of Belarus, and that the cooperation will be held to both sides' benefit. I believe that this is so, and that there is no reason not to believe it and not to expect the coming [words indistinct].

[Chigir, in Russian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The Belarus and Yugoslav Governments will do everything to create mutually complementary economies. Following the hard times after 1990, the time has come for us to establish mutually useful cooperation in many spheres and to the extent we had before. Above all I mean agriculture, because we know that agriculture and food processing industry in Yugoslavia have kept their potentials. As we are already importing food items from many countries, why would we not do so from Yugoslavia? In return for that, we will deliver you the technical products you need. As these have been difficult times for Belarus and even harder for Yugoslavia, in the shortage of money, we hope to be able to use barter deals. [passage omitted] [end recording]

FRY: Lilic Demands Equal Treatment for B-H Parties

AU0803180996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 96

[Report by Jugoslava Zagorac on news conference by FRY President Zoran Lilic in Belgrade on 8 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Zagorac] [Passage omitted] Immediately upon arrival, FRY President Zoran Lilic addressed reporters in the Belgrade airport lounge:

[Lilic] We have just returned from the really friendly country of Belarus with, if you like, a basic impression that the visit was extremely successful on all counts. I think that there is no reason for us not to be satisfied with what we have done. We reached a high level of agreement in the political, economic, and every other sphere.

What is important is that the Republic of Belarus, the Belarus Assembly and Government, and President Lukashenka himself have all given absolute support to the policy that the FRY is conducting when it comes to the developments on the territory of the previous Yugoslavia. The general assessment is that these areas—and when I say these areas, I am referring to areas outside the FRY, areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina—really do not need war. They need peace and revival, and economic development and cooperation among all the nations that live in these areas. Our joint conclusion was—and you know that this is the policy being conducted by the FRY—that the three sides interested in developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina must absolutely receive the same treatment when it comes to decisions on possible awards for somebody's behavior and also on possible punishment of one or the other or the third side in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What is particularly important to us are the agreements signed with Belarus, primarily the basic agreement on the cooperation signed by President Lukashenka and myself, which is the basic condition for every other cooperation. Another seven agreements were also signed. All seven refer to the possibility of cooperation in communications and other economic spheres, and agriculture and everything else that is in the interest of the two sides.

It is also very important that we were welcomed truly cordially and warmly, that we had a chance to hold talks in the Belarus Academy of Sciences, and that we received support for everything that we have been doing in the region from such prominent and wise people such as academicians. I am sure that the scientific, cultural, and every other cooperation between our republics will intensify. [passage omitted]

FRY: Serbian Bishop Urges Serbs To Return to W. Bosnia

LD1103132196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1301 GMT 11 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Mar. 11 (TANJUG)—A Serbian Orthodox dignitary has appealed to Serbs to return to Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar, Petrovac and other towns in western Bosnia that are now part of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Bishop Chrysostom of Bihac and Petrovac said 'I have appealed to the people to return because Bosnian Serb political leaders, by displacing Serbs from western Bosnian municipalities, perhaps want to hold the people accountable for the misfortune that has befallen them.'

He said Sarajevo was a sad sight not only because of the migration of Serbs, but because it showed how the Bosnian Serb political leadership judged the people.

People deserving of respect and political wisdom are leaving Sarajevo, now when all human rights and international protection have been guaranteed them, said Chrysostom.

Instead of persuading the Serbs to remain in Sarajevo by positive political methods, the Bosnian Serb leaders keep setting out the impossibility of coexistence with other ethnic groups and incredulity in the international community, said Chrysostom.

Such behavior should be condemned and is not only a political, but a national, failure, he said.

No one has the right to renounce Serb heritage, Serb traditions and Serb territories, which will happen unless the Serbs return to their territories, said the bishop.

'We must take advantage of the international mediators who are here precisely to implement the peace accord, of which a key provision is the right of everyone to return to their homes,' said Chrysostom.

'The West wants us to show them our trust, minimum belief in their intentions. If we do so, the world will be obliged to be honest with us. That is why I call on Serbs driven away from western Krajina to return to their homes,' said the bishop.

FRY: Economic Delegation To Visit Bosnian Serb Republic

LD0903164196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1335 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 9 March (SRNA)—Dr. Mihailo Milojevic, chairman of the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy will lead a delegation to Banja Luka and Bijeljina on 10-11 March as part of its visit to the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

The Yugoslav delegation is made up of over 20 directors of big Yugoslav concerns in the fields of electricity generation, construction, iron and steel, electronics, post and telecommunications and transport.

The Yugoslav business personnel, during their visit to the Serb Republic, are to have talks with representatives of the Serb Republic's government on reconstruction and the scope for expanding economic cooperation between the two republics. Visits to Cajavec [Banja Luka-based electronics company] and Vitaminka are also envisaged.

Serbia

Serbia: DS Warns of Authorities' Plans To Disrupt Rally

AU0803165196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Police From Nis Went to Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nis—"Six buses with police left yesterday for Belgrade from Nis, in order to efficiently to prepare for the 9 March rally," deputy chairman of the Democratic Party [DS] Zoran Zivkovic stated yesterday.

He invited the citizens of Nis to take part in the rally, which will be held in Freedom Square in Belgrade, although, as he pointed out, it is less than probable that he will succeed in mobilizing them. "It has happened on similar occasions that the authorities simply cancelled certain bus services and even held up trains leaving for Belgrade, so it is realistic to expect such things to happen this time, too," he said.

Serbia: Authorities' Bid To Disrupt 9 Mar Rally Reported

AU0803170896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Everybody Is Preparing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dimitrovgrad: Posters announcing the 9 March opposition rally in Belgrade are torn down.

Pancevo: On the eve of an announced organized trip to the rally in Belgrade, a lawsuit is filed against the opposition parties followed by their eviction from their offices for allegedly not paying the rent.

Novi Sad: The police receive instructions to make discreet inquiries at the bus and railroad stations about why people are travelling to Belgrade on Saturday.

Uzice: "We have organized transport by bus and many will be arriving on their own, so I expect more citizens from Uzice in Freedom Square this time than on 9 March 1991," says Bogoljub Zecevic, chairman of the Uzice branch of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement].

Kraljevo: Municipal boards of the SPO and the Democratic Party announce a joint, Gandhi-style trip to the capital.

Belgrade: The director of a Komgrac factory declares 9 March as working Saturday, explaining this by a sudden export order that needs urgent handling.

Serbia: Further on Campaign To Minimize Belgrade Rally

AU0803204096 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 96 p 16

[Article by B. Lazukic: "Horoscope and Police on the Same Task"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How to prevent the massive (announced), organized arrival from other regions of potential participators in the 9 March rally in Belgrade is the only, and probably the most acute, preoccupation of the regime in Serbia at the moment. The fear of a (im)possible critical mass in Freedom Square is causing panic and, together with the emotions generated by the historical recollection of the great rally five years ago, reveals the authorities' extraordinary imagination, ready to resort even to unmistakable, severe violations of the basic principles of the Constitution, which itself was tailored to their own needs.

These days the citizens of Novi Sad have been disturbed by the knowledge that the Secretariat of Interior Affairs in Novi Sad has received orders that a number of police should be sent to watch the railroad station on Saturday, where they will be, at their own discretion, removing suspicious passengers from trains heading for Belgrade. This information has leaked from the Interior Ministry itself, revealing the bitterness among police officers occasioned by such an order, who are probably aware that for such actions they need to have a justification, such as that to be found in an official state of emergency in the republic, which, according to the Constitution, must be announced by the president.

The rules of conduct on 9 March has been worked out in detail, even to the extent of how a dialogue should go in prepared scenarios: The police are obliged cordially and politely to ask any passenger who buys a ticket for Belgrade on that day about the reason for his visit to the capital. If, for example, a suspicious passenger answers that he is travelling to Belgrade, for example, to buy a pair of shoes, a gentle recommendation will be made by the police that for shopping some other working day is much better or some other Saturday rather this one. For the more stubborn types, the assortment of suggestions is probably more convincing! The question of whether this kind of conduct is an anticonstitutional restriction of freedom of movement (similar to the state of occupation) remains unanswered, because there is not much time for answers in the current circumstances.

This method of close encounters with the keepers of the public peace and order is the last in a series that is already being implemented. Many state-run media are directing their entire propaganda toward just one goal, to dissuade as many people as possible from even thinking about travelling to Belgrade.

To this end even horoscopes and weather forecasts are being used. According to the weather forecasters and others, in Yugoslavia precisely on 9 March a combination of all possible disasters that modern meteorology knows should be expected, from fog, precipitation of all kinds, and winds of various intensities and directions. "Your organism is susceptible to virus infections because of an increasingly apparent weariness. You should use the weekend to get the maximum rest and not leave your home. This week you should avoid any mass rallies." These are just some of the horoscope messages for this week, which ominously forecast a sudden plunge of the biorhythms for all the signs of the Zodiac. Thus, certain weekly horoscopes have happened to be doing the same work, side by side with the police.

Still, to judge from the reports so far of organized arrivals in Belgrade, the citizens of Novi Sad are obviously not being intimidated with such "foggy" views of the regime regarding the 9 March rally.

Serbia: TANJUG Reports 'Several Thousand' Attend Rally

LD0903160496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1441 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Mar (TANJUG)—A meeting organized by three parliamentary opposition parties—the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], the Democratic Party [DS], and the Civic Alliance of Serbia [GSS]—was held at Belgrade's Republic Square today. It was attended by several thousand people.

The beginning of the meeting was announced for noon, but it began half an hour later because the loudspeakers had to be mounted around the monument to Knez Mihajlo.

At the meeting, dominated by the flags of the parties which organized it, leaders of the SPO, the GSS, and the DS did not pull any punches in sharply criticizing the current political and economic situation and the authorities' activity.

They spoke firmly in favor of a united and unified opposition, stressing the need to present a single opposition list at the upcoming elections.

Pointing to poor living conditions and the low standard of living, GSS Chairwoman Vesna Pesic said the meeting was a protest of Serbia's disgruntled citizens.

She warned that there was no greater goal than a powerful and strong Serbia, because only such a Serbia can enter Europe.

DS leader Zoran Djindjic accused the Socialist Party of Serbia of "occupying the country," and said that the first step in uniting Serbia has to be a united opposition, where the "sheep have to be separated from the goats."

He thinks there are two messages to be taken from this rally—"for change, and unity."

SPO chairman Vuk Draskovic, during whose speech people began to disperse, said with his typical leadership gusto that the situation in Serbia is "worse and blacker" than five years ago.

The rally adopted 10 joint goals of the united opposition: one electoral list for the opposition; joint parliamentary and nonparliamentary actions against the regime; return of Serbia to Europe; cooperation in the Balkans; quick and economical privatization; freedom of the media; establishment of a civic society and the rule of law; radical reform of the political and economic system; a professional, nonideological, financially secure army and police; national reconciliation.

The rally, which began with the Serbian national anthemn "Boze Pravde" and a minute's silence for the victims of 9 March 1991 demonstrations and victims of the war, ended just before 1400 with the hymn "Vostani Serbije."

The rally passed off peacefully and without incidents.

Serbia: AFP: Belgrade Rally Draws 'Around 10,000'

AU0903150396 Paris AFP in English 1218 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 9 (AFP)—Around 10,000 people demonstrated against Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his government Saturday [9 March], organisers here said as police stepped up their presence in and around the capital.

Three parliamentary opposition parties organised the gathering in the city's central square to mark the fifth anniversary of a bloody demonstration against Milosevic's regime.

On that occasion in 1991, some 100,000 people called for the resignation of the head of state television, considered a government mouthpiece.

Police intervened and two people—a policeman and a teenager—died in clashes that followed before tanks were deployed to restore order.

This time police maintained a more discreet presence, patrolling the streets of the city centre, but they prevented organisers from setting up a podium.

When leaders of the three opposition parties arrived, the crowd chanted the name of one of them, writer Vuk Draskovic, and jeered at Milosevic's communist past before Yugoslavia broke up.

They waved hundreds of flags of the parties and the European Union.

On March 2,the three opposition parties had given anti-government speeches to 20,000 sympathisers in Kragujevac, an industrial city south of Belgrade.

Serbia: SRNA: 'Several Tens of Thousands' at Rally

LD0903161696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1405 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Mar (SRNA)—A protest meeting is under way in Republic Square [central Belgrade] at which the democratic opposition is marking the fifth anniversary of the 9 March demonstrations, and begins its election campaign.

The "promotional meeting for a democratic Serbia" is being attended by several tens of thousands of citizens. They are to be addressed by Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) leader Vuk Draskovic; Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic; and Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) leader Vesna Pesic.

GSS chairwoman Vesna Pesic was the first to address the meeting. She called for cooperation between all democratic forces in Serbia, stressing "the opportunity to create a democratic Serbia."

Confirming that this is not a meeting of the opposition but one of the citizens of Serbia, she stressed that opposition parties cannot change anything on their own, but that everyone has to do their bit.

The meeting was attended by opposition deputies from the republican and federal assemblies and representatives of various embassies, and about 300 Yugoslav and foreign journalists were accredited to cover it.

A large number of members of the Interior Ministry and several special armored police vehicles are stationed between the JAT [Yugoslav airline] offices and the Faculty of Law in Bulevar Revolucije street. A big police presence has not been observed in Republic Square.

Serbia: Rally Organizers Disappointed With Low Turnout

AU0903150996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The opposition held a rally in the Republic's Square in Belgrade today. The beginning of the rally was delayed by more than 30 minutes because the organizers were obviously expecting more people to come.

The organizers did not hide their disappointment with the exceptionally low turnout, which was also admitted by Vuk Draskovic himself. As usual, he tried to justify this by bad weather and the people's alleged fear of the regime.

During the meeting, traffic remained undisturbed in the central part of Belgrade and the surrounding streets. Some participants started to leave even before the end of the meeting, while Vuk Draskovic was still speaking.

Serbia: Draskovic Blames Milosevic Regime for War

LD0903171996 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 9 Mar 96

[Item received from SRNA]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Mar (SRNA-FONET)—Vuk Draskovic, the chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], demanded at the meeting at Belgrade's Republic Square today that the authorities be brought to account for everything that has happened to Serbia since the demonstrations on 9 March 1991.

"The regime's propaganda repeats that we were the vandals who destroyed Belgrade. This is the square of freedom, the square of truth; lies are crushed under our feet here, here we will see who destroyed what and how much that cost," Draskovic said.

"They have destroyed our state, turned hundreds of villages and towns into Hiroshima, made hundreds of thousands of people refugees, and forced 400,000 people to leave Serbia. What is the price of that? Someone must be brought to account for it," he stressed.

The SPO leader said that what happened on 9 March disproved the charges that the Serbs wanted war, because, he recalled, "the Serbs were the first victim, the first victims of the war fell in Belgrade, and the first communist tanks were brought out on the streets of Belgrade."

According to him, "the downfall of Serbia is not completed" because with the signing of the Dayton Agreement the president of Serbia imagined that he had been given a free hand to do as he wanted and so he, his party, his wife, and her party had embarked on the renewal and consolidation of "the communist ideals of human happiness."

"They want to turn the Freedom Square into Tiananmen [Square] where schoolchildren and students were mown down by tanks. We will not allow them to," the SPO leader said.

His message to Slobodan Milosevic was: "You have not destroyed the seed of rebellion, the seed of that Serbia that will explode in order to achieve the aims of 9 March 1991."

Draskovic had the following message for the participants in the demonstration: "We are here to ignite the fire of nationwide, peaceful but powerful resistance."

The SPO chairman appealed for votes for the list of the united democratic parliamentary opposition. "This list must win against the communists. We cannot wait, the sanctions have fallen, but Serbia is continuing to fall," the SPO leader said.

Serbia: DS Leader Says 'No Future' With Milosevic

LD0903172796 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 9 Mar 96

[Item received from SRNA]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 9 Mar (SRNA-FONET)—Zoran Djindjic, the chairman of the Democratic Party [DS], told today's rally in Belgrade's Republic Square that "the regime of Slobodan Milosevic" was the main obstacle to the renaissance of Serbia.

"If we remove those parasites from the Serbian economy, we could have twice as much even today. If they want to lead us into the 21st century, they should leave. There is no future with them," Djindjic said.

Djindjic pointed out that he was addressing "that part of Serbia that supports the regime," and added: "In the future of Serbia planned by Milosevic and his wife Mirjana Markovic there is room for only 10,000 privileged people."

"The Yugoslav left is a red Noah's arc. The [ruling] couple will put into it its 10,000 people. Is there room on it for militia? Let them consider that when they charge at us. We are on the same side," Djindjic said [sentence as received].

He said that if "this system remains in power, there will be no [Bosnian] Serb Republic," and added that the opposition is "fighting also for them (Serbs in Bosnia)."

"Serbia will win if it is united. Milosevic rules because he has broken up Serbia. The first step toward uniting Serbia is unity among the opposition," Djindjic said, and added: "We must remove the unhealthy elements from the opposition, so that some New Democracies do not happen to us again."

"We could start a new life as soon as 1997 under the condition that we remove the Milosevic regime," Djindjic said.

Serbia: Communist Leader Calls For SPS-JUL Coalition

AU0803151896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by N.T.: "Union of JUL, SPS for Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Only if the left-wing parties in Serbia unite, can they oppose the right-wing parties, Goran Latinovic, chairman of the Republican Committee of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ], said at a news conference held yesterday. According to him, this union would primarily take place between the [United] Yugoslav Left [JUL] and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS].

This union must be created by the end of the year, Latinovic pointed out. If this is not done, no left-wing party on its own will achieve the necessary "absolute majority," he explained.

Latinovic did not precisely give the method and form of this union and in fact only touched upon the term "a bloc of leftist forces." However, he pointed out that the SK-PJ will not lose its identity in any way, any more than it lost it by joining the JUL.

Latinovic described the joint appearance by Draskovic, Djindjic, and Pesic [opposition leaders] as a "dishonest alliance" that could lead Serbia into a period of instability, a significant role in which is also being played by the foreign factor.

However, Latinovic deems this joint appearance by the opposition to be one of the death throes of the right, as well as a vain attempt to return to the political scene as united.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Serb Violence in Kacanik, Urosevac Reported

AU0803203496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] sources in Kacanik issued today a report presenting accounts on the Serbian police repression against the Albanian residents in this municipality during February.

According to the report, 20 Albanian residents were subjected to physical torture under the pretext of arms possession; two families had their homes raided on; 41

persons were summoned to report to the police station for interrogation; one person had his passport seized.

Meanwhile, LDK sources in Ferizaj [Urosevac] reported that during February the Serbian police detained and interrogated 37 persons in the municipality; raided on 23 Albanian homes, adding that 14 persons were subjected to physical torture and 13 others, under unfounded suspicions of being in possession of arms, were summoned to report at the Serbian police station.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Efforts Toward Vojvodina Autonomy Reported

LD1003172896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians and organizations which demand autonomy for Vojvodina have come to an agreement that the territory belonging to Serbia [as heard] should be granted autonomy and that Hungarians living in Vojvodina should be allowed to establish their own self-government [onkormanyzat].

It also emerged at the meeting of those concerned that there are several common points which would make cooperation in the establishment of a Vojvodina autonomy and a Hungarian self-government possible.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

- — Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.
- — Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.
- — Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.